scholarly journals Review of Sergey Sayapin and Evhen Tsybulenko, editors. The Use of Force against Ukraine and International Law: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, Jus post Bellum.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-357
Author(s):  
Andriy Tyushka
Author(s):  
Justin Morris

This chapter examines the place of international law in international politics, with particular emphasis on whether legal constraint is effective in averting or limiting the use of force by states. It begins with a discussion of the efficacy of international law in regulating the behaviour of states, focusing on the so-called perception–reality gap in international law. It then considers various reasons why states obey the law, from fear of coercion to self-interest and perceptions of legitimacy. It also explores the role and status of breaches of international law in international politics as well as the functions of the two laws of armed conflict, namely, jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Finally, it analyses the apparent paradox of legal constraint on warfare in relation to power politics and the mitigatory effects of norms governing the conduct of war.


2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 601-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEX J. BELLAMY

AbstractRecent years have seen a growing interest in questions about justice after war (jus post bellum), fuelled in large part by moral questions about coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, it has become common to argue that jus post bellum is a third strand of Just War thinking. This article evaluates this position. It argues that that there are broadly two ways of understanding moral requirements after war: a minimalist position which holds that moral principles derived largely from jus ad bellum and jus in bello concerns should constrain what victors are entitled to do after war and a maximalist position which holds that victors acquire additional responsibilities that are grounded more in liberalism and international law than in Just War thinking. Finding problems with both approaches, the article argues that it is premature to include jus post bellum as a third element of Just War thinking and concludes by setting out six principles to guide future thinking in this area.


2019 ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter assesses the law of armed conflict. The right to resort to armed force, known as ‘jus ad bellum’, is a body of law that addresses the permissibility of entering into war in the first place. Despite the restrictions imposed by this body of law, it is clear that international law does not fully forbid the use of force, and instances of armed disputes between and within States continue to exist. Consequently, a second, older body of law exists called ‘jus in bello’, or the law of armed conflict, which has sought to restrain, or at least to regulate, the actual conduct of hostilities. The basic imperative of this body of law has been to restrict warfare in order to account for humanitarian principles by prohibiting certain types of weapons, or protecting certain categories of persons, such as wounded combatants, prisoners of war, or the civilian population.


Author(s):  
Justin Morris

This chapter explores the role of international law in international politics, with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of legal constraint of the use of force by states. It first considers the effect of international law on state behaviour, focusing on the so-called ‘perception–reality gap’, before discussing three reasons why states obey the law: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. It then examines the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello; the former governs and seeks to limit resort to armed force in the conduct of international relations, while the latter governs and seeks to moderate the actual conduct of hostilities. Jus in bello is further subdivided into Geneva law and Hague law, both of which generally have the status of jus cogens.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-143
Author(s):  
Charlotte Beaucillon

Abstract The aim of this article is to contribute to the general analysis of ‘due regard obligations’, through their articulation with branches of international law other than the law of the sea. More specifically, it focuses on the law of military activities at sea, as governed by international law on the use of force and nuclear weapons. It is argued here that the scope of the Law of the Sea Convention’s ‘due regard obligations’ cannot be examined in a vacuum, but should rather, to the extent possible, be interpreted in conformity with other related sources of international law. Reciprocally, this paper shows that some rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello applicable to the use of nuclear weapons in a third state’s exclusive economic zone, fail to consider other simultaneously applicable obligations, which could well be grasped through the prism of ‘due regard’.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 779-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

AbstractThis article analyses the role and content of proportionality under contemporary international law governing the use of force, with a view to clarifying the legal framework governing the conduct of the parties to an armed conflict. In the system of jus ad bellum, protection is primarily granted to the interest of the attacked state in repelling the attack; the other competing interests are considered only to curtail the choice of the means to be employed in order to achieve that aim. Conversely, in the system of jus in bello there is by definition no prevailing interest, but instead a variety of interests and values which are entitled to equal protection of the law and must be balanced against each other. The existence of two distinct normative systems, with distinct standards of legality applicable to the same conduct, does not as a rule give rise to major problems. The legality of recourse to force is measured against the proportionality of self-defence, whereas individual actions would have to conform to the requirement of proportionality in jus in bello. However, beyond the large area in which these two standards overlap, there might be situations in which the strict application of the jus ad bellum standard makes it impossible to achieve the aims of jus in bello. In these cases, the proportionality test under jus in bello must be regarded as part of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum. States must thus take humanitarian implications into account in determining the level of security they may seek to obtain using military action.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Nicholas Tsagourias ◽  
Russell Buchan

Automatic cyber defence describes computer operations to neutralise a cyber attack. Once a system detects that it is under cyber attack, it automatically launches offensive cyber operations that pursue the attacker back to its own network with the objective of rescuing stolen data or disabling or destroying the computer hardware and software that is responsible for hosting and distributing the attacking code. The aim of this article is to examine the legality of automatic cyber defence under the law regulating the use of force in international law (jus ad bellum) and under international humanitarian law (jus in bello). Thus, the first part of this article examines automatic cyber defence in the context of the jus ad bellum by considering the legal requirements of an armed attack, necessity, and proportionality. In the second part, it examines the jus in bello aspects of automatic cyber defence and, in particular, whether it triggers an international or a non-international armed conflict and, if so, whether it can comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 284-305
Author(s):  
Peter Hilpold

In the last years, the traditional dichotomy in international law between jus ad bellum and jus in bello has been more and more abandoned in favour of a system comprising also norms designed to create fair and sustainable peace. It has been recognized that post-war societies need help in order to avoid a relapse into conflict and chaos. But what is the essence of this jus post bellum? What are its sources? Did the introduction of a Responsibility to Protect (r2p) change the rather sceptical attitude by most governments towards peace-building activities that were often considered intrusive? Particular attention will be given to two recent post conflict countries, Kosovo and Libya, where the Responsibility to Rebuild was of considerable importance, but the State community only partially considered (Kosovo) or did not consider at all (Libya). In this contribution it will be shown that the contours of the jus post bellum are still rather unclear but that nevertheless it is very likely that this concept is here to stay.


Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.


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