TRYING TO DEFEND ATTEMPTS: REPLIES TO BRATMAN, BRINK, ALEXANDER, AND MOORE

Legal Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-215
Author(s):  
Gideon Yaffe
Keyword(s):  
Michael Bratman ◽  
David Brink ◽  
Michael Moore

This essay replies to the thoughtful commentaries, by Michael Bratman, David Brink, Larry Alexander, and Michael Moore, on my book Attempts.

A hard choice for Tomasello

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hard Choice ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Human Sense ◽  
Sense Of Obligation

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.

Connecting Moral Status to Proper Legal Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 215-230
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sachs
Keyword(s):  
Medical Research ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
State Funding ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Legal Moralism ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Law ◽  
Strong Claim ◽  
Michael Moore

This chapter entertains three proposals as to the connection between an animal’s moral status and what legal status it ought to have. The first proposal is this strong claim: that an act wrongs an animal is a justification for criminalizing it. The second proposal is this moderate claim: that an act constitutes an injustice to an animal is a justification for criminalizing it. Both of these proposals can be vindicated if an argument for legal moralism that the author constructs, drawing on the work of Michael Moore, is sound. Meanwhile, Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair Cochrane, and Robert Garner have each argued for the second proposal. The chapter demonstrates that all four of these arguments are unsound. The third proposal is this claim: it is obligatory for legislators to eliminate any aspect of the law that facilitates the wronging of animals. This proposal, the author argues, is sound. Comparatively weak though this proposal is, the chapter extracts from it radical implications for animal ownership and state funding of medical research on animal subjects.

scholarly journals FROM THE EDITORS

Legal Theory ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander ◽  
Mitchell Berman ◽  
Connie Rosati ◽  
Scott Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
San Diego ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Law School ◽  
University Of California ◽  
University Of Pennsylvania ◽  
University Of Arizona ◽  
Editorial Work ◽  
David Brink

The last year has seen major changes at Legal Theory. Two of the journals’ editors—David Brink (Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego) and Matthew Adler (Professor of Law, Duke Law School)—stepped down after years of outstanding editorial work. We gratefully acknowledge their invaluable contributions in sustaining and improving the journal. As each editor stepped down, a new editor stepped in. Connie Rosati (Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona) began work as an editor in the fall of 2016. In the spring of 2017, Mitchell Berman (Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School) joined the journal.

Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Sverdlik
Keyword(s):  
Simple View ◽  
Michael Bratman

What is the relation between the intention to A and doing A intentionally? It is natural to suppose that the latter entails the former. That is, it is natural to accept what Michael Bratman has called the ‘Simple View’ of the relation between acting intentionally and having an intention. Bratman is one noteworthy writer who has denied that the Simple View is true. In the present paper I do not defend this view. I contend that one well-known argument that Bratman offers for thinking that the Simple View is false fails, in fact, to disprove it. If there are reasons for thinking that the Simple View is false, as I believe there are, they are not the ones that Bratman has offered. My discussion of Bratman also raises some more general questions about the principles governing the rational formation of intentions. I suggest that a special sort of example casts doubt on the tenability of a commonly accepted principle that Bratman, among others, utilizes.

scholarly journals Hart's Methodological Positivism

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Perry
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Michael Moore

To understand H.L.A. Hart's general theory of law, it is helpful to distinguish between substantive and methodological legal positivism. Substantive legal positivism is the view that there is no necessary connection between morality and the content of law. Methodological legal positivism is the view that legal theory can and should offer a normatively neutral description of a particular social phenomenon, namely law. Methodological positivism holds, we might say, not that there is no necessary connection between morality and law, but rather that there is no connection, necessary or otherwise, between morality and legal theory. The respective claims of substantive and methodological positivism are, at least on the surface, logically independent. Hobbes and Bentham employed normative methodologies to defend versions of substantive positivism, and in modern times Michael Moore has developed what can be regarded as a variant of methodological positivism to defend a theory of natural law.

scholarly journals Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Shared Intention ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
Technical Terms

AbstractDrawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of the correlative personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.

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