LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE WORLD AND THE MIND
The article strives to explain why semiology based on the structuralist approach to language was not widely recognized as a metascience. The author views as the key reason the fact that the subject matter of linguistics was understood to be linguistic structure as immanent reality. In order to support this argument, the author examines the theories of Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Hjelmslev, and Emile Benveniste as not only linguistic, but also philosophical theories. The structuralist interpretation of Saussure’s theory views the structure of language as independent from the world and the human mind. The article demonstrates why it leads to the conclusion that the language sets the limits of one’s world and mind. The author shows why this conclusion generates internal contradictions in the theory and, paradoxically, casts doubt on the possibility of studying and explaining language. The article analyzes how Hjelmslev and Benveniste tried to provide theoretical solutions to these problems and why their attempts were not fully successful. It is argued that the key source of problems of this approach is the ontologization of language structure which makes explaining language possible only through deep structures that belong to the extralinguistic reality. The author shows how rejecting the ontological understanding of structure and including human subjectivity in the theory makes it possible to avoid the problems of structuralism. The article concludes with a brief overview of several theoretical frameworks which analyze language and its interconnections with the mind and extralinguistic reality without relying on the concept of structure.