The Autonomy-Based Liberalism of Joseph Raz

1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Norman
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Philosophical Aspect ◽  
History Of ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The One ◽  
Conception Of The Good

Ask a practising liberal to define her political creed, and more likely than not she will begin by describing the wonderful life of the free person. That is, in the parlance of modern political philosophers, she will begin with a conception of the good. The good life is the free life, and the good society is the one where people are as free as possible. By contrast, recent liberal philosophers have for the most part grounded their theories in principles of right or rights. Indeed, some have argued that what is unique about liberalism as a political doctrine is that it is not committed to the advancement of any particular conception of the good, let alone to that of the free person. In his celebrated recent book, The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz sides with the practitioner and confronts the pedlars of right-based or deontological liberalism head-on. Believing the history of liberal theory to be against them, he labels his opponents ‘revisionists’. The Morality of Freedom has already been hailed as the most significant new statement of liberal principles since Mill’s On Liberty. And while this may be a bit over-enthusiastic, Raz would welcome at least one philosophical aspect of the comparison with Mill. Both are teleologists who ground their theories of political morality on considerations of the value of the free or autonomous life. I shall dub such theories ‘autonomarian’. And I shall examine Raz’s autonomarian reaction in detail here, for it may well be the most important such theory in the post-Rawlsian era.

Liberalism and Minority Rights

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-40
Author(s):  
Domenico Melidoro
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Cultural Diversity ◽  
Ethnic Minorities ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Minority Rights ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Cultural Belonging

This chapter illustrates CA liberalism through the exposition of Will Kymlicka’s theory. Kymlicka works out a systematic liberal theory sensitive to cultural belonging and minority rights. The liberalism he defends is overtly comprehensive and pro-autonomy, and alleges to be adequate in addressing the cultural diversity represented by national and ethnic minorities (or migrants). In spite of caution in his use of the notion of autonomy, it is the sole reliance on this value that make Kymlicka’s liberalism seriously objectionable. In fact, Kymlicka explicitly aims at liberalizing the minorities. This liberalization transforms minorities into something they reject as extraneous to their conception of the good life. Thus, the liberalization of minorities put their diversity at risk, and entails disrespect for their conception of the good. This means that our search for a theory that is able to accommodate diversity should go beyond CA liberalism.

Does Liberalism Rest on a Mistake?

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Rodewald
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Conflicts Of Interests ◽  
Moral Requirement ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
Conception Of The Good

It is becoming popular among contemporary philosophers to view liberalism as a political morality which rests on a fundamental moral requirement that persons are to be treated equally according to a certain conception of equal respect and concern. On this view, the liberal conception of equal respect and concern requires that conflicts of interests must be decided by appeal to principles which are rationally justifiable on grounds that are neutral or impartial between persons and their competing conceptions of the good life. Ronald Dworkin has expressed this view by contrasting liberalism with political moralities that are founded on conceptions of what constitutes treating persons equally which are ‘at least partly determined by some conception of the good life.‘

Friendship

2020 ◽  
pp. 249-283
Author(s):  
Phillip Mitsis
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Discourse ◽  
Original Theory ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Individual Self

The surviving evidence for Epicurus’s view of friendship has given rise to divergent scholarly interpretations. For some, Epicurus recommends narrowly self-regarding relations with friends, while for others, he seems to recognize the commonly held opinion that reliable and rewarding friendships require us to treat our friends not solely as instruments to our own pleasure. Both of these views have been bolstered by larger considerations from within the wider theory, practice, and history of Epicureanism. Thus, some have made inferences from what they take to be Epicurean social practices, while others have tried to view friendship within the larger context of Epicurean social theory. Still others have posited various kinds of developmental accounts that see Epicurus’s original theory changing as later Epicureans confronted new practical and theoretical questions raised by their conception of the good life. A further question is raised by later Epicurean evidence about divine friendships, which are not based on mutual need. To what extent can humans, enmeshed in the practical demands of human friendship, hope to realize Epicurus’s injunctions to live a life worthy of the gods, and hence, perhaps, form friendships untainted by mutual need? Again the evidence seems muted, but Epicurus’s concerns about the nature of ataraxia, autonomy, and our invulnerability to chance puts questions about the relations among philosophical philoi at the very center of what we might call his high philosophical discourse about the nature of the individual self and the external requirements of hedonistic happiness.

