“Controversy”

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Freudenthal

Controversies are pervasive in the history of science. History is thus here also at odds with science's images. According to both traditional and contemporary views of science, there are no scientific controversies sui generis. In traditional images of science controversies are external to science proper; in some contemporary views nothing about controversies in science specifically distinguishes them from controversies in other domains. According to one traditional image, science progresses from common ground to conclusions according to secure procedures such that there is no place for disagreement nor, therefore, for controversy. According to another traditional image of science, there are no such secure procedures. On the contrary: one does and even should jump to conclusions. Whereas here subsequent criticism is called for, it seems that controversy is not. This image is built on the assumption that refutations are clear cut, so that producing a valid refutation does not require a lengthy exchange of arguments.

Author(s):  
Holger Schulze

Sound affects and pervades our body in a physical as well as a phenomenological sense: a notion that may sound fairly trivial today. But for a long time in Western history ‘sound’ was no scientific entity. It was looked upon merely as the lower, material appearance of truly higher forces: of more ephemeral, angel-, spirit- or godlike structures – and later of compositional knowledge. To be interested in sound was to be defamed as being unscientific, noncompositional, unmanly. Which steps were taken historically that gradually gave sound the character of a scientific entity? This article moves along recent science history: since the nineteenth century when the physicality of sound and later the corporeality of sonic experiences were first discovered and tentatively described. Exemplary studies from the science history of acoustics, musicology and anthropology of the senses are analysed and restudied – from Hermann von Helmholtz to Michel Serres. Even today, we may ask ourselves: What would an auditorily-founded research be like? Could there be a field of sensory research – via sensing sound?


2015 ◽  
Vol 83 (12) ◽  
pp. 4460-4464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arturo Casadevall ◽  
Ferric C. Fang

In contrast to many other human endeavors, science pays little attention to its history. Fundamental scientific discoveries are often considered to be timeless and independent of how they were made. Science and the history of science are regarded as independent academic disciplines. Although most scientists are aware of great discoveries in their fields and their association with the names of individual scientists, few know the detailed stories behind the discoveries. Indeed, the history of scientific discovery is sometimes recorded only in informal accounts that may be inaccurate or biased for self-serving reasons. Scientific papers are generally written in a formulaic style that bears no relationship to the actual process of discovery. Here we examine why scientists should care more about the history of science. A better understanding of history can illuminate social influences on the scientific process, allow scientists to learn from previous errors, and provide a greater appreciation for the importance of serendipity in scientific discovery. Moreover, history can help to assign credit where it is due and call attention to evolving ethical standards in science. History can make science better.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28

The authors start from the premise that science is an empirical manifold and then examine different ways of dealing with it. The traditional essentialist approach would construct a single “essence,” a unique and normative set of distinctive qualities that is to be found with minor variations in any branch of science. The usual elements in such a set are the concepts of fact, method, theory, experiment, verification and falsification, while any social, political and cultural processes or factors are discounted as external and collateral. This approach would provide a relatively straightforward account of what science is and reliably distinguish science from everything that is not science so that its claim to autonomy would be supported by a normative “strong” image of science. The history of science would then be reduced to a selection of illustrations of how that essence was formed and implemented. The most well-known versions of this essence and strong image are derived from a logical positivist philosophy of science and from the self-descriptions of many scientists, which are usually considered the authoritative explanation of science and often referred to when science is popularized. The authors point out some considerations that cast doubt on this privilege of self-description. Furthermore, scientificity requires that science itself become an object of specialized research. Studying the activities of scientists and scientific communities using the empirical methods of sociology, history and anthropology has exposed a divergence between the normative “strong” image and the actually observed variety of sciences, methodologies, ways to be scientists, etc. When those empirical disciplines are applied to science, they do not provide an alternative “strong” image of it, but instead construct a relativized and pluralistic “weak” one. The authors locate the crux of the dilemma of choosing between these images of science at the point where the desire to study science meets the urge to defend its autonomy. The article closes by briefly describing the current state of the history of science and outlining the possible advantages of choosing the “weak” image.


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