Should Empathic Development Be a Priority in Biomedical Ethics Teaching? A Critical Perspective

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE MAXWELL ◽  
ERIC RACINE
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Medical Curriculum ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Biomedical Ethics ◽  
Critical Perspective ◽  
Moral Functioning ◽  
Ethics Teaching ◽  
Empathic Development ◽  
Education And Development

Biomedical ethics is an essential part of the medical curriculum because it is thought to enrich moral reflection and conduce to ethical decisionmaking and ethical behavior. In recent years, however, the received idea that competency in moral reasoning leads to moral responsibility “in the field” has been the subject of sustained attention. Today, moral education and development research widely recognize moral reasoning as being but one among at least four distinguishable dimensions of psychological moral functioning alongside moral motivation, moral character, and moral sensitivity. In a reflection of this framework, medical educators and curriculum planners repeatedly advance the idea that educators should be concerned with supporting empathy, and this, very often, as a means of improving on and broadening medical ethics education’s traditional focus on moral reasoning.

Moral education

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John White
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Natural Process ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
Rules And Principles ◽  
History Of

This entry looks at three contemporary approaches to moral learning and education, all of which have roots in the history of philosophy. The first holds that just as children grow, or develop, in a physical sense, so they also develop in their moral dispositions or judgments. A central issue here is whether the concept of development is applicable outside its biological home. The second sees moral learning not as a natural process, but as a deliberate induction into socially approved norms or values. On one version of this view, it is not enough to bring children to follow the rules enshrined in conventional moral codes as they need to learn to sift these in the light of higher-order rational principles. Problems arise here both about moral motivation and about whether morality is wholly to do with rules and principles. For other theorists moral education is more a matter of shaping children’s nature-given desires and emotions into settled dispositions or virtues on Aristotelian lines. While the ‘rational principle’ view focuses on the morally autonomous individual, this view has its roots in communal moral traditions. Despite Plato’s belief that only knowledge is teachable, and therefore that it is doubtful whether moral goodness can be taught at all, the third view of moral learning maintains that it must include the acquisition of relevant knowledge and understanding, and cover the formation of dispositions. All this bears on how moral education should feature in schools – on the role of school ethos, learning by example, and the contribution of the whole curriculum.

Defining features of moral sensitivity and moral motivation: pathways to moral reasoning in medical students1

2006 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly R. Morton ◽  
Joanna S. Worthley ◽  
John K. Testerman ◽  
Marita L. Mahoney
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Sensitivity

Sentimentalist moral education

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Slote
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Care Ethics ◽  
Lawrence Kohlberg ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Moral Sentimentalism ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Do So

Care ethics, and moral sentimentalism more generally, have not developed a picture of moral education that is comparable in scope or depth to the rationalist/Kantian/Rawlsian account of moral education that has been offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. But it is possible to do so if one borrows from the work of Martin Hoffman and makes systematic use of Hume’s earlier sentimentalist ideas. Kohlberg and Rawls offer accounts of moral learning that leave moral motivation largely unexplained or mysterious, but an emphasis on the psychology of empathy can help us to better understand both the content of our morality and the ways in which children and adults can become and be morally motivated. Parents can in a number of ways evoke and strengthen children’s empathic moral tendencies, and such processes can also occur and need to occur in schools and later on in life. In addition, a sentimentalist understanding of the meaning of moral terms can show how moral rules, principles, and injunctions can strongly reinforce the sorts of empathic/moral tendencies that are at least initially based in other elements of human psychology.

scholarly journals Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Svoboda
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Better Than

Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality (Richard Garner), adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality (Richard Joyce), and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged (Jonas Olson). I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.

Consistency and Inconsistency in Adolescents’ Moral Reasoning

1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-836 ◽  
Author(s):  
Júlio Rique ◽  
Cleonice Camino
Keyword(s):  
High School Students ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Defining Issues Test ◽  
School Students ◽  
Educational Methods ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Developmental Progression ◽  
Male High School ◽  
Quasi Experimental

Authors in the cognitive developmental tradition (e.g. Damon & Hart, 1988; Snyder & Feldman, 1984; Turiel, 1983) have created models to explain transition between stages of development. This study introduces consistency and inconsistency of moral reasoning as patterns of moral thinking and presents implications for moral education. Consistency and inconsistency are determined by the level of “stage mixture” scored on the Defining Issues Test. A 2 × 2 quasi-experimental design was created. Participants were 52, 15-year-old male high school students. Moral judgement was the dependent variable. Consistency, inconsistency, and the experimental procedures were independent variables. Results showed a significant interaction between levels of consistency and educational methods ( P < .014), a developmental progression for the condition inconsistent experimental ( P < .004), and a predicted pattern of change for the condition consistent experimental ( P < .001). The authors concluded that consistency and inconsistency of moral reasoning require different assumptions for the promotion of moral development.

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