The Plant Life of China: Diversity and Distribution. By G.P. Chapman and Y.Z. Wang. [Berlin: Springer, 2002. xiii+257 pp. ISBN 3-540-42257-9.]

2003 ◽  
Vol 175 ◽  
pp. 851-852
Author(s):  
C.Y. Jim

This book is not one of those publications filled with colourful photographs or illustrations that delight the eye but numb the mind, but rather a labour of love that distils the knowledge of plants in China of two scholars who have plenty of experience on the subject matter. The study is based largely on published analyses of flora in China, both in English and in Chinese. It has a botanical orientation, and concentrates on the taxonomic aspects of the diversity of plant life in China, despite the inclusion of the word “distribution” in its subtitle. Readers should not anticipate many discussions of the plant-geographical, geobotanical or phytogeographical flavour in the tradition of N. Polunin or R. Good.

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Roark

In Stone-Heng Restored (1655), Inigo Jones, the father of English neoclassicism, used drawings, histories, and questionable logic to argue that Stonehenge was built by the ancient Romans and that it originally exhibited perfect Platonic geometries. This argument was never given much credence, but by 1725 the subject matter and the architect had received enough attention that two book-length responses (a challenge and a defense) were published, and both were then republished in a single volume alongside Jones's original text. While most Jones scholars have neglected this work because of its logical and historical shortcomings, Ryan Roark argues in “Stonehenge in the Mind” and “Stonehenge on the Ground”: Reader, Viewer, and Object in Inigo Jones's Stone-Heng Restored (1655) that it was in fact exemplary of what made Jones, for many, a protomodern architect and scholar. Rather than viewing Jones's book as an earnest attempt to prove a historical inaccuracy, Roark considers it as an exercise in formal analysis, one that set the precedent for the contemporary pedagogical trend of using geometric simplifications of existing structures as a first step in new design. Jones's idiosyncratic reading of Stonehenge belied the idea that such analysis could be anything but intensely reliant on the subjectivity of both architect and viewer.


PMLA ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1033-1046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hope Emily Allen

During the period covered by the Early Modern English Dictionary, witchcraft occupied the mind of the average man, and became the subject-matter of literature (dramatic, theological, philosophical, legal) to an extent probably not known in any other epoch. It is natural that such a predominating interest should have its effect on the vocabulary. There can now be described, with more detail than has hitherto been available, one instance in which the beliefs and practices of contemporary charlatans, pretending to supernatural connections, made an interesting development of meaning for a common word. This instance will be illustrated at length, for the sake of the analogies which it suggests as to possible starting points for studying other words. The discussion seems to indicate that elements in the problem go back to learned tradition and at the same time to primitive Teutonic folk-lore.


2010 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 141-154
Author(s):  
Eduard Marbach

AbstractThe paper first addresses Husserl's conception of philosophical phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl's view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of consciousness. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori science which has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates; metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, has to do with its reality or actuality, requiring an eidetic foundation in order to become scientifically valuable. Presuming that, if consciousness is to be the subject-matter of a metaphysics which is not simply speculative or based on prejudice, it is crucial to get the phenomenology of consciousness right, the paper then engages in a detailed descriptive-eidetic analysis of mental acts of re-presenting something and tries to argue that their structures, involving components of non-actual experiencing, pose a serious problem for a materialistic or physicalistic metaphysics of consciousness. The paper ends with a brief comment on Husserl's broader view of metaphysics, having to do with the irrationality of the transcendental fact, i.e. the constitution of the factual world and the factual life of the mind.


Philosophy ◽  
1930 ◽  
Vol 5 (20) ◽  
pp. 516-532
Author(s):  
S. Alexander

It has been explained how science, with the freedom which makes it an art, uses ideas of its own construction, and that they are verified by nature shows them to be, directly or indirectly, at differing degrees of remoteness, congenial to and so far inherent in the material which is the subject-matter of the science. Take, for an instance, velocity. It is expressed by the ratio of two integers which measure distance and time respectively. Now a ratio is a construction of the mind, and it does not exist in external things in the sense in which universals must be said to belong to them and have in one way or another been held to belong to them since the time of Socrates, or at least Plato. Even if we agree that the integers themselves are given to mind and not created by mind, their ratio implies the intervention of mind, and does not inhere in the integers themselves. But though velocity does not inhere in things, it corresponds to and stands for something which is found alike in all moving things and varies in the moving tram and the sea-plane in a Schneider race.