A Liberal Theory of the Good?

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Neal
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Liberal Theory ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
To Come ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Made In ◽  
Do So

One argument often made in support of liberal political morality is that liberalism, both as a theory and as a practice, is neutral in regard to the question of the good life. In this essay, I shall criticize and reject this argument. Now this conclusion is anything but novel; one would have almost as much difficulty finding a critic, of whatever perspective, granting that liberalism is indeed neutral with regard to the good as one would have finding a liberal denying it. It is this phenomenon that I find especially interesting, and which serves to set the context of my discussion. If, as I aim to show, it is a relatively straightforward path of argument which leads to the conclusion that liberalism is not neutral with regard to the question of the good life, then why do so many liberals remain convinced that it is? Why, when liberals and their critics debate the issue of neutrality, do they so often seem to talk beyond one another? It seems to me that instances of these debates ought to come off better than they do, and so I shall attempt here to describe how they might.

Public Reason and Prostitution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Sex Work ◽  
State Policy ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Conception Of The Good

This chapter critically engages with the “sex work” approach to prostitution and argues that treating “sex work” like any other form of work is neither possible nor compatible with valuing the freedom and equality of women as citizens. Liberals often claim, erroneously, that liberalism’s commitment to a kind of neutrality among competing conceptions of the good life and its commitment to antipaternalism requires either decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. While arguments that rest on a particular conception of the “good” of sex or of the role of sex in a broader conception of the good are illegitimate grounds for state policy, it is argued that there are, nonetheless, good public reason arguments against decriminalization or legalization of prostitution. A defense of the Nordic model is offered.

A Critique of Raz’s Liberal Perfectionism: Morality and Politics

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-364
Author(s):  
Bi‐Hwan Kim
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Liberal Perfectionism

Joseph Raz Has Long Been Well Known as a Legal philosopher and theorist of practical reason. But it is only in the last decade that he has come to be widely identified as the most prominent defender of a distinctive interpretation of the liberal tradition. Raz wholeheartedly endorses the communitarian view that the individual is a social being, who needs society to establish his/her self-identity and to gain objective knowledge of the good, rather than a self-contained subject abstracted from any specific social experience. Unlike neutralist liberals, such as Rawls and Dworkin, he rejects ‘the priority of right over the good’, stressing the interdependent relationship between right and the good. Yet he remains very much a liberal in his commitment to the value of autonomy (or freedom) and argues powerfully for the desirability (or necessity) of incommensurable plural conceptions of the good life for the well-being of people, as well as for the liberal virtue of toleration, and for their attendant liberal democratic political institutions.

“The secret to happiness may be unhappiness”

Propelled ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andreas Elpidorou
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Positive Emotions ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Negative Experiences ◽  
Emotional Adaptation ◽  
Positive Experiences ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The chapter explores the nature of the good life, articulates the role that happiness, pleasure, and positive emotions play in such a life, and considers the effects of emotional adaptation and emotional diversity on our well-being. By drawing upon both philosophical literature and research in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience, it argues for a broad conception of the good life, one that does not identify the good life simply with the presence of positive experiences and the absence of negative ones. The chapter shows not only that negative experiences aren’t detrimental to our well-being, but that they are often necessary to achieve it.

