Performing the rule of law in international organizations: Ibrahim Shihata and the World Bank’s turn to governance reform

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 47-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitri Van Den Meerssche

AbstractIn recent years, the academic field of international institutional law has taken a clear ‘constitutional’ turn. In this normative endeavour, liberal ‘rule of law’ ideals are being reinvigorated, translated and projected onto international organizations. This article trades this well-trodden path for a socio-legal inquiry into how the ‘rule of law’ is produced, practiced and performed in the everyday political and operational life of one specific international organization (the World Bank) during one contentious historical episode. To grasp what it means for ‘law to rule’, I argue, we need to expand our archives to the daily praxis of legality: the actors that embody it; the consciousness that drives it; the politics that rely on it; and the fragile institutional balances that give it meaning. Grounded in this pragmatist perspective, I retrace the intervention of legal expertise during the Bank’s turn to state reform in the wake of the Cold War. Descending from principles to practices, from norms to acts, from abstract heights to situated performances, the article not only strives for an enhanced understanding of the ‘rule of law’ within the World Bank, but also aims at a critical methodological intervention in the field of international institutional law.

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
William Gabriel Brînză

For a long period of time, corruption was accepted as being an inevitable fact of life.Corruption in the 27 EU member states undermines citizens' fundamental rights, goodgovernance and the rule of law. In 2000, the World Bank carried out a study about corruptionat the request of the Romanian Government. The elaboration process and the implementationof an anticorruption strategy depend on the state’s politics and priorities.


2019 ◽  
pp. 605-616
Author(s):  
Andrew Boutros

As part of its development efforts, the World Bank has a fiduciary duty to ensure that its funds are used for their intended purposes and with due attention to economy and efficiency. In furtherance of this fiduciary duty, the Bank’s anti-corruption measures seek to incorporate processes that ensure standards of good governance and conformity with principles of the rule of law. Indeed, fraud and corruption weaken institutions and divert essential resources from those who are supposed to benefit the most: the poor. Since the mid-1990s, the World Bank has worked to develop a robust sanctions system that is efficient, effective, and fair, offering accused parties a fair process through which they can present their defense. The World Bank has also sought to work with its partners to deter and prevent misconduct from occurring in the first place. This chapter describes the history and evolution of the World Bank’s sanctions system and its efforts to combat fraud and corruption in its development activities.


2021 ◽  
pp. 223386592110248
Author(s):  
Yooneui Kim ◽  
Youngwan Kim

Are international organizations autonomous actors in global politics? This paper investigates whether and how major powers influence the World Bank’s official development assistance policies. Despite the World Bank’s attempts to maintain independence from its member states, we argue that major powers are still influential. Testing this expectation with the data of official development assistance provisions between 1981 and 2017, we find that the World Bank provides a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipient countries that receive a higher amount of such assistance from the major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. In addition, the World Bank is prone to provide a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipients that have a similar preference to the major powers. This study sheds light on the relations between major powers and international organizations.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 717-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS POGGE

Various human rights are widely recognized in codified and customary international law. These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet international law also establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to violations of these human rights: fundamental components of international law systematically obstruct the aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, are designed so that they systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 332-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Gallagher

This article explores norms as idealizations, in an attempt to grasp their significance as projects for international organizations. We can think about norms as ‘standards of proper behaviour’. In this sense they are somehow natural, things to be taken for granted, noticed only really when they are absent. We can also think about norms as ‘understandings about what is good and appropriate’. In this sense, norms embody a stronger sense of virtue and an ability to enable progress or improvement. Norms become ideal when they are able to conflate what is good with what is appropriate, standard, or proper. It is when the good becomes ‘natural’ that a norm appears immanent and non-contestable, and so acquires an idealized form.45Along with the other articles in this special issue, I will attempt to challenge some of the complacency surrounding the apparent naturalness and universality of norms employed in international relations.


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