Connecting Moral Status to Proper Legal Status

2021 ◽  
pp. 215-230
Author(s):  
Benjamin Sachs

This chapter entertains three proposals as to the connection between an animal’s moral status and what legal status it ought to have. The first proposal is this strong claim: that an act wrongs an animal is a justification for criminalizing it. The second proposal is this moderate claim: that an act constitutes an injustice to an animal is a justification for criminalizing it. Both of these proposals can be vindicated if an argument for legal moralism that the author constructs, drawing on the work of Michael Moore, is sound. Meanwhile, Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair Cochrane, and Robert Garner have each argued for the second proposal. The chapter demonstrates that all four of these arguments are unsound. The third proposal is this claim: it is obligatory for legislators to eliminate any aspect of the law that facilitates the wronging of animals. This proposal, the author argues, is sound. Comparatively weak though this proposal is, the chapter extracts from it radical implications for animal ownership and state funding of medical research on animal subjects.

Author(s):  
von Heinegg Wolff Heintschel

This chapter evaluates legal developments and practice with respect to armed conflict at sea. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has progressively developed the law and contributed to the emergence of multiple differing regimes, some of which are now customary in character. The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1995) provides a contemporary restatement of the law of armed conflict at sea, together with some progressive development. The chapter provides an overview of the different acts of naval warfare, comments on special provisions concerning means and methods of naval warfare, and explains the legal status of hospital ships including conditions of their protection.


Author(s):  
McLaughlin Robert

This chapter examines the third level of the three level scheme: belligerency. Belligerency, under the customary three level scheme, was a formal legal status. Once the conflict state accorded an adversary NSAG (non-state armed group) formal belligerency status—either directly or by implication—both parties were bound by the Law of War as applicable to conflicts between states. As Justice Brown noted in The Ambrose Light (1885): "The recognition by foreign states of a state of war in civil strife, or, what is the same thing, a recognition of the belligerent rights of the insurgents, authorizes courts of law to treat the insurgents as lawful combatants." This recognition did not bind third states, who were entitled to make their own determination based upon a part objective, part political test. As a matter of practicality, however, once the conflict state afforded the NSAG belligerency status, third states directly affected by the conflict usually acted in accordance with this recognition. The chapter then considers the belligerency test.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Raghid Fattal ◽  

The French decree no. 131/2016 promulgated on Feb.10, 2016, and the Law no. 287/2018 promulgated on April 20, 2018 have amended many issues in the French Civil Code, including the doctrine “the contract has effect towards the parties only”. However, this doctrine is not very clear, and needs to be interpreted according to the new legislations. This shall include the idea that “the third party shall respect the legal status created by the contract”, and the idea that the third party can benefit from the legal status created by the contract as well. The doctrine according to which the simulated contract does not have effect towards the third party, and the nullity of the contract that simulates the true price, and how the amendments of the articles 1199 and 1200 of the French Civil Code affect the courts decisions that allow the third party to oblige the seller to execute the sale contract. It is also important to mention the conditions that allow the third party to sue for damages, the debtor who did not perform his/her contractual duties. We would like also to mention the opinions of the Law projects makers, and to compare the laws with the UAE Civil Transactions Law. The new doctrine of “binding himself on behalf of a third party” and the doctrine of “stipulation for the benefit of a third party” shall be interpreted according to the new legislations.


Author(s):  
Chen Lei

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Daniel B. Kelly

This chapter analyzes how law and economics influences private law and how (new) private law is influencing law and economics. It focuses on three generation or “waves” within law and economics and how they approach private law. In the first generation, many scholars took the law as a starting point and attempted to use economic insights to explain, justify, or reform legal doctrines, institutions, and structures. In the second generation, the “law” at times became secondary, with more focus on theory and less focus on doctrines, institutions, and structures. But this generation also relied increasingly on empirical analysis. In the third generation, which includes scholars in the New Private Law (NPL), there has been a resurgence of interest in the law and legal institutions. To be sure, NPL scholars analyze the law using various approaches, with some more and some less predisposed to economic analysis. However, economic analysis will continue to be a major force on private law, including the New Private Law, for the foreseeable future. The chapter considers three foundational private law areas: property, contracts, and torts. For each area, it discusses the major ideas that economic analysis has contributed to private law, and surveys contributions of the NPL. The chapter also looks at the impact of law and economics on advanced private law areas, such as business associations, trusts and estates, and intellectual property.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-434
Author(s):  
David R Lawrence ◽  
Sarah Morley

AbstractEmerging biotechnologies and advances in computer science promise the arrival of novel beings possessed of some degree of moral status, even potentially sentient or sapient life. Such a manifestation will constitute an epochal change, and perhaps threaten Homo sapiens’ status as the only being generally considered worthy of personhood and its contingent protections; as well as being the root of any number of social and legal issues. The law as it stands is not likely to be capable of managing or adapting to this challenge. This paper highlights the likely societal ramifications of novel beings and the gaps in the legislation which is likely to be relied upon to respond to these. In so doing, the authors make a case for the development of new regulatory structures to manage the moral issues surrounding this new technological upheaval.


1990 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Meyer

It is now notorious that the production of inscriptions in the Roman Empire was not constant over time, but rose over the first and second centuries A.D. and fell in the third. Ramsay MacMullen pointed this out more than five years ago, with conclusions more cautionary than explanatory: ‘history is not being written in the right way’, he said, for historians have deduced Rome's decline from evidence that–since it appears only epigraphically–has merely disappeared for its own reasons, or have sought general explanations of decline in theories political, economic, or even demographic in nature, none of which can, in turn, explain the disappearance of epigraphy itself. Why this epigraphic habit rose and fell MacMullen left open to question, although he did postulate control by a ‘sense of audience’. The purpose of this paper is to propose that this ‘sense of audience’ was not generalized or generic, but depended on a belief in the value of romanization, of which (as noted but not explained by MacMullen's article) the epigraphic habit is also a rough indicator. Epitaphs constitute the bulk of all provincial inscriptions and in form and number are (generally speaking) the consequence of a provincial imitation of characteristically Roman practices, an imitation that depended on the belief that Roman legal status and style were important, and that may indeed have ultimately depended, at least in North Africa, on the acquisition or prior possession of that status. Such status-based motivations for erecting an epitaph help to explain not only the chronological distribution of epitaphs but also the differences in the type and distribution of epitaphs in the western and eastern halves of the empire. They will be used here moreover to suggest an explanation for the epigraphic habit as a whole.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malgosia Fitzmaurice

The subject-matter of this article are the issues of treaty law as expounded in the Judgment in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case. The following problems are discussed: unilateral suspension and abandonment of obligations deriving from the binding treaty; the principle of fundamental change of circumstances; unilateral termination of a treaty; applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in this case; legal status of so-called ‘provisional solution’; impossibility of performance and material breach of treaty; the application of the principle of ‘approximate application’; and the principle pacta sunt servanda. The issues arc discussed at the background of the Drafts of the International Law Commission.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 933-940
Author(s):  
Leonard S. Saxe

The Judicial Council and Its Objectives. My assignment is to implement Professor Sunderland's brilliant primer on judicial councils by a more specific presentation utilizing the experiences of the New York State Judicial Council. Of the three elements that enter into a consideration of the judicial branch of government, the first—the substantive law, the law of rights and duties—is not within the province of the judicial council either in New York or elsewhere. The second element—the machinery of justice—is the principal field of the judicial council. If the council does its work well in that field, attention cannot fail to be focused upon the third and most important element—also part of a judicial council's problems—the judicial personnel.


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