Framing to persuade. Sweden's decision to join the European Union

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-141
Author(s):  
LEIF LEWIN

In September 2003, in a referendum, Sweden said ‘no’ to the euro. This might have shocked the European political establishments, but for Swedish observers the result came as no surprise. Swedish ordinary citizens were already sceptical of the whole EU project when Sweden applied for membership in 1991; thereafter, Sweden was the only member country with a EU-negative majority in its delegation to the European Parliament. For once the dominant Social Democratic Party in Sweden, otherwise so superbly skilful in forming opinion, had not anchored its EU-policy among the voters. Instead, the politics leading to Swedish membership were a rather Machiavellian process that – in the light of the assumption of politics as rational action – reveals a fascinating internal political game between central figures in the Social Democratic Party.

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 56-79
Author(s):  
M. Anne Sa'adah

Joschka Fischer (b. 1948), Germany’s foreign minister and for severalyears one of the country’s most popular politicians, is a man ofthe moment, of consequence both domestically and beyond hiscountry’s borders. Nationally prominent as leader of the “realo” factionof the Greens, he was instrumental in turning a protest movementinto the partner in power of the Social Democratic Party(SPD). During the Kosovo crisis, he was a key figure in securingGerman participation in the NATO intervention. He has played aninfluential role in the unfolding debate about institutional reformwithin the European Union. During the latest round of Israeli-Palestinianviolence, he has actively tried to bring the parties to the table.


2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Thau

Abstract In Denmark, as in other Western European countries, the working class does not vote for social democratic parties to the same extent as before. Yet, what role did the social democratic parties themselves play in the demobilization of class politics? Building on core ideas from public opinion literature, this article differs from the focus on party policy positions in previous work and, instead, focuses on the group-based appeals of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Based on a quantitative content analysis of party programs between 1961 and 2004, I find that, at the general level, class-related appeals have been replaced by appeals targeting non-economic groups. At the specific level, the class-related appeals that remain have increasingly been targeting businesses at the expense of traditional left-wing groups such as wage earners, tenants and pensioners. These findings support a widespread hypothesis that party strategy was crucial in the decline of class politics, but also suggests that future work on class mobilization should adopt a group-centered perspective.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubomír Kopeček ◽  
Pavel Pšeja

This article attempts to analyze developments within the Czech Left after 1989. Primarily, the authors focus on two questions: (1) How did the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) achieve its dominance of the Left? (2)What is the relationship between the Social Democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)? We conclude that the unsuccessful attempt to move the KSČM towards a moderate leftist identity opened up a space in which the Social Democrats could thrive, at the same time gradually assuming a pragmatic approach towards the Communists. Moreover, the ability of Miloš Zeman, the leader of the Social Democrats, to build a clear non-Communist Left alternative to the hegemony of the Right during the 1990s was also very important.


Author(s):  
Charles S. Maier

This chapter examines issues arising from the elections that were held in France, Germany, and Italy in the spring of 1924, asking in particular whether the elections could resolve the political ambiguities persisting in the three countries. It suggests that the presence of important political alternatives could not guarantee that the voting would yield clear decisions. Even where significant majorities or shifts of opinion occurred, the results were not unequivocal in terms of the issues at stake. Choices on the ballot did not parallel real policy alternatives. Superficially decisive victories led merely to coalitions built around opportunity rather than policy. The chapter considers the limits of Benito Mussolini's majority, the setback suffered by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the polls, and the coalition between the Radical Socialist Party and the SPD to form the Cartel des Gauches.


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