Propositions First: Biting Geach's Bullet

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 87-110
Author(s):  
M. J. Frápolli
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Standard Approach ◽  
Theoretical Principle ◽  
Attitude Verbs

AbstractTo be a proposition is to possess propositional properties and to stand in inferential relations. This is the organic intuition, [OI], concerning propositional recognition. [OI] is not a circular characterization as long as those properties and relations that signal the presence of propositions are independently identified. My take on propositions does not depart from the standard approach widely accepted among philosophers of language. Propositions are truth-bearers, the arguments of truth-functions (‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘if’), the arguments of propositional-attitude verbs (‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘doubt’, ‘assume’, ‘reject’) and the kind of entity capable of standing in inferential relations (which are basically implication and incompatibility). The aim of this paper is to argue for [OI]. In doing so, I will show that even what is probably the most repeated argument against non-descriptivism, the so-called Frege-Geach Argument (FGA), presupposes something like [OI], a presupposition that Geach shares with his critics. Despite the huge success of FGA, a thorough analysis of the actual scope of this argument has yet to be given. I will provide such an analysis in section 3 below. In this paper, I argue that [OI] is a meta-theoretical principle which is neutral with respect to specific metaphysical debates about the nature of propositions, as well as specific proposals about the semantics of declarative sentences.

scholarly journals Semantic Information and the Syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron S. White ◽  
Valentine Hacquard ◽  
Jeffrey Lidz
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Information ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Attitude Verbs

Manner implicatures and how to spot them

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Rett
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Scalar Implicature ◽  
Conversational Implicature ◽  
General Sense ◽  
General Picture ◽  
Gradable Adjective ◽  
Scalar Quantity ◽  
Conversational Implicatures ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
Question Under Discussion

Abstract The goal of this paper is to help develop a general picture of conversational implicature (Grice, 1975) by looking beyond scalar implicature to see how the phenomenon behaves in a general sense. I focus on non-scalar Quantity implicatures and Manner implicatures. I review canonical examples of Manner implicature, as well as a more recent, productive one involving gradable adjective antonym pairs (Rett, 2015). Based on these data, I argue that Manner implicatures—and conversational implicatures generally—are distinguishable primarily by their calculability; their reinforceability; their discourse sensitivity (to the Question Under Discussion; Roberts, 1990; van Kuppevelt, 1995; Simons et al., 2011); and their embeddability (under negation, propositional attitude verbs, quantifiers, etc.). I use these data to draw conclusions about the usefulness of implicature-specific operators and about ways to compositionally represent conversational implicatures.

scholarly journals Triviality and grammatical cor­rectess: contemporary issues in intensional semantics

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-68
Author(s):  
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova ◽  
◽  
Petr S. Kusliy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Embedded Questions ◽  
Subordinate Clauses ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Interrogative Clauses ◽  
Key Aspects

The article is devoted to the study of the semantics of embedded questions (interrogative subordinate clauses), as well as the nature of restrictions on the licensing of declarative and interrogative clauses as complements of propositional attitude verbs. The authors show that this topic goes back to the key aspects of the semantic and cognitive program of G. Frege and is of key importance for the philosophy of language. Using the analytical apparatus of contemporary semantics, the authors investigate this topic on the material of the most recent theoretical works. They show how the semantics of embedded questions contributes to the development of a new perspective on the structure of meaning and the cognitive potential of natural language users. The authors also identify a number of theoretical shortcomings and empirical limitations of several theories of the semantics of embedded questions and point at some directions for future research.

Corporations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management System ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Upper Management ◽  
Corporate Agency ◽  
Corporate Form ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
And Control

Chapter 14 applies the account developed through Chapter 13 to corporate agency. First, it develops an account of the corporation as its shareholders acting through the corporate form. Second, it explains the significance of legal personality and its relation to the forms of speech we use to attribute corporate agency, which shows the surface forms of speech to be misleading. Third, it develops an account of the structure of corporate agency when ownership and control are separated in a two-tier management system consisting of an elected board of directors overseeing upper management. The conclusion is the board, management, and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders. Fourth, it considers the some forms of legal speech about corporations that raise specific puzzles. Fifth, it develops a deflationary account of the import of ordinary forms of speech about corporations and businesses that employ propositional attitude verbs.

scholarly journals Conceptualizing Some Verbs of Propositional Attitudes in English

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Cherif Teimi
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Semantic Approach ◽  
Conceptual Semantics ◽  
Attitude Verbs

In this article, we discuss the semantics and syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs. Our goal is to clarify and illustrate how Propositional Attitudes function and behave and put forth the conceptualization/ formalization of sentences containing this type of Verbs. We will see how intentions and beliefs are useful to study Propositional Attitudes. Also, we will argue that the semantic approach is more adequate than the syntactic one in terms of classifying Propositional Attitude Verbs. This, of course, is carried out in the framework of Conceptual Semantics that was mainly introduced by Jackendoff.

Intensional logics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Garson
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Intensional Logic ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Widespread Application ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Attitude Verbs ◽  
The Law ◽  
Richard Montague

Intensional logics are systems that distinguish an expression’s intension (roughly, its sense or meaning) from its extension (reference, denotation). The purpose of bringing intensions into logic is to explain the logical behaviour of so-called intensional expressions. Intensional expressions create contexts which violate a cluster of standard principles of logic, the most notable of which is the law of substitution of identities – the law that from a = b and P(a) it follows that P(b). For example, ‘obviously’ is intensional because the following instance of the law of substitution is invalid (at least on one reading): Scott = the author of Waverley; obviously Scott = Scott; so, obviously Scott = the author of Waverley. By providing an analysis of meaning, intensional logics attempt to explain the logical behaviour of expressions such as ‘obviously’. On the assumption that it is intensions and not extensions which matter in intensional contexts, the failure of substitution and related anomalies can be understood. Alonzo Church pioneered intensional logic, basing it on his theory of types. However, the widespread application of intensional logic to linguistics and philosophy began with the work of Richard Montague, who crafted a number of systems designed to capture the expressive power of natural languages. One important feature of Montague’s work was the application of possible worlds semantics to the analysis of intensional logic. The most difficult problems concerning intensional logic concern the treatment of propositional attitude verbs, such as ‘believes’, ‘desires’ and ‘knows’. Such expressions pose difficulties for the possible worlds treatment, and have thus spawned alternative approaches.

scholarly journals Frege and saving substitution

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Pickel ◽  
Brian Rabern
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Leibniz’S Law ◽  
Philos Stud ◽  
Attitude Verbs

Abstract Goodman and Lederman (Philos Stud 177(4):947–952, 2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.

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