“Jus Ad Bellum,” “Jus in Bello,” “Jus Post Bellum?” Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 158-160
Author(s):  
Carsten Stahn
Keyword(s):  
Armed Force ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
The Law

15. The law of armed conflict

2019 ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Prisoners Of War ◽  
Armed Force ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

This chapter assesses the law of armed conflict. The right to resort to armed force, known as ‘jus ad bellum’, is a body of law that addresses the permissibility of entering into war in the first place. Despite the restrictions imposed by this body of law, it is clear that international law does not fully forbid the use of force, and instances of armed disputes between and within States continue to exist. Consequently, a second, older body of law exists called ‘jus in bello’, or the law of armed conflict, which has sought to restrain, or at least to regulate, the actual conduct of hostilities. The basic imperative of this body of law has been to restrict warfare in order to account for humanitarian principles by prohibiting certain types of weapons, or protecting certain categories of persons, such as wounded combatants, prisoners of war, or the civilian population.

scholarly journals Jus Post Bellum and Proportionality

2020 ◽  
pp. 79-96
Author(s):  
Michael A. Newton
Keyword(s):  
Armed Force ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Shadow Cast ◽  
Proportionality Principle

The chapter analyses proportionality aspects of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and their connection to jus post bellum. It argues that proportionality functions are interconnected, although they operate as independent normative frameworks. Nevertheless, each operates beneath the larger shadow cast by jus post bellum considerations. The contribution engages with misapplication of Cicero’s precept of the nexus of war and peace. While jus ad bellum concepts provide a vital safeguard against reckless usages of armed force, jus in bello proportionality delineates the outer boundaries of the commander’s appropriate discretion during hostilities. The author shows that jus post bellum provides an important bridging function that arises from the deep synergies shared by the proportionality principle embodies across respective usages.

Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Berlin Wall ◽  
Special Forces ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Use Context ◽  
Just War Tradition

Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.

scholarly journals Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus ex bello y jus post bellum

2021 ◽  
pp. 25-48
Author(s):  
Paola Alexandra Sierra-Zamora ◽  
Tania Lucía Fonseca-Ortiz ◽  
Andres Eduardo Fernandez-Osorio
Keyword(s):  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum

Necessity and Proportionality in Morality and Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-38
Author(s):  
Jeff McMahan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Law

This chapter offers a systematic analysis of the notion of proportionality in both moral philosophy and law, particularly the law of armed conflict. Proportionality is a constraint on different forms of justification for harming people. There are thus different forms of proportionality corresponding to different types of justification. The proportionality constraint should not be conflated with a different constraint—the necessity constraint—which in turn must be carefully distinguished from necessity as a form of justification. The chapter explains how the proportionality constraint and the necessity constraint are distinguished by the different comparisons they require. It further explains the relations between the requirement of proportionality in jus ad bellum and the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello and argues that the criterion of proportionality in the law of jus in bello is actually incoherent. The final section elucidates the various matters of moral theory that are relevant to understanding how the requirement of proportionality applies in practice to the action of combatants who fight in just wars.

TheJus Ad Bellum/Jus In BelloDistinction and the Law of Occupation

2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 246-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem Giladi
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Broad Scope ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Conventional Expression ◽  
The Law

This is a preliminary inquiry into the application to occupation law of the distinction betweenjus in bello(or IHL) andjus ad bellum.Under current doctrine, the two are mutually exclusive: the former applies irrespective of the “nature or origin of the armed conflict or the causes espoused by the Parties.” I argue that occupation law, although generally considered part of IHL, is intrinsically less susceptible to a strict application of the distinction.Exploring its pedigree, meaning, and rationale, the paper notes the distinction's scant, soft Conventional expression and brief history, but also its fundamental character and the broad scope attributed to it under contemporary IHL. Although the distinction sometimes fulfill important humanitarian functions in occupied territories, occupation law—in regulating governance of territory—differs from ordinary IHL norms; this and other differences render the strict application of the distinction to occupation law, whose key norms often depend on jus ad bellum references to the “nature, origin and causes” of armed conflict, impossible.The last part of the Paper calls for a more nuanced approach to the application of the distinction to occupation law and identifies some of its contours. Such an approach can enhance the efficacy of occupation law and facilitate fulfillment of the two different functions of occupation law: protection of individuals and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Paper concludes with preliminary observations on the roles and powers, under bothjus ad bellumandjus in bello,of the Security Council with regard to occupied territories.

scholarly journals Droits humains et conflits armés

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-333
Author(s):  
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer
Keyword(s):  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Jus Post Bellum ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Droits Humains ◽  
Conflits Armes

À première vue, il s’agit d’une chose et son contraire : la guerre est tellement le lieu par excellence de la violation des droits humains que leur relation semble se résumer à cet antagonisme primaire — l’un serait la négation de l’autre. La guerre viole les droits et les droits ont la paix, donc l’absence de guerre, comme condition de possibilité. Puis l’on se souvient que, contrairement aux apparences, la guerre n’est pas cet état de non-droit où tout est permis, mais un espace normé, codifié. Il est question des droits humains pendant la guerre — pour dénoncer leur violation, certes, mais la violation des règles n’est pas la preuve de leur absence — mais aussi avant la guerre, puisque certains conflits sont justifiés par la protection des droits des populations locales, ou en vertu d’un « droit de l’humanité » qui serait un intérêt à agir. Les relations entre droits humains et conflits armés sont résumées dans cet article en quatre parties : d’un point de vue historique, d’abord, où l’on montre leur réciprocité (le rôle de la guerre dans l’évolution des droits humains, et le rôle des droits humains dans l’évolution de la guerre). En reprenant la trilogie de l’éthique de la guerre ensuite : la guerre au nom des droits humains (jus ad bellum), les droits humains dans la guerre (jus in bello) et, en guise de conclusion, les droits humains après la guerre (jus post bellum).

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