TARGETING NARCOINSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 301-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
International Security ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Drug Trade ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Drug Trafficker ◽  
Joint Force ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
Drug Traffickers ◽  
International Security Assistance Force

AbstractIn October 2008, upon the request of the Afghan government, NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Budapest agreed that ‘ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to the authorization of respective nations’. In explaining the scope of the contemplated actions, NATO officials noted that drug producers and traffickers who aided the ongoing insurgency could now be attacked. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Bantz Craddock, justified the policy on the ground that the Taliban reaped over $100 million annually from the drug trade. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates likewise defended the decision as sound strategy.It soon became clear that other key figures were less enamoured with the new approach, or the subsequent guidance issued to effectuate it. On 5 January 2009, Craddock instructed General Egon Ramms, the German Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, which overseas NATO operations in Afghanistan, ‘to attack directly drug producers and facilities throughout Afghanistan’. The threshold for engagement seemed to require little connection to the insurgency. According to SACEUR's guidance, it was ‘no longer necessary to produce intelligence or other evidence that each particular drug trafficker or narcotics facility in Afghanistan meets the criteria of being a military objective’ because the alliance ‘has decided that (drug traffickers and narcotics facilities) are inextricably linked to the Opposing Military Forces, and thus may be attacked’.

scholarly journals Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák
Keyword(s):  
Customary Law ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Computer Data ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Teleological Interpretation

This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in international humanitarian law (IHL), bringing computer data within the scope of this concept. The advent of cyber military operations has presented a dilemma as to the proper understanding of data in IHL. The emerging orthodoxy, represented by the 2013Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, advances the argument that the intangible nature of data renders it ineligible to be an object for the purposes of the rules on targeting in IHL. This article, on the contrary, argues that because of its susceptibility to alteration and destruction, the better view is that data is an object within the meaning of this term under IHL and thus it may qualify as a military objective. The article supports this conclusion by means of a textual, systematic and teleological interpretation of the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law. The upshot of the analysis presented here is that data that does not meet the criteria for qualification as a military objective must be considered a civilian object, with profound implications for the protection of civilian datasets in times of armed conflict.

Afghanistan in 2006: The Complications of Post-Conflict Transition

Asian Survey ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nasreen Ghufran
Keyword(s):  
International Security ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Drug Trade ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Opium Production ◽  
Security Assistance ◽  
International Security Assistance Force ◽  
Positive Step

The year 2006 in Afghanistan began with the functioning of a democratically elected parliament——a bold and positive step forward in institution-building. Development and reconstruction have continued at a slow pace. Security has sharply deteriorated, and the Taliban insurgency has become more violent in spite of the enlarged International Security Assistance Force. Opium production has increased to record levels, leading to a boom in the drug trade.

scholarly journals LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMEN

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Rassokha ◽  
Keyword(s):  
International Security ◽  
Legal Aspect ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Legal Problems

The article reflects the main views on international security problems in the legal aspect and identified actual problems and contradictions in the application and compliance with international humanitarian law norms.

‘Excessive’ ambiguity: analysing and refining the proportionality standard

2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 819-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason D. Wright
Keyword(s):  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Collateral Damage ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Jus In Bello ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
The Us ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Military Objective

AbstractThis article analyses the jus in bello proportionality standard under international humanitarian law to assist judge advocates and practitioners in achieving a measure of clarity as to what constitutes ‘excessive’ collateral damage when planning or executing an attack on a legitimate military objective when incidental harm to civilians is expected. Applying international humanitarian law, the author analyses existing US practice to evidence the need for states to adopt further institutional mechanisms and methodologies to clarify targeting principles and proportionality assessments. A subjective-objective standard for determining ‘excessive’ collateral damage is proposed, along with a seven-step targeting methodology that is readily applicable to the US, and all other state and non-state actors engaged in the conduct of hostilities.

Minimizing civilian harm in populated areas: Lessons from examining ISAF and AMISOM policies

2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (901) ◽  
pp. 225-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahr Muhammedally
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
African Union ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Fire Policy ◽  
Civilian Protection ◽  
The North ◽  
Security Assistance ◽  
International Security Assistance Force ◽  
Policies And Practices

AbstractBoth the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's security assistance mission to Afghanistan – have recognized the importance of reducing civilian harm, and adopted policies and practices that restrict the use of certain weapons in populated areas. ISAF commanders issued a number of tactical directives that restricted the use of certain air-delivered weapons, and AMISOM developed an indirect fire policy limiting the use of artillery and other indirect fire munitions in populated areas. This article examines both ISAF and AMISOM policies and practices to reduce civilian harm in populated areas and explores how these policies strengthened adherence to international humanitarian law and illustrated new ways in which armed actors can take feasible precautions and prioritize civilian protection.