Critical theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Geuss ◽  
J. M. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The term ‘critical theory’ designates the approach to the study of society developed between 1930 and 1970 by the so-called ‘Frankfurt School’. A group of theorists associated with the Institute for Social Research, the School was founded in Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. The three most important philosophers belonging to it were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. The project was renewed by the second- and third-generation critical theorists, most notably, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse feared that modern Western societies were turning into closed, totalitarian systems in which all individual autonomy was eliminated. In their earliest writings from the 1930s they presented this tendency towards totalitarianism as one result of the capitalist mode of production. In later accounts they give more prominence to the role of science and technology in modern society, and to the concomitant, purely ‘instrumental’, conception of reason. This conception of reason denies that there can be any such thing as inherently rational ends or goals for human action and asserts that reason is concerned exclusively with the choice of effective instruments or means for attaining arbitrary ends. ‘Critical theory’ was to be a form of resistance to contemporary society; its basic method was to be that of ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ criticism. Every society, it was claimed, must be seen as making a tacit claim to substantive (and not merely instrumental) rationality; that is, making the claim that it allows its members to lead a good life. This claim gives critical theory a standard for criticism which is internal to the society being criticized. Critical theory demonstrates in what ways contemporary society fails to live up to its own claims. The conception of the good life to which each society makes tacit appeal in legitimizing itself will usually not be fully propositionally explicit, so any critical theory will have to begin by extracting a tacit conception of the good life from the beliefs, cultural artefacts and forms of experience present in the society in question. One of the particular difficulties confronting a critical theory of contemporary society is the disappearance of traditional substantive conceptions of the good life that could serve as a basis for internal criticism, and their replacement with the view that modern society needs no legitimation beyond simple reference to its actual efficient functioning, to its ‘instrumental’ rationality. The ideology of ‘instrumental rationality’ thus itself becomes a major target for critical theory.

Critical theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Geuss
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Social Research ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Conception Of The Good

The term ‘critical theory’ designates the approach to the study of society developed between 1930 and 1970 by the so-called ‘Frankfurt School’. A group of theorists associated with the Institute for Social Research, the School was founded in Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. The three most important philosophers belonging to it were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse feared that modern Western societies were turning into closed, totalitarian systems in which all individual autonomy was eliminated. In their earliest writings from the 1930s they presented this tendency towards totalitarianism as one result of the capitalist mode of production. In later accounts they give more prominence to the role of science and technology in modern society, and to the concomitant, purely ‘instrumental’, conception of reason. This conception of reason denies that there can be any such thing as inherently rational ends or goals for human action and asserts that reason is concerned exclusively with the choice of effective instruments or means for attaining arbitrary ends. ‘Critical theory’ was to be a form of resistance to contemporary society; its basic method was to be that of ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ criticism. Every society, it was claimed, must be seen as making a tacit claim to substantive (and not merely instrumental) rationality; that is, making the claim that it allows its members to lead a good life. This claim gives critical theory a standard for criticism which is internal to the society being criticized. Critical theory demonstrates in what ways contemporary society fails to live up to its own claims. The conception of the good life to which each society makes tacit appeal in legitimizing itself will usually not be fully propositionally explicit, so any critical theory will have to begin by extracting a tacit conception of the good life from the beliefs, cultural artefacts and forms of experience present in the society in question. One of the particular difficulties confronting a critical theory of contemporary society is the disappearance of traditional substantive conceptions of the good life that could serve as a basis for internal criticism, and their replacement with the view that modern society needs no legitimation beyond simple reference to its actual efficient functioning, to its ‘instrumental’ rationality. The ideology of ‘instrumental rationality’ thus itself becomes a major target for critical theory.

Dilemmas of Political Agency and Sovereignty: The Omelian Allegory

2020 ◽  
pp. 026327642096743
Author(s):  
Annabel Herzog
Keyword(s):  
Short Story ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Walk Away ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Neoliberal Capitalism ◽  
Conception Of The Good

This essay is a political reading of Ursula K. Le Guin’s ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’, which examines agency and resistance in situations of political wrong. Le Guin’s short story allows us to reformulate the questions of the boundaries of popular sovereignty and the opposition to general consent. These concerns will be here regarded as elements of a critique of neoliberal capitalism, in which freedom and self-realization are founded on injustices that persist because of a prevalent conception of the good life. The case of ‘Omelas’, moreover, challenges our understanding of resistance in revealing the blurred boundary between political action and mere noncompliance. The question asked will be about the nature of noncompliance: is noncompliance a form of resistance, and, if so, can it transform the political reality?

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