A Multilevel Analysis of Moral Functioning Integrating Socio-Bio-Evolutionary Science, Socio-Constructionism and Constructivist-Developmental Theory

Tensions chronically exist in the research literature among bio-evolutionary scientists, constructivist-developmental psychologists, and socio-constructionist scholars about how to describe, understand, and predict our moral functioning. An analysis of the assumptions of each of these theoretical paradigms, the disciplinary fields that inform their conceptual models, and the empirical evidence they use to sustain their claims reveals the tensions that exist, as different communities of scholars assign different roles to nature and nurture, reason and intuition, and to the private minds of individuals and the social intelligibilities available to them in a given time and place of history. Using simple multilevel structures, it is possible to see that the divisions that exist within these scientific communities can be conceptualized in terms of their use of different levels of analysis, as they each focus on different populations and employ different underlying units of time and space. Bio-evolutionary scientists study humans as species, using slow-paced time units of analysis such as millennia, and their studies focus on the epigenetic dimensions of our moral sense, documenting inter-species variance in moral functioning. Socio-constructionists study humans as members of groups, using moderately paced time units of analysis such as decades and centuries, and their studies focus on cultural variations in what different groups of people consider to be good or bad, according to the social structures and intelligibilities that are available to them in a given time and place of history. Constructivist-developmental psychologists study humans as individuals, using fast-paced time units of analysis such as months and years, and their studies focus on the maturational dimension of our moral sense, documenting within- and between-individuals variation throughout their lifetime. Unfortunately, by focusing on different populations and time units, these communities of scholars produce research findings that highlight certain aspects of our moral functioning while downplaying others. Interestingly, complex multilevel structures can illustrate how different levels of analysis are nested within each other and can demonstrate how different scientific endeavors have been striving to account for different sources of variability in our moral functioning. The use of complex multilevel structures can also allow us to understand our moral functioning from a dynamic, complex, multilevel theoretical perspective, and as the product of (a) genetic variations that occur between and within species, (b) variations in the social structures, discourses, and intelligibilities that are available in the culture and regulate what social groups consider good and bad at different places and times of history, and (c) variations in the personal experiences and opportunities of interaction that individuals have in different environments throughout their lifetime. Researchers need to clarify the epigenetic, historical, and developmental rules of our moral functioning, and the ways in which different dimensions interact with each other.

Cerebellum and Emotion in Morality

In the current chapter, I examined the relationship between the cerebellum, emotion, and morality with evidence from large-scale neuroimaging data analysis. Although the aforementioned relationship has not been well studied in neuroscience, recent studies have shown that the cerebellum is closely associated with emotional and social processes at the neural level. Also, debates in the field of moral philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have supported the importance of emotion in moral functioning. Thus, I explored the potentially important but less-studies topic with NeuroSynth, a tool for large-scale brain image analysis, while addressing issues associated with reverse inference. The result from analysis demonstrated that brain regions in the cerebellum, the right Crus I and Crus II in particular, were specifically associated with morality in general. I discussed the potential implications of the finding based on clinical and functional neuroimaging studies of the cerebellum, emotional functioning, and neural networks for diverse psychological processes.

A plea for the study of the relation between the Aretaic Morality and the Deontic and Responsibility Moralities

Although the deontic, responsibility/caring, and aretaic moralities have been extensively investigated, the relation among them, namely the relation between the aretaic and the deontic and responsibility moralities, have rarely been studied. To fill in this gap is the main goal of this study. In the first part, we set the context for the study of the relation between the aretaic and the deontic and caring moralities, while arguing that Kohlberg’s theory is mainly a deontic moral theory. Second, we elaborate on the reasons why Kohlberg did not introduce an aretaic morality into his theory. Third, we show that Kohlberg’s reasons to exclude this type of morality from his moral theory are problematic. Fourth, we argue that much could be gained if moral psychology took the aretaic morality and its relation to the deontic and caring/responsibility moralities into account. Fifth, we present the main findings of an exploratory research on preadolescents’ (n = 32) and adolescents’ (n = 32) deontic, aretaic and responsibility evaluations of hypothetical actions, and analyze the relations among these evaluations. Finally, we summarize the main ideas of this study; refer to some of its limitations; point to some examples for future research; and claim that our suggestion of an aretaic-deontic-responsibility model may contribute to the understanding of one’s moral functioning. However, this suggestion requires further methodological and empirical efforts.

Linking Moral Identity With Moral Emotions: A Meta-Analysis

This meta-analysis examined the relationship between moral identity and moral emotions drawing on 57 independent studies. Moral identity was significantly associated with moral emotions, r = .32, p < .01, 95% confidence interval [CI: .27, .36]. Effect sizes were moderated by the type of moral emotion. Studies reporting other-regarding emotions (sympathy, empathy, and compassion) had the largest effect sizes ( r = .41), while negative other-evaluative emotions (moral anger, contempt, and disgust) had the smallest ( r = .16). Self-evaluative and other-evaluative positive emotions had intermediate effect sizes ( r values between .29 and .32). The type of emotion measure also was a significant moderator, with trait measures of emotion ( r = .38) correlating more strongly with moral identity than state measures ( r = .24). Effect sizes did not differ for the type of moral identity measure being used, publication status, or cultural origin of the study sample. The results of this meta-analysis demonstrate a robust empirical connection between moral identity and moral emotions, which confirms the multifaceted role of moral identity in moral functioning.

Introduction

Morality is central to our lives and regulates our behavior even absent external punishment or reward. Because morality is complicated, it is best studied from multiple perspectives and disciplines. We here propose studying morality from the perspective of psychiatry. Moral psychiatry, as we call this new subfield, focuses on mental illnesses whose content is closely related to morality, using psychiatric conditions to illuminate morality. This ultimately sheds light on ordinary moral functioning without unrealistically idealizing our psychology. Scrupulosity is an example of how psychiatric conditions can illuminate morality and test philosophical theories in various ways.