The First Person and the Moral Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-300
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Experience ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Moral Constraint

AbstractIn Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, Jeanine Grenberg argues for the centrality to Kant’s ethics of the experience of the feeling of moral constraint, especially as that feeling is described in Kant’s fact of reason argument. She criticizes interpretations of the fact of reason that interpret it as primarily a certain kind of act. I defend my version of an act-based interpretation against Grenberg’s criticisms, flesh out the Fichtean background of that interpretation and raise some further questions about Grenberg’s account.

Boutwerk, Balthazar Barbosa, Willaschek e os Paradoxos da Filosofia do Direito de Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
João Carlos Brum Torres
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
External Character ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Positive Character ◽  
Made In

O artigo tem por objeto o exame de três registros de gritantes e distintos paradoxos na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. Registros feitos em tempos e contextos históricos diferentes por Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek atribuiu a Kant a mais paradoxal das proposições jamais enunciadas por qualquer autor, a de que a mera ideia de soberania deve obrigar-nos a obedecer como a nosso inquestionável senhor a quem quer que se haja estabelecido como tal, sem que caiba indagar quem lhe deu o direito de comandar-nos. Willaschek aponta a incompatibilidade de duas teses centrais da doutrina kantiana: a do caráter externo dos vínculos jurídicos e a da incondicionalidade obrigacional do direito positivo, pois não é possível entender como é possível termo-nos como obrigados por imperativos jurídicos e, ao mesmo, vermo-nos internamente isentados do dever de obedecê-los. O ponto crítico de Balthazar é alegar que não pode haver na filosofia kantiana uma crítica da razão político e jurídica, simplesmente porque o conceito de imputação, base da normatividade própria dessas esferas, pressupõe uma pluralidade de agentes livres que, justamente, só pode ser uma pressuposição, pois nosso acesso à normatividade prática só pode ter lugar em primeira pessoa. No exame a que o artigo submete essas alegações, o artigo argumenta, em objeção à tese de Balthazar, que o caráter universal e categórico da força que vincula o sujeito quando confrontado com a lei moral em primeira pessoa necessariamente se desvaneceria se, ao mesmo tempo, ele não fosse tomado pela evidência de que a realidade objetiva dos princípios morais é não só instanciável, mas assegurada pela múltipla instanciação. Com relação às dificuldades levantadas por Willaschek e Bouterwek, o artigo argumenta que o princípio exeundum e statu naturali, enquanto norma metapositiva, anterior à divisão do domínio prático entre doutrina do direito e doutrina da virtude, permite ao mesmo tempo compreender a exigência de obediência ao poder constituído e a restrição das obrigações jurídico-políticas exclusivamente ao foro externo.AbstractThe object of the article is to examine three claims about three distinct and allegedly blatant paradoxes in Kant's Doctrine of Right. These three critical points had been made in distinct times and contexts by Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek attributed to Kant the most paradoxical of all paradoxical propositions, the statement that by the mere idea of sovereignty we are obliged to obey as our lord who has imposed himself upon us, without questioning from where he got such right. Willaschek points out the incompatibility of two main theses of Kantian doctrine of right: the claims that the legal bounds are of external character and that they are the source of unconditional obligations, since it seems impossible to understand how it would be possible to be obliged by juridical norms and decisions and at the same time to be exempted of the internal duty of compliance. The radical objection of Professor Balthazar is the claim that in the context of Kantian Philosophy it is impossible to admit a critique of the juridical and political reason because the concept of imputation, ground of the normativity in these domains, requires not only the presupposition of free agents, but a true and secure epistemic access to them, which is, according to him, impossible considering that the moral law and the other practical principles are accessible for us only in the first person. In the course of the appraisal of such claims, the article contest that objection arguing that the universal and categorical force of the normative bound experienced by the subject when confronted with the moral law in the first person would ineluctably vanish if, at the same time, he had not been taken by the evidence that the objective reality of the moral principles is secured by multiple instancing. Regarding the difficulties raised by Willaschek and Bouterwek, the article argues that the principle exeundum e statu naturali, as a norm of meta-positive character, prior to the division of practical domains between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, is the cue both to the understanding of the requirement of unquestioning obedience to the constituted power and to the restriction of the validity of this requirement only in foro externo.

scholarly journals Change and Moral Development in Kant’s Ethics

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Kyle Curran
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Change ◽  
Kant's Ethics

This paper is concerned with an ambiguous aspect of Kant’s ethics, namely, how moral change is possible. Kant conceives that change is possible, indeed desirable, without making clear the mechanism by which this change occurs. I conclude that one’s moral development must come about through the autonomous rationality of humanity. This allows for the moral law to be held at all times and for the rejection of immoral sentiments and inclinations. Further, it is constant soulsearching that allows one to keep a check on their maxims, facilitating the development of a moral disposition.

