Attitudinal Differences within the Cultural Revolution Cohort: Effects of the Sent-down Experience

2016 ◽  
Vol 225 ◽  
pp. 234-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Harmel ◽  
Yao-Yuan Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Class Struggle ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Attitudinal Differences ◽  
Communist Ideology ◽  
Urban Sample ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cultural Revolution

AbstractThis study addresses whether individuals who were sent down during the Cultural Revolution reveal different political attitudes from those who were socialized during the same period but were not themselves sent down. Using data from the urban sample of the 2006 General Social Survey of China, the authors find evidence that formerly sent-down youth – and particularly sent-down women – as compared to their not-sent-down peers, are today more willing to accept the class-struggle foundation of Mao's communist ideology but are, at the same time, more willing to assess the performance and structure of the communist regime critically.

scholarly journals Four decades of transition to first marriage in China: Economic reform and persisting marriage norms

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaorong Gu
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Family Formation ◽  
Coming Of Age ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Pooled Data ◽  
First Marriage ◽  
Formation Pattern ◽  
The Cultural Revolution

This study draws on three waves (2012; 2013; 2015) of pooled data from the China General Social Survey to examine two major dimensions of the transition to first marriage among four cohorts of youths, i.e. the transition tempos and the homogamy patterns. Key findings include: 1) there is no evidence of systematic delays in family formation among cohorts coming of age after reform, albeit moderate cross-cohort heterogeneity. Two cohorts are identified for their unique trajectories: The Cultural Revolution cohort with a relatively protracted transition process and the Late Reform cohort with a rather condensed marriage formation pattern; 2) respondents who belong to older cohorts, are men, have received higher education and hold urban hukou have low hazards in entering first marriage by a certain age; 3)I record steady growing strengths of homogamy over cohorts, with the Ф parameters rising from 0.42 for the Cultural Revolution cohort to 0.56 for the Late Reform cohort. The overall message is that four decades of rapid economic development in post-reform China has failed to weaken persisting marriage norms and practices among young people, contrary to well-documented empirical evidence from many other national contexts. I ruminate on potential institutional and cultural mechanisms underlying such an intriguing phenomenon.

scholarly journals Attitudinal Change, Cohort Replacement, and the Liberalization of Attitudes about Same-sex Relationships, 1973–2018

2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142199485
Author(s):  
Ashley Wendell Kranjac ◽  
Robert L. Wagmiller
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Individual Change ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Population Turnover ◽  
Demographic Processes ◽  
Lesbian And Gay Rights ◽  
Using Data

Americans’ attitudes toward same-sex relationships have liberalized considerably over the last 40 years. We examine how the demographic processes generating social change in attitudes toward same-sex relationships changed over time. Using data from the 1973 to 2018 General Social Survey and decomposition techniques, we estimate the relative contributions of intracohort change and cohort replacement to overall social change for three different periods. We examine (1) the period prior to the rapid increase in attitude liberalization toward same-sex marriage rights (1973–1991), (2) the period of contentious debate about same-sex marriage and lesbian and gay rights (1991–2002), and (3) the period of legislative and judicial liberalization at the state and federal levels (2002–2018). We find that both intracohort and intercohort change played positive and significant roles in the liberalization of attitudes toward same-sex relationships in the postlegalization period, but that individual change was more important than population turnover over this period.

Constrained and Unconstrained Partial Adjacent Category Logit Models for Ordinal Response Variables

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Fullerton ◽  
Jun Xu
Keyword(s):  
General Social Survey ◽  
Estimation Method ◽  
Logit Models ◽  
Proportional Odds ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Partial Model ◽  
Ordinal Response ◽  
Proportional Odds Assumption ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Response Variables

Adjacent category logit models are ordered regression models that focus on comparisons of adjacent categories. These models are particularly useful for ordinal response variables with categories that are of substantive interest. In this article, we consider unconstrained and constrained versions of the partial adjacent category logit model, which is an extension of the traditional model that relaxes the proportional odds assumption for a subset of independent variables. In the unconstrained partial model, the variables without proportional odds have coefficients that freely vary across cutpoint equations, whereas in the constrained partial model two or more of these variables have coefficients that vary by common factors. We improve upon an earlier formulation of the constrained partial adjacent category model by introducing a new estimation method and conceptual justification for the model. Additionally, we discuss the connections between partial adjacent category models and other models within the adjacent approach, including stereotype logit and multinomial logit. We show that the constrained and unconstrained partial models differ only in terms of the number of dimensions required to describe the effects of variables with nonproportional odds. Finally, we illustrate the partial adjacent category logit models with empirical examples using data from the international social survey program and the general social survey.

The Unique “Blooming and Contending” 1961–62

1969 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 54-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Other ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
Main Trend ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cultural Revolution

From its inception until at least the Cultural Revolution, the Communist regime in China has had a twofold aim for its intellectuals: it has sought to indoctrinate them with the exclusive ideologies of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and it has tried to utilize their skills to develop an industrialized and modernized society. The Chinese Communist Party has attempted to implement these two policies by an insistence on the strict orthodoxy of thinking individuals, on the one hand, and by the encouragement of intellectuals to work creatively at their jobs on the other. This contradictory approach has resulted in a policy toward the intellectuals that has been alternatively severe and relaxed. Though the main trend is usually in one direction or the other, there have always been counter-currents present which can be revived when necessary.

