The Refoundation of Evidence Law

1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Stein
Keyword(s):  
Upright Position ◽  
New Foundations ◽  
Core Principle ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Fact Finding

This article examines and criticizes the conventional evidence doctrine and its core principle (albeit with exceptions) of legally unregulated fact-finding. New foundations for evidence law are offered that reflect a principled allocation of the risk of error in conditions of uncertainty. Such conditions are present in virtually every litigated case. This article opposes the doctrine of ‘free proof’. That doctrine underlies the current flowering of discretion injudicial fact-finding and is responsible for the ongoing abolition of evidentiary rules. The evidence law theory developed in this article is of course itself theory-dependent. Far from claiming the theory here is uniquely correct rather than simply valid, I shall be satisfied by its survival as yet “another view of the Cathedral”. Nonetheless, evidence law as conventionally portrayed can hardly be compared with Monet’s Cathedral. It is conspicuously more like Pisa’s Leaning Tower. This article aims at returning the leaning tower of evidence law to an upright position.

The explanationist revolution in evidence law

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 60-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Revolutionary Change ◽  
The Core ◽  
Basic Distinction ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Probabilistic Criteria

According to Allen and Pardo, the field of evidence law has experienced a revolution -in Kuhn's sense- from probabilism to explanationism, which they identify with the relative plausibility theory. The explanationist revolution, argue Allen and Pardo, has placed explanationist -rather than probabilistic criteria- at the core of the fact-finding process and, in contrast to probabilism, has advanced a comparative understanding of the theory of legal proof. This paper develops an alternative interpretation of the explanationist revolution in evidence law. First, it elaborates on the concept of legal revolution and argues that it involves a kind of shift that is best characterized as a Hacking -rather than a Kuhnean- type of revolution and, thus, as an ‘emplacement’ instead of a ‘replacement’ revolution. Second, it claims that the shift from probabilism to explanationism involves a deep -genuinely revolutionary- change in the conception of rationality that is taken to govern the processes of evidence and legal proof. Other differences between probabilistim and explanationism, such as those mentioned by Allen and Pardo, are not central to the revolutionary shift, but rather emanate from this basic distinction. Last, it argues that the explanationist paradigm embraces, but cannot be reduced to, the relative plausibility theory; the identification of explanationism with the relative plausibility theory occludes the richness and possibilities harboured by the new, explanationist, paradigm.

How to Teach Factual Analysis: Assessing an Indian Evidence Law Course

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-136
Author(s):  
Ajay Kr Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Teaching Experience ◽  
Analysis Methods ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Teaching Learning ◽  
Law Of Evidence

This article experientially narrates the innovative use of certain fact-finding and analysis methods, namely, ‘an investigation problem’, the Wigmorean chart method and the probability theory with Bayesian analysis (with the case law demonstrating its pragmatic application and limitation), by the author, an Indian law teacher, in teaching his ‘law of evidence’ course. This marks a departure from the conventional way of teaching evidence law in India, which presents its own challenges. In the course of this article, the author vividly shares his teaching experiences, discusses the academic resources used, highlights the key learning outcomes derived in administering these components, and delineates their overall positive impact on the learning of the subject. He further validates these experiences on the basis of the results of an empirical study conducted by him, in which a large number of his students voluntarily participated and gave their feedbacks. The results demonstrate the efficacy of these factual analysis methods individually, and their positive correlation with the increased understanding and knowledge of this course. This is descriptively demonstrated by the results obtained from Kendall’s Tau-b correlation which, along with the graphics, show a significant monotonic relationship between the said three methods and their cumulative contribution in terms of the overall learning of the subject. This empirical study also demonstrates an overall match between the author’s teaching experience as an evidence law teacher in teaching the avowed fact analysis methods, and his evidence law class’ experience as the students learning them, which is crucial for every effective teaching–learning exercise. After discussing important literature on teaching fact analysis and evidence law, the author concludes by justifying his overall use of the ‘hybrid approach’ in teaching his ‘law of evidence’ course. Consequentially, this study seeks to inspire other evidence law teachers to pedagogically assimilate similar methods in their curricula.

scholarly journals Can there be a burden of the best explanation?

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Evidence Law ◽  
Civil Cases ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
The Many ◽  
Legal Fact ◽  
Burden Of Persuasion

In this article I address a foundational question in evidence law: how should judges and jurors reason with evidence? According to a widely accepted approach, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. In most civil cases, the party carrying the burden of persuasion is said to need to persuade triers that the facts she needs to prevail are “more likely than not” true. The problem is that this approach is both a descriptively and normatively inadequate account of reasoning with evidence in law. It does not offer a plausible picture of how people in general, and legal fact-finders in particular, reason with evidence. And it turns out that if we try to do what the approach tells us, we end up with absurd results. Faced with these difficulties, a group of evidence scholars has proposed an alternative. According to them, legal fact-finding should involve a determination of which hypothesis best explains the admitted evidence, rather than whether each cause of action is proven to a specific probability. My main contributions in this article are twofold. First, I elaborate on the many descriptive, normative and explanatory considerations in support of an explanation-based approach to standards. Second, I offer novel replies to pressing objections against that same approach.

New foundations for cognitive psychology

1971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julius M. Moravcsek ◽  
Seymour Papert ◽  
Zenon W. Pylyshyn ◽  
Robert Shaw ◽  
Michael Mclntyre ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
New Foundations

Postural Changes in Essential Hypertension under Treatment and their Effect on the Renogram

1971 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 39-46
Author(s):  
C. Alexandrou ◽  
E. Papadakis ◽  
E. Gyftaki ◽  
J. Darsinos
Keyword(s):  
Renal Function ◽  
Essential Hypertension ◽  
Early Diagnosis ◽  
Postural Hypotension ◽  
Antihypertensive Treatment ◽  
Normal Subjects ◽  
Upright Position ◽  
Postural Changes ◽  
Significant Impairment

SummaryRadioisotope renograms were obtained in the upright and prone position in 9 normal subjects, in 5 patients with untreated essential hypertension and in 21 hypertensives under treatment, showing moderate postural hypotension.No significant renographic change were seen in the two positions in normal subjects and untreated hypertensives. Treated hypertensives with postural hypotension showed significant impairment of renal function in the upright position in 15 cases and no change in 6. Renal creatinine clearance was lower in the group that showed renographic changes. Renography in the upright position is suggested as a convenient test for early diagnosis and follow-up of the adverse effects of antihypertensive treatment.

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