scholarly journals State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making. Dissolving the Paradox

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMANTHA BESSON

AbstractThis article starts with a paradox: international law-making is ridden with reasonable disagreement and yet no state can be bound by international law without its consent and hence without agreement. Breaking away from the pragmatic resignation that prevails among international law scholars on this question, the article proposes an interpretation of the role of state consent that both fits and justifies its central role in the practice of international law-making and, hopefully, strengthens the latter's legitimacy in the future. Its proposed justification actually lies in the circumstances of reasonable disagreement among democratic states and this proposal dissolves the paradox. The article argues that, in international law as it is the case domestically, consent is neither a criterion of validity of law nor a ground for its legitimate authority. It also dispels two myths about state consent: its necessary relationship to legal positivism and state sovereignty. Instead, the article argues, the role of democratic state consent is that of an exception to the legitimate authority of international law and hence to its bindingness in a concrete case. While the legitimacy of international law is not democratic, the democratic nature of states and their democratic accountability to their people matter. This is especially the case in circumstances of widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement as they prevail among democratic states in international law-making. In these circumstances, respecting the sovereign equality of democratic states by requiring their consent is the way to grant an equal voice to their people. Of course, there are limits to the democratic state exception that are inherent to both its democratic dimension (it requires respecting basic political equality) and its consensual dimension (it requires that consent is expressed in a free, fair and informed fashion). The article concludes by showing how the proposed disagreement-attuned account of democratic state consent explains various characteristics of the main international law-making processes, i.e., treaties and custom.

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Ebikake

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive anti-money laundering control (hereinafter AMLC). Design/methodology/approach This article focuses heavily on understanding the nature of international anti-money laundering (AML) law-making process. The approach towards this question is interdisciplinary and looks at the treaty and non-treaty AML obligations through a prism of two theoretical lenses (legal positivism and liberal/legal process theory) to explain the role of soft law in the area. Findings Current international effort to combat money laundering (ML) is fragmented (as evident in the enormous variety of law-making processes), despite the role of soft law. Part of the problem is the divergent nature of domestic criminal legislation, which is reflected in the choice of predicate crime and a lack of procedural rule to identify and enforce the law at the state level. To address the limit of current efforts, the paper will propose a uniform codification of AML law directed by a more representative body or commission of experts offering means of restating, clarifying and revising the law authoritatively and systematically. Research limitations/implications The research is focused mainly on the theoretical issues relating to the subject of ML and less on any empirical case study. Practical implications The paper will focus on the role of soft law as a technique for repressive and preventive AMLC. Based on current analyses of the role of soft law as an alternative to hard law or as a complement to hard law (leading to greater cooperation), it attempts to outline the possible advantages and disadvantages that soft law could have in the context of AMLC. For example, the use of soft law promotes harmonisation of international AML standards through the Financial Action Task Force, while the role of the FATF remains unclear in international law. This is important for the purpose of responsibility, as the law on state responsibility clearly states when a State is responsible, in the event of a breach, and the consequence in international law. Social implications The implication of the paper is that it contributes to the on-going debate about the increasingly role of soft law-making in international law. Originality/value The research perspective to the study of ML is theoretical and focuses on the nature of the law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-138
Author(s):  
Kevin W. Gray ◽  
Kafumu Kalyalya

In this paper we challenge the role of consent in the global order by discussing current modes of international law making in the global order. We contend that the features of state consent in international law depart substantially from those assumed by theorists of the liberal order, who subscribe, in most cases, to the realist conception of state action. We argue, against those theorists, that state consents to coercive measures, and the state’s role in carrying them out, has ceased to be central to an account of global law. We conclude that international law—often thought of as law beyond the state—now has expanded its scope to reach individuals and corporations, and that this change has important ramifications for theories of global justice.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 349-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshinobu Takei

Established in 1996, the Arctic Council has played an essential role in promoting pan- Arctic cooperation on various issues concerning the Arctic. Increasingly, its activities have contributed to the development of international law relating to the Arctic in terms of law-making and implementation. Recent developments make it pertinent to investigate the possibilities and challenges faced by the Arctic Council in developing legally binding instruments and otherwise contributing to the development of international law relating to the Arctic. How has the Council been engaged in activities that contribute to the development of international law? What factors have affected these activities? This article describes the structure of the Arctic Council and its status under international law; analyzes important developments relating to this issue in the period before the 2009 Ministerial Meeting held in Tromsø, Norway; examines the processes in which two legally binding instruments were negotiated and eventually adopted as well as elements common to these agreements; and discusses Arctic Council processes relevant to the development of international law other than treaty negotiations under its auspices.


