Ideology, positionality and war

The objective of this article is to explore issues of ideology in situations of interpreting in conflict zones. Research into interpreting in conflict zones is quite recent and has shed light on interesting aspects. Ideology is clearly present in war situations and may condition the interpreter’s role. This article seeks to identify examples of power relations and ideology by drawing on the narratives of five local interpreters who worked with Spanish troops stationed in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force between 2003 and 2015. The narratives were collected using a semi-structured interview technique. The findings indicate that ideology is reflected in the interpreters’ perception of their own role as agents working for the good of their country against a common enemy, even though they were potentially perceived by both sides in the conflict as possible traitors. The traditional narrative of the interpreter as an invisible and impartial facilitator of communication would not appear to be applicable in this context.

Whole of (coalition) government: Comparing Swedish and German experiences in Afghanistan

Whole-of-government (WOG) approaches have emerged as a blueprint for contemporary peace and state-building operations. Countries contributing civilian and military personnel to multinational interventions are persistently urged to improve coherence and enhance coordination between the ministries that form part of the national contingent. Despite a heated debate about what WOG should look like and how to achieve it, the causal mechanisms of WOG variance remains under-theorised. Based on 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, this study compares Swedish and German WOG approaches in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). I argue that coalition bargaining drove the fluctuation in the Swedish and German WOG models. Strategic culture was an antecedent condition. In both cases, COIN and the war on terror clashed with foundational elements of the Swedish and German strategic cultures, paving the way for a non-debate on WOG on the political arena. Finally, bureaucratic politics was an intervening condition that obstructed or enabled coherence, depending on the ambition of the incumbent coalition government to progress WOG. Overall, the results suggest that coalitions face limitations in implementing a WOG framework when the nature of the military engagement is highly disputed in national parliaments.

Peeking into Afghan's history: A study from 1988 to 2010

The study will elaborate the Afghan historical events that took place right after the Geneva accord of 1988 when USSR forces pullout from the country till 2010. The article will explain the emergence of the Taliban and their establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moreover, the paper will elaborate on the Taliban's nexus with al-Qaeda and their efforts to settle them in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this particular research tends to analyse the US retaliation and war on terror after the catastrophic event of 9/11. Additionally, the paper will illustrate the launching of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban's bloody resurgence and their belligerence after the said mission. Consequently, the research will examine Obama's administration war strategies and tactics after his presidential victory over John McCain.

When peace nations go to war: Examining the narrative transformation of Sweden and Norway in Afghanistan

What happens to dominant narratives and settled self-images of so-called peace nations when experiencing actual combat in out-of-area military missions? This question arises when studying the contemporary international engagement of small states that previously have mostly been engaged in peacekeeping with limited mandates and non-use of force restrictions. As today's international missions have altered radically, it is important to analyse narrative friction and transformation in small states with little prior experience of international war-fighting. This article addresses this lacuna by examining two small states and self-proclaimed peace nations – Sweden and Norway – in relation to their engagement in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led security mission to Afghanistan 2002–14. By examining the interplay and discursive struggle of two narratives — peace nation and military culture – this article finds that these narratives constantly constitute and reconstitute a small state's self-image and the boundaries for acceptable or even required behaviour. With altered principles regarding use of force there is an increased friction between the narratives. By addressing these frictions, the article contributes to the literature on small state international military engagement and develops and refines assumptions regarding the drivers and consequences of small state participation in out-of-area missions.

ISAF WITHDRAWAL AND AN UPSURGE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN AFGHANISTAN

An upsurge of religious extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan that followed the 2014 withdrawal of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) confirmed the pessimistic forecasts for the country’s future: a far greater number of terrorist attacks and their victims among non-combatants across the country was the most obvious repercussion. The civil war continued unabated, while the negative additional factors—the Taliban that had grown much stronger, as well as the activation of ISIS militants, who had come from Iraq and Syria to continue fighting—contributed to its further exacerbation. All sorts of extremist religious groups in Afghanistan consolidated their positions and even created an unwelcome possibility of their transit to the Central Asian countries. The authors have clearly demonstrated that there is a direct interdependence between the presence of ISAF under U.S. command and the degree of violence of the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—Khorasan Chapter, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan operating in Afghanistan. They have also analyzed the impact of the statement made by the U.S. regarding the signed agreement with the Taliban that envisaged the removal of U.S. troops from the country in the next fourteen months and the release of Taliban prisoners. Since the Government of Afghanistan had been left in the cold, many doubted that the agreement would be fully realized any time soon. An analysis of the events that followed demonstrated that the Taliban would not stick to its part of the agreement, while the White House treated the document as an election promise (formally) fulfilled. There are enough extremist organizations (i.e., ISIS) that operate in the provinces and, free from obligations and in pursuit of their own aims, might interfere in the attempts to fulfill the agreement in its optimistic version. An assessment of certain processes suggests that the threats coming from ISIS are somewhat overestimated. The studies are based on the following methods: comparative analysis of relevant literature, statistical analysis of the dynamics of time series to identify the developing trends of terrorist activities of religious extremists in Afghanistan.

“We are not getting the good stories out”: revisiting Quebec media coverage and NATO’s strategic narrative for the International Assistance and Security Force (ISAF)

The purpose of NATO’s strategic communications is to inform and influence key audiences into supporting its decisions and operations. High levels of public opposition in contributing nations to NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has led many to blame strategic communications for failing to explain the objectives and the importance of the mission. This paper seeks to evaluate where strategic communications succeeded and where they failed using Quebec as a case study, as it is the Canadian province that had the highest levels of opposition to the mission. The first part of this study uses NATO internal communications products to establish the core messages of the ISAF narrative in different phases of the mission. The second part surveys the main themes in the coverage of ISAF in Quebec’s main newspapers and TV shows. The major finding of this paper is that there was an effective dissemination of the NATO narrative in Quebec media, yet the narrative had little impact on opinion polls. The fact that the strategic communication campaign was successful in informing but not in influencing the Quebec audience carries important implications for the crafting of future NATO strategic narratives. This study concludes that efforts to improve military strategic communications in should focus developing communication products specific to minority cultures.

“We cannot rule out that torture is going on”

This chapter analyzes the conditions for pluralist accountability in response to the violation of the rights of detainees in Afghanistan that were captured by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and transferred to United States or Afghan custody. The analysis demonstrates that the lack of competition among third parties to act as advocates for the rights of suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, as well as the low vulnerability of the United States government regarding human rights demands in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, hindered the emergence of pluralist accountability in the case of detainees transferred to the United States-led coalition forces. In contrast, the case on the rights of detainees transferred by ISAF to the Afghan government shows how competition within the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and increasing vulnerability of the transferring ISAF states with regard to human rights demands, fostered pluralist accountability.

The Afghanistan War, 2001–?

With the September 11, 2001 attack by al-Qaeda terrorists on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration conceded to decisional bias. It committed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan without duly assessing the implications of a Taliban defeat or how it might serve the administration’s “global war on terrorism.” Once engaged, the administration defined the US mission in Afghanistan broadly yet remained detached from harsh realities—including Afghan government corruption and ineptitude, finite alliance resources (in the International Security Assistance Force), and a Taliban resurgence—that hampered the achievement of these goals. The Obama administration capped US involvement in pursuing the limited goal of “reversing” the Taliban’s momentum. Although the administration increased US force levels in Afghanistan, it did so modestly and temporarily and then pursued a troop exit despite the country’s ongoing violence and instability. The administration stuck to its plan, slowing, not reversing, the withdrawal as the country’s security conditions worsened.