Depression and the Phenomenology of Free Will

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Ratcliffe
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
First Person ◽  
Ability To Act ◽  
Phenomenological Account ◽  
Wrong Place

This chapter offers a phenomenological account of impaired agency in depression. It begins by briefly considering some first-person descriptions of how depression affects the ability to act, which point to an altered "experience of free will." Although it is often assumed that we have such an experience, it is far from clear what it consists of. The chapter argues that this lack of clarity is symptomatic of looking in the wrong place. Drawing on themes in Sartre'sBeing and Nothingness, it is suggested that the sense of freedom associated with action is not-first and foremost-an episodic "quale" or "feeling" that is experienced as internal to the agent. Rather, it is embedded in the experienced world; my freedom appears in the guise of my surroundings. This makes better sense of what people with depression consistently describe-a diminished ability to act that is inextricable from a transformation of the experienced world. In addition to illuminating an aspect of the experience of depression, the chapter aims to illustrate something more general: how phenomenology and psychiatry can interact in a fruitful way.

scholarly journals Morality and legality in Kant’s ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40
Author(s):  
Josip Guc
Keyword(s):  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Feeling ◽  
The One ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Different Levels

Differentiation of morality and legality is one of the fundamental topoi of Kant?s ethics. However, alongside it is often interpreted in too simple (and also sometimes wrong) manner, this differentiation does not demonstrate the whole complexity of Kant?s understanding of moral correctness of certain types of will determination. Thus the goal of this paper is to point out different kinds of morally relevant actions (which are not limited to morality and legality), and then to explain to which extend each of them can be understood as morally correct. For that purpose we will thoroughly consider the issue of determination of will, and then also some of the problematic interpretations of legality and morality, where as a specific issue arises the one of equating morality with autonomy and legality with heteronomy (especially in domestic philosophical works). The issue of different levels of moral correctness of action will also be examined concerning the phenomenon of moral feeling. Particular attention will be given to the role of the kind of action that refer to having direct inclination toward morally correct action, even though it is not directly determined by the moral law. The analysis of these issues brings us to conclusion that legality is satisfied by an action which is outwardly done in a way it would be done by an autonomously determined will. Considering this, the determination of morality precedes the determination of legality. Other way around can be detected only in the process of education.

Immanuel Kant: Ethics

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosophies ◽  
The Will ◽  
Kant's Ethics

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Kant's Ethics

This chapter comments on Christine Korsgaard's views on reason, humanity, and moral law in the context of her ethics. In particular, it examines Korsgaard's response to the question inspired by Thomas Hobbes' second argument, the one about the sovereign: how can the subject be responsible to a law that it makes and can therefore unmake? Korsgaard's ethics descends from Immanuel Kant, but it contrasts in important ways with Kant's ethics. Korsgaard's subject is unequivocally the author of the law that binds it, for its law is the law of its practical identity, and the subject itself “constructs” that identity. In the case of the Kantian subject, we can say that it both is and is not the author of the law that binds it. The chapter considers Korsgaard's claim that morality is grounded in human nature, along with her position on the problem of normativity and on obligation.

Kant’s Ethics

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
General Account ◽  
Sources Of Knowledge ◽  
Reason And Faith ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines Immanuel Kant's ethics, and particularly his views on reason and faith. According to Thomas Aquinas, there were two avenues whereby men could come to possess knowledge: the way of reason and the way of faith, of faith in revelation. Unlike Aquinas, Kant entertains not two faculties, but a single faculty in two employments. The chapter considers Kant's motives, and what he advanced as justifications, for treating the sources of knowledge and of moral behavior not as two separate faculties, but as different employments of a single faculty, reason. It offers a general account of Kant's moral philosophy, and more specifically his account of reason and his argument that men are obliged to obey the moral law. It also suggests that the duality of obligation and motivation is present in Kant's ethics and compares Kant's ideas with those of Richard Peters regarding human behavior.

scholarly journals Heteronomi som forutsetning for autonomi

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 44-65
Author(s):  
Fredrik Nilsen
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Formula Of Humanity ◽  
Minor Works

In his major works in ethics, Immanuel Kant (1724—1804) does not pay much attention to the question how humans become moral. The main tasks for Kant in these works are to establish the moral law and discuss its application. However, in his minor works in ethics and pedagogy he draws our attention to the question mentioned and claims that humans first become moral when they get 16 years old. Before we reach this age, our will (Willkür) is able to choose, that means prioritize, between rationality (the moral law) and sensitivity (inclinations), but our will (Wille) lacks the capacity to impose the moral law on ourselves. To evolve in this regard so that our will becomes fully moral and autonomous, we need moral restrictions from other people with more moral experience. The relevant Kantian distinction in this regard is the distinction Kant draws between persons and moral actors in the wake of his formula of the categorical imperative called the formula of humanity. According to this distinction, a person needs to be educated heteronomously in order to reach the level of moral actor and become autonomous. Constraint is therefore a necessary condition for self-constraint.

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