Part II Predominant Security Challenges and International Law, Economic and Resource Security, Ch.28 Humanitarian Relief in Situations of Armed Conflict

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gillard Emanuela-Chiara ◽  
Weizmann Nathalie
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Security ◽  
Human Security ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Humanitarian Relief ◽  
Security Challenges ◽  
Humanitarian Crises ◽  
Relief Operations

This chapter addresses humanitarian relief in situations of armed conflict. In many modern wars, more civilian deaths and suffering occur as a result of humanitarian crises prompted or exacerbated by the conflicts than from actual hostilities. International humanitarian law (IHL) includes an important body of rules aimed at ensuring that the basic needs of civilians caught up in conflict are met. While these protections can be considered as a manifestation of the ‘freedom from want’ dimension of human security, it is essential to bear in mind that the relevant rules of IHL are well established, binding on States and, in case of non-international armed conflict, also organized armed groups. The chapter outlines the rules of IHL regulating collective humanitarian relief operations, with a particular focus on how they balance the dictates of belligerents’ security interests and civilians’ ‘human security’ needs and entitlements. It then considers one particular way in which a pressing national and international security objective—countering terrorism—interacts with and adversely impacts the capacity of humanitarian actors to operate in a principled manner, and thus impairs the human security of populations in need.

scholarly journals Armed escorts to humanitarian convoys: An unexplored framework under international humanitarian law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Annabel Bassil
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality

Abstract The use of armed escorts to humanitarian convoys delivering humanitarian assistance potentially increases the targeting of these convoys, yet so far this use has not been examined from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL). This article attempts to determine whether the resort to armed escorts is in line with the principle of passive precautions under IHL, how the principle of proportionality could apply in cases of attack against the escort, and whether the convoy turns into a military objective when escorted. Finally, the article tackles the limitations of such a framework in order to define the situations it covers.

scholarly journals Future arms, technologies, and international law: Preventive security governance

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Garcia
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Security ◽  
International Order ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Security Governance ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Peace And War

AbstractThis article presents an initial discussion of the political and legal challenges associated with weaponised technologies in three interconnected areas that may impinge upon the ability to protect civilian populations during peace and war and imperil international security: armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (commonly known as drones); autonomous weapons systems (known as ‘killer robots’); and the potential militarisation of cyberspace, or its use as a weapon, and the operation of drones and killer robots in the cyber domain. Supporting the argument that the world is ‘facing new methods of warfare’ and that international security governance and law are not keeping up, the article provides an overview and interpretation of three technologies in connection with aspects of five branches of law: state responsibility, use of force, international humanitarian law, human rights law, and law of the commons. I argue therefore that ‘preventive security governance’ could be a strategy to curtail uncertainty in the preservation of stability and international order. I define ‘preventive security governance’ as the codification of specific or new global norms, arising from existing international law that will clarify expectations and universally agreed behaviour on a given issue-area. This is essential for a peaceful future for humanity and for international order and stability.

Legality of Use and Challenges of New Technologies in Warfare – the Use of Autonomous Weapons in Contemporary or Future Wars

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-131
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Szpak
Keyword(s):  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ◽  
International Security ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Aerial Vehicles ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
The World ◽  
The Usa

Along with the rapid development and proliferation of autonomous robotic weapons, machines are beginning to replace people on battlefields. The use by the USA of Predators or Reapers and other unmanned aerial vehicles in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places in the world clearly signals a distancing of soldiers from their targets. In this article I concentrate on fully autonomous weapons. The theses of the article are as follows: the use of autonomous weapons would be contrary to the basic and fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, such as the principles of distinction and proportionality, and thus illegal. As such, their use would threaten the wellbeing, life and health of civilians and civilian populations. Their use would undermine the whole concept of the rules of war. Still, there are scholars who are of the opinion that prohibiting the use of autonomous weapons would make no sense at all and that the development of such weapons is inevitable and will take place gradually. Their use would be an expression of the technological dimension of international security. As this article will attempt to demonstrate, the drawbacks of the use of autonomous weapons are of such magnitude that they exclude the legality of such devices.

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