A Collision of Principles? Free Expression, Racial Equality and the Prohibition of Racist Speech

1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIMBERLY A. GROSS ◽  
DONALD R. KINDER
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Racial Equality ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Hard Case ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Straightforward Application ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Democratic Principles

Freedom of expression is celebrated as one of the glories of the American political system. But does all speech deserve immunity? In particular, should speech designed to vilify or degrade on the basis of race be protected? Opinions on racist speech are complicated because they must accommodate two fundamental democratic principles that operate at cross purposes: freedom of expression, which implies support for racist speech, and racial equality, which implies the opposite. Using data from the 1990 General Social Survey, we examine how Americans resolve this conflict. Our major finding is that the principle of free expression dominates the principle of racial equality. What contemporary legal scholars regard as a hard case entailing a collision of democratic principles, ordinary Americans seem to interpret as a straightforward application of just a single principle. This result mirrors and perhaps reflects a nearly century-long and mostly lop-sided debate favouring free speech among American elites.

Religion and Happiness

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hout ◽  
Andrew Greeley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Religious Affiliation ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
The United States ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Religious Rituals ◽  
Religious Services ◽  
Using Data ◽  
International Social

This chapter discusses the link between happiness and religion. It draws on meaning-and-belonging theory to deduce that a religious affiliation heightens happiness through participation in collective religious rituals. Attendance and engagement appear key: a merely nominal religious affiliation makes people little happier. Notably, two religious foundations of happiness—affiliation with organized religious groups and attendance at services—have fallen. Softened religious engagement, then, may contribute to the slight downturn in general happiness. In fact, steady happiness is reported among those who participate frequently in religious services, but falling levels among those who are less involved. The chapter also considers the association between religion and happiness outside the United States using data from the International Social Survey Program, an international collaborative survey to which the General Social Survey contributes the American data.

A gun gap in voter choice

The Gun Gap ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 50-79
Author(s):  
Mark R. Joslyn
Keyword(s):  
General Social Survey ◽  
National Election ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Political Consequence ◽  
Empirical Regularities ◽  
Voter Choice ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Election Studies

Chapter 2 presents a framework to examine the vote choices of gun owners. Using data from the General Social Survey and American National Election Studies, two important empirical regularities emerge. First, compared to those who do not own a guns, people who do own guns reliably vote Republican. In addition, the divide between the vote choices of gun owners and nonowners is growing. Since 2004, the “gun gap” has nearly doubled. Second, the more guns an individual owns, the more likely he or she is to vote Republican. In this respect, purchasing a gun or guns is an act of some political consequence.

scholarly journals Income management strategies of older couples in Canada

2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Laporte ◽  
Grant Schellenberg
Keyword(s):  
Educational Attainment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Older Couples ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Female Partners ◽  
Using Data

In this study, the income management strategies of Canadian couples are examined using data from the 2007 General Social Survey. The extent to which “older” couples, in which at least one spouse or partner is aged 45 or older, employ an allocative, pooled, or separate strategy is explored.Results show that the income management strategies used by these couples are correlated with relationship characteristics, such as common-law status, duration of relationship, and presence of children. As well, the likelihood of using a separate approach is positively correlated with levels of educational attainment and with the amount of income received by wives or female partners.

Prayer and Helping

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Sharp
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Symbolic Interaction ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Sociodemographic Factors ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
The Past ◽  
Using Data

I propose a theoretical framework to understand how the religious practice of prayer influences helping. Drawing on work from symbolic interaction and cognitive psychology, I argue that individuals’ concepts of divine others become more cognitively accessible during the act of prayer. Because most people attribute the characteristics of omniscience and the desire for humans to help others to divine others, people are more likely to help known and unknown others the more cognitively accessible divine other concepts are to them. This leads to the prediction that frequency of prayer will be positively and linearly associated with frequency of helping. Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), I find support for my argument. Frequency of prayer is positively and linearly associated with the frequency in which individuals engaged in several helpful behaviors toward known and unknown others in the past year, even after accounting for other religious and sociodemographic factors.

scholarly journals Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and Motivated Resistance to Expert Consensus

2020 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Merkley
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Public Attitudes ◽  
Strong Association ◽  
General Social Survey ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Expert Consensus ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Water Fluoridation ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Using Data

Abstract Scholars have maintained that public attitudes often diverge from expert consensus due to ideology-driven motivated reasoning. However, this is not a sufficient explanation for less salient and politically charged questions. More attention needs to be given to anti-intellectualism—the generalized mistrust of intellectuals and experts. Using data from the General Social Survey and a survey of 3,600 Americans on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I provide evidence of a strong association between anti-intellectualism and opposition to scientific positions on climate change, nuclear power, GMOs, and water fluoridation, particularly for respondents with higher levels of political interest. Second, a survey experiment shows that anti-intellectualism moderates the acceptance of expert consensus cues such that respondents with high levels of anti-intellectualism actually increase their opposition to these positions in response. Third, evidence shows anti-intellectualism is connected to populism, a worldview that sees political conflict as primarily between ordinary citizens and a privileged societal elite. Exposure to randomly assigned populist rhetoric, even that which does not pertain to experts directly, primes anti-intellectual predispositions among respondents in the processing of expert consensus cues. These findings suggest that rising anti-elite rhetoric may make anti-intellectual sentiment more salient in information processing.

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