Necessity and Proportionality in Morality and Law

Author(s):  
Jeff McMahan

This chapter offers a systematic analysis of the notion of proportionality in both moral philosophy and law, particularly the law of armed conflict. Proportionality is a constraint on different forms of justification for harming people. There are thus different forms of proportionality corresponding to different types of justification. The proportionality constraint should not be conflated with a different constraint—the necessity constraint—which in turn must be carefully distinguished from necessity as a form of justification. The chapter explains how the proportionality constraint and the necessity constraint are distinguished by the different comparisons they require. It further explains the relations between the requirement of proportionality in jus ad bellum and the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello and argues that the criterion of proportionality in the law of jus in bello is actually incoherent. The final section elucidates the various matters of moral theory that are relevant to understanding how the requirement of proportionality applies in practice to the action of combatants who fight in just wars.

2019 ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter assesses the law of armed conflict. The right to resort to armed force, known as ‘jus ad bellum’, is a body of law that addresses the permissibility of entering into war in the first place. Despite the restrictions imposed by this body of law, it is clear that international law does not fully forbid the use of force, and instances of armed disputes between and within States continue to exist. Consequently, a second, older body of law exists called ‘jus in bello’, or the law of armed conflict, which has sought to restrain, or at least to regulate, the actual conduct of hostilities. The basic imperative of this body of law has been to restrict warfare in order to account for humanitarian principles by prohibiting certain types of weapons, or protecting certain categories of persons, such as wounded combatants, prisoners of war, or the civilian population.


Author(s):  
Okimoto Keichiro

This chapter discusses the relationship between jus ad bellum (international law regulating the resort to force) and jus in bello (law of armed conflict). It examines state practice, international decisions, and expert opinions to determine how the relationship has been addressed in practice. The chapter considers the question of whether jus in bello applies equally to the unlawful and lawful parties to an armed conflict before turning to the legal implications of the cumulative requirements of the law of self-defence and international humanitarian law (IHL) imposed on a use of force in self-defence. Finally, it considers the legal implications of the concurrent application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and IHL with respect to use authorized under Chapter VII.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 246-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem Giladi

This is a preliminary inquiry into the application to occupation law of the distinction betweenjus in bello(or IHL) andjus ad bellum.Under current doctrine, the two are mutually exclusive: the former applies irrespective of the “nature or origin of the armed conflict or the causes espoused by the Parties.” I argue that occupation law, although generally considered part of IHL, is intrinsically less susceptible to a strict application of the distinction.Exploring its pedigree, meaning, and rationale, the paper notes the distinction's scant, soft Conventional expression and brief history, but also its fundamental character and the broad scope attributed to it under contemporary IHL. Although the distinction sometimes fulfill important humanitarian functions in occupied territories, occupation law—in regulating governance of territory—differs from ordinary IHL norms; this and other differences render the strict application of the distinction to occupation law, whose key norms often depend on jus ad bellum references to the “nature, origin and causes” of armed conflict, impossible.The last part of the Paper calls for a more nuanced approach to the application of the distinction to occupation law and identifies some of its contours. Such an approach can enhance the efficacy of occupation law and facilitate fulfillment of the two different functions of occupation law: protection of individuals and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Paper concludes with preliminary observations on the roles and powers, under bothjus ad bellumandjus in bello,of the Security Council with regard to occupied territories.


Author(s):  
Eliav Lieblich

The principle of proportionality in international law operates both in the law on the resort to force—or jus ad bellum—and the law that governs how wars are fought, or jus in bello. On both levels, it seeks to constrain force in relation to a certain lawful objective. Yet, beyond this understanding, few other aspects concerning the interaction between ad bellum and in bello proportionality are clear. This chapter addresses two distinct yet interrelated aspects of this interaction. The first concerns the question whether ad bellum proportionality applies throughout an armed conflict, alongside proportionality under jus in bello. The second addresses the manner in which both levels of proportionality interact, assuming that they indeed apply concurrently. Concerning the first question, this chapter revisits the debate between the “static approach,” which argues that at least in some cases, ad bellum proportionality ceases to apply after the initial judgment on the resort to force, and the “continuous approach,” which holds that ad bellum proportionality applies continuously throughout the conflict. By uncovering and contesting the normative and theoretical assumptions that underlie the static approach, this chapter offers a defense of the continuous approach. Regarding the second question, this chapter explores the specific difficulties of concurrent application, as these arise under different conceptions of ad bellum proportionality. It concludes that although both levels of proportionality apply concurrently, and albeit they share some moral and conceptual similarities, we should not conflate between them. Rather, owing to the difficulties this chapter discusses, a functional separation between the spheres of proportionality should be maintained.


Emerging technologies have always played an important role in armed conflict. From the crossbow to cyber capabilities, technology that could be weaponized to create an advantage over an adversary has inevitably found its way into military arsenals for use in armed conflict. The weaponization of emerging technologies, however, raises challenging legal issues with respect to the law of armed conflict. As States continue to develop and exploit new technologies, how will the law of armed conflict address the use of these technologies on the battlefield? Is existing law sufficient to regulate new technologies, such as cyber capabilities, autonomous weapons systems, and artificial intelligence? Have emerging technologies fundamentally altered the way we should understand concepts such as law-of-war precautions and the principle of distinction? How can we ensure compliance and accountability in light of technological advancement? This book explores these critical questions while highlighting the legal challenges—and opportunities—presented by the use of emerging technologies on the battlefield.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document