Liberal Justice: Kant, Rawls and Human Rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-659
Author(s):  
Onora O’Neill

AbstractKant’s practical philosophy, Rawls’s theory of justice and contemporary human rights thinking are landmarks in liberal discussions of justice. Each forms part of a powerful tradition of political thought, and although their substantive accounts of justice diverge at many points, they also overlap in substantial ways. This article focuses not on their substantive claims about justice, or about other ethical standards, but on their differing views of the questions to be addressed, on their proposed justifications for standards of justice, and on a limited range of questions about interpreting and institutionalizing those standards.

Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Osler ◽  
Juanjuan Zhu

Throughout history individual and collective narratives have been used in struggles for justice. We draw on Sen’s theory of justice to examine the potential of narratives in teaching and researching for social justice. Human rights are presented as powerful ethical claims that can be critically examined by learners to consider their rights and responsibilities to others, at scales from the local to the global. One life history is used as an illustrative example to examine the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and its possible meanings for learners in China and globally. This article discusses the strengths and limitations of narratives as research and pedagogical tools in understanding justice, human rights and inequalities; in stimulating solidarity and our common humanity; and in enabling learners to explore their multiple identities. We conclude by making the case for human rights as principles for learning and living together in overlapping communities of fate.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-169
Author(s):  
Robert Mark Simpson

According to a widely-shared view, human rights encompass a very limited range of ethical concerns: not all human interests, only urgent interests;1 not our preferences, only our needs;2 not all wrongs, only severe injustices;3 not a good life in the fullest sense, but only a minimally decent or autonomous life.4 In short, human rights are not about realizing the best, they are about shielding us from the worst. I will call this general theoretical stance Minimalism.


Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  

The aim of this paper is to identify how the ethical-political foundation of human rights in John Rawls’s theory of justice makes use of a coherentist model of moral justification in which cognitivism, liberalism, pluralism, non-foundationalism, and mitigated intuititionism stand out, leading to a pragmatic model of foundation with public justification in The Law of Peoples (LP). The main idea is to think about the reasonableness of the universal defence of human rights as primary goods with the aspects foliows: its political nature, not metaphysical; its theoretical coherentist model, non-foundationalist; its pragmatic function and its public justification.


1982 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 207-228
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

The problem which motivates this paper bears on the relationship between Marxism and morality. It is not the well-established question of whether the Marxist's commitments undermine an attachment to ethical standards, but the more neglected query as to whether they allow the espousal of political ideals. The study and assessment of political ideals is pursued nowadays under the title of theory of justice, the aim of such theory being to provide a criterion for distinguishing just patterns of social organization from unjust ones. The main rivals in the field represent justice respectively as legitimacy, welfare and fairness. Marxism does not put forward a distinctive conception of justice itself and the question is whether the Marxist is free to choose as he thinks fit among the candidates on offer


Human Affairs ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-310
Author(s):  
Luiz Gustavo Da Cunha De Souza

Abstract The paper deals with a possible tension within Axel Honneth’s theory of justice as presented in his Freedom’s Right. It takes as its point of departure Georg Lohmann’s objection that Honneth loses sight of the critical potential associated with positive right and tries to discuss it critically both exposing Lohmann’s and Honneth’s position. From the complex of problems identified thereby, the paper moves to a discussion of Émile Durkheim’s theory of State, with which it helps to provide a possible contribution to the discussion between positive, individual rights and the normative framework of social freedom.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 320-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Cassidy

In advancing children’s rights, and human rights more broadly, this article supports the view that participation through deliberation by children is desirable. Practising Philosophy with Children, through an approach such as Community of Philosophical Inquiry, is proposed as a powerful way forward as a rights-based means of supporting children to deliberate about matters affecting them in society. In considering that children are educated about, through and for rights, an example of children’s philosophical dialogue is provided to illustrate children deliberating on rights issues, and how teachers might use such dialogue to influence their teaching in this area. The suggestion is that participating in practical philosophy enables children to practise human rights behaviour as a means of participating beyond consultation exercises and as an approach to facilitating their engagement with ideas and issues that are important to the promotion of rights for all.


1982 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 207-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

The problem which motivates this paper bears on the relationship between Marxism and morality. It is not the well-established question of whether the Marxist's commitments undermine an attachment to ethical standards, but the more neglected query as to whether they allow the espousal of political ideals. The study and assessment of political ideals is pursued nowadays under the title of theory of justice, the aim of such theory being to provide a criterion for distinguishing just patterns of social organization from unjust ones. The main rivals in the field represent justice respectively as legitimacy, welfare and fairness. Marxism does not put forward a distinctive conception of justice itself and the question is whether the Marxist is free to choose as he thinks fit among the candidates on offer


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