METOD ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 243-268
Author(s):  
Mikhail Zabotkin

The article strives to explain why semiology based on the structuralist approach to language was not widely recognized as a metascience. The author views as the key reason the fact that the subject matter of linguistics was understood to be linguistic structure as immanent reality. In order to support this argument, the author examines the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Hjelmslev, and Emile Benveniste as not only linguistic, but also philosophical theories. The structuralist interpretation of Saussure’s theory views the structure of language as independent from the world and the human mind. The article demonstrates why it leads to the conclusion that the language sets the limits of one’s world and mind. The author shows why this conclusion generates internal contradictions in the theory and, paradoxically, casts doubt on the possibility of studying and explaining language. The article analyzes how Hjelmslev and Benveniste tried to provide theoretical solutions to these problems and why their attempts were not fully successful. It is argued that the key source of problems of this approach is the ontologization of language structure which makes explaining language possible only through deep structures that belong to the extralinguistic reality. The author shows how rejecting the ontological understanding of structure and including human subjectivity in the theory makes it possible to avoid the problems of structuralism. The article concludes with a brief overview of several theoretical frameworks which analyze language and its interconnections with the mind and extralinguistic reality without relying on the concept of structure.


Author(s):  
Cynthia L. Allen

This chapter introduces the subject matter of the book and briefly surveys the literature on dative external possessors cross-linguistically and in the history of English. This corpus-based study adds to the empirical base for assessing hypotheses about the reasons for the loss of dative external possessors as a productive construction in Middle English, drawing on recent advances in linguistic typology, syntactic theory, and language contact. Cross-linguistically, dative external possessors are most likely to be found with affected possessors of inalienable possessa. This study focuses on possessa referring to the body and the mind and compares the use of internal and external possessors, establishing the timing of the loss of the external possessor and evaluating proposed explanations for this syntactic change, including the so-called Celtic Hypothesis.


1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 42-54
Author(s):  
M. T. L. Bizley

1. In this note we shall try to unravel a puzzle. It is hoped that the triviality of the subject-matter will not persuade the reader that it is unworthy of his attention; our excuse for offering it is that the underlying principle turns out to be applicable to some very practical situations. In many of these we experience no problem and seem to be on firm ground, as may a man who on a winter's day strays from the common on to the pond, until the ice breaks.2. By repeatedly presenting theorems that appear intuitively to be unacceptable, a mathematical training is apt to engender distrust in the conclusions of common sense. When the mind has learned to convince itself of the truth of a host of astonishing facts, it hesitates to reject a fresh one however improbable it may seem. This reluctance has an unfortunate consequence, in that the more often the validity of such results is demonstrated, the less the urge is felt to scrutinize a new proof before entering yet another black mark upon the long crime sheet of intuition. Thus, paradoxically, the highly trained expert may sometimes be deceived into accepting a false statement that would be instantly denied by a layman incapable of following its supporting argument. ‘You can't fool me’, boasts the novice, ‘I'm too ignorant.’


PMLA ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1320-1327
Author(s):  
Colbert Searles

THE germ of that which follows came into being many years ago in the days of my youth as a university instructor and assistant professor. It was generated by the then quite outspoken attitude of colleagues in the “exact sciences”; the sciences of which the subject-matter can be exactly weighed and measured and the force of its movements mathematically demonstrated. They assured us that the study of languages and literature had little or nothing scientific about it because: “It had no domain of concrete fact in which to work.” Ergo, the scientific spirit was theirs by a stroke of “efficacious grace” as it were. Ours was at best only a kind of “sufficient grace,” pleasant and even necessary to have, but which could, by no means ensure a reception among the elected.


1965 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 112-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Zinsser

An outline has been presented in historical fashion of the steps devised to organize the central core of medical information allowing the subject matter, the patient, to define the nature and the progression of the diseases from which he suffers, with and without therapy; and approaches have been made to organize this information in such fashion as to align the definitions in orderly fashion to teach both diagnostic strategy and the content of the diseases by programmed instruction.


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