scholarly journals Intellectualism, Relational Properties and the Divine Mind in Kant's Pre-Critical Philosophy

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Insole
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
Other Substances ◽  
Divine Mind

AbstractI demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant's transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom.

Space, Time and Mind-Dependence

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorin Baiasu
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Space Time ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
The One

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

‘How, or Why, do we Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves?’

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kuehn
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
The One

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

Allais on Transcendental Idealism

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew F. Roche
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
The Core ◽  
Key Features

AbstractLucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant's transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in the Prolegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais's position and its benefits, not least of which is its elegant explanation of how the features of objects that appear to us are transcendentally ideal while still being ‘empirically’ real. In section 2, I contend that there are elements of Allais's account that are problematic, yet also inessential, to what I view to be the core contribution of her analysis. These elements are the views that the properties that appear to human beings are not really distinct from properties that things have ‘in themselves’ and that Kant embraced a relational account of perception. In section 3, I return to the core of Allais's reading and argue that, despite its multiple virtues, it cannot make sense of key features of Kant's idealism.

Afterword

2020 ◽  
pp. 161-164
Author(s):  
Abraham Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Practical Metaphysics

The proposal that Hume woke Kant by challenging the principle of sufficient reason lets us understand why Kant saw Hume as an opponent of speculative theodicy, since speculative theodicy was grounded in that principle. It thereby also allows us to understand Kant’s turn to Rousseau, who “saved Providence,” and the turn from speculative to practical metaphysics that characterizes Kant’s critical philosophy. The difficulty people have had in understanding Kant’s account of how Hume roused him has to do with the fact that they wish to avoid his transcendental idealism, since that account implies that Hume woke him by putting him on the path to transcendental idealism. To understand the Critique, we must understand it as the “execution” of Hume’s problem understood as the problem of metaphysics.

Kantian Things in Themselves, Leibniz-Wolffian Things in Themselves, and Fictionalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 319-354
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Difference

An account is provided of how Kant’s apparent endorsement of fictionalism about things in themselves, as well as his apparent endorsement of the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of things in themselves, can be reconciled with the reading that he is a realist about things in themselves as characterized in critical idealism. In this context, the difference between Kantian things in themselves and noumena, that is, objects of the pure understanding, is explained as well. Furthermore, two additional arguments for transcendental idealism that are suggested by Kant are subject to scrutiny, both of which seem odd at first glance since they rely on premises about things in themselves to which he does not appear to be entitled within the framework of the critical philosophy.

scholarly journals Kant’s Asynchronicity Concerning Newtonian Space and Gravity in his Pre-Critical Writings

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-28
Author(s):  
E. Görg
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Turning Points ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
Foundations Of Physics ◽  
Newtonian Space ◽  
Critical Writings

Kant’s ‘Newtonianism’ has been rightly highlighted by figures like Friedman. The follow-up debates led to a more adequate view on Kant’s natural philosophy and in particular his relation towards Newton. But the discussion that evolved did not point to the asynchronicity that takes place in Kant’s struggle with the central Newtonian concepts. Newtonian space and gravity, in revised form, are of central concern to Kant’s critical philosophy. But Kant adapted and re-evaluated these two concepts in an asynchronous way. While Kant tries to integrate a notion of gravity into his theory of matter in his very first published writing, he has at this stage no adequate notion of space. At this time, as in regard to space, he can neither be called a Newtonian nor a proper Leibnizian and misconceives the necessity of an independent space for the foundations of physics. This perspective changes under the influence of Euler at the end of the fifties of the eighteenth century and finally leads to his writing of 1768 and the adoption of transcendental idealism in 1770. In the following, I depict this asynchronicity by taking central pre-critical writings into account while discussing Kant’s concept of space and gravity. This sharpens the picture of Kant’s work and the different stages his philosophy of nature went through. Further, it helps to understand the influence of Euler on Kant’s development in natural philosophy and his critical philosophy in general, as Kant under the influence of Euler formed deeper-going reflections on Newton’s theory of space and these mark turning points of his development.

Comments on Graham Bird's The Revolutionary Kant

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
The One

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

The Status of the Principles of the Analogies

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-210
Author(s):  
Gary Banham
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

AbstractThe interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed (whether explicitly or implicitly and whether consistently or inconsistently) to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough evaluation of the traditionalist interpretation, as part of perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling defence of a revolutionary reading of Kant's thought. In the third part of this special issue, the exchanges between, on the one hand, Graham Bird and, on the other, Gary Banham, Gordon Brittan, Manfred Kuehn, Adrian Moore and Kenneth Westphal focus on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of Kant's first Critique. More exactly, the emphasis is on specific aspects of Bird's interpretation of the Introduction, Analytic of Principles and Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's first Critique.The second part of the special issue is devoted to discussions of particular topics in Bird's construal of the remaining significant parts of the first Critique, namely, of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts. Written by Sorin Baiasu and Michelle Grier, these articles examine specific issues in these two remaining parts of the Critique, from the perspective of the debate between the traditionalist and revolutionary interpretation. The special issue begins with an Introduction by the guest co-editors. This provides a summary of the exchanges between Bird and his critics, with a particular focus on the debates stemming from the differences between traditional and revolutionary interpretations of Kant.

Kant, Aesthetic Autonomy, and Literary Ethics

2020 ◽  
pp. 71-100
Author(s):  
Philipp Hunnekuhl
Keyword(s):  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Moral Discourse ◽  
The Self ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Moses Mendelssohn ◽  
Aesthetic Autonomy ◽  
Literary Ethics ◽  
Unpublished Manuscripts ◽  
The Mind

Chapter three reveals the paradigm shift in Robinson’s theorization of literature that his ‘conversion’ from the empiricism of Locke, Hume, and Godwin to Kant’s critical philosophy prompted. Yet Kant’s notion of aesthetic autonomy – of art’s detachment from the motives of the mind and the causality governing the laws of nature – occasioned an impasse in Robinson’s conceptualization of literature’s ethical relevance. He resolved this in an ingenious move by skilfully locating in Kant’s critical philosophy, and then developing, an analogy between art and morals: the self-contained structure and dynamic of a work of literature find their corresponding parameters in the reader’s mind, in her or his moral compass. On the basis of this analogy, chapter three argues, Robinson conducted his own ‘ethical turn’ away from notions of absolute aesthetic autonomy, and developed the ground-breaking critical principle of ‘Free Moral Discourse’ (Hunnekuhl) that from here onwards underpinned his literary activities. Against the backdrop of various unpublished manuscripts, this chapter discusses Robinson’s articles on Hume and causality, and on Moses Mendelssohn and the Pantheism Controversy, in the Monthly Magazine (1799–1801), as well as his letters ‘On the Philosophy of Kant’ in the Monthly Register and Encyclopaedian Magazine (1802–03).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document