Author(s):  
Giulio Bartolini

In 1931 Lauterpacht described the Italian scholarship as characterized by a ‘rigid and frequently uncompromising positivist school in international law’. While his statement has some merits, this chapter seeks both to illustrate how this trend emerged from previous approaches and, conversely, to emphasize the multifaceted perspectives that were effectively present in those decades, thus partly circumscribing Lauterpacht’s assertion. Following a survey of the fluid approaches present at the beginning of the twentieth century, this chapter will introduce the pivotal role of Dionisio Anzilotti in favoring legal positivism, even if dissident voices were still present or subsequently emerged. After Anzilotti, other poles of attraction emerged, in particular through Santi Romano and other scholars, who, while still claiming to adhere to the lines of positive law, deprived this conception of several of its original theoretical attributes. Conversely, few attempts were made to elaborate doctrines aimed at reflecting the political ambitions of Fascism, which was unsuccessful in influencing the broad theoretical debate.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter briefly discusses the nature of the international legal system. The premise is that the structure of the international legal system is fundamentally different from that of national legal order: contrary to the vertical structure encountered in domestic settings, in international law the structure is horizontal. States enjoy sovereign equality, while both international law-making and international adjudication are based on the consent of the States. There are various theories that have attempted to describe the nature of the international law, including naturalism, positivism, formalism, and realism. Also significant is the existence of a certain hierarchy in the international legal system, in the sense that there are some peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of torture and genocide, to which there is no derogation.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter briefly discusses the nature of the international legal system. The premise is that the structure of the international legal system is fundamentally different from that of national legal order: contrary to the vertical structure encountered in domestic settings, in international law the structure is horizontal. States enjoy sovereign equality, while both international law-making and international adjudication are based on the consent of the States. There are various theories that have attempted to describe the nature of the international law, including naturalism, positivism, formalism, and realism. Significant is also the existence of a certain hierarchy in the international legal system, in the sense that there are some peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of torture and genocide, to which there is no derogation.


Author(s):  
Kammerhofer Jörg

This chapter explores the role of positivism in international law, noting that the term ‘positivism’ itself has many connotations, most of which muddy an already neglected—yet strikingly pervasive—approach to international law. On that note, the chapter explores the differences (and overlaps) between positivism and formalism; then, it shows how radically different modern, philosophically- and jurisprudentially-informed forms of international legal positivism are, how little they are touched by the constant attack on the positivist–voluntarist straw man, and how unfair it is to lump them together with unthinking ‘positivists’:. Following these arguments is a reconstruction of the Neo-Hartian Socio-Psychologico-Linguistic school of positivism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREAS FOLLESDAL

AbstractThis paper explores subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in international law. Some authors have appealed to a principle of subsidiarity in order to defend the legitimacy of several striking features of international law, such as the centrality of state consent, the leeway in assessing state compliance and weak sanctions in its absence. The article presents such defences of state-centric aspects of international law by appeals to subsidiarity, and finds them wanting. Different interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of subunits, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. Five different interpretations are explored, drawn from Althusius, the US federalists, Pope Leo XIII, and others. One upshot is that the principle of subsidiarity cannot provide normative legitimacy to the state-centric aspects of current international law on its own. It stands in need of substantial interpretation. The versions of subsidiarity that match current practices of public international law are questionable. Many crucial aspects of our legal order must be reconsidered – in particular the standing and scope of state sovereignty.


KPGT_dlutz_1 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 164-180
Author(s):  
Igor Anisimov ◽  
Elena Gulyaeva

This article introduces a brief outline of the inter-State conflict types. The evaluation considers the principle of peaceful disputes’ settlement evolution from antiquity to the present based on the legal analysis of historical and international legal sources. The article looks at the content of this principle and a comparative legal study of peaceful dispute resolution laid down in the UN Charter and other international legal instruments. The authors conclude that the peaceful international disputes settlement is a complex, integrated principle with several interrelated elements and the content incorporated in various international legal instruments. The article highlights the vital role of appropriate freedom of States to choose the remedies of settling their disputes. This right is a corollary to two interrelated international law principles – the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in matters within their domestic jurisdiction.


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