scholarly journals Ask for the Moon, Settle for the Stars: What is a Reasonable Period to Comply with WTO Awards?

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ◽  
NIALL MEAGHER ◽  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
TATIANA YANGUAS
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Legal System ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Moon ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

AbstractThe World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process allows a defending Member a ‘reasonable period of time’ (RPT) to implement any findings that its contested measures are inconsistent with WTO law. If agreement on this RPT cannot be reached, Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides for the possibility of arbitration on the length of the RPT. The DSU provides limited guidelines on the RPT, stating only that it should not normally exceed 15 months. In practice, Arbitrators have developed the standard that the RPT should reflect the shortest possible period under the domestic legal system of the defending Member to make the changes necessary to comply with the WTO rulings. Our research confirms that in practice Arbitrators have determined this period by ‘splitting the difference’ approximately between the periods suggested by the complaining and defending Member. In addition, the process appears to reward defending Members that request an RPT that exceeds the 15-month guideline in Article 21.3(c).

Joint Competence of the European Community and its Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization

1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
European Community ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Tokyo Round ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

One of the principal achievements of the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was the new mechanism for dispute settlement, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. While its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (and the 1979 Agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) had already evolved, to a considerable degree, from a negotiating forum for the conduct of world trade diplomacy to a “judicial” system properly so called, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding nevertheless marked a decisive step forward.

Joint Competence of the European Community and its Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization

1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
European Community ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Tokyo Round ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

One of the principal achievements of the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was the new mechanism for dispute settlement, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. While its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (and the 1979 Agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) had already evolved, to a considerable degree, from a negotiating forum for the conduct of world trade diplomacy to a “judicial” system properly so called, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding nevertheless marked a decisive step forward.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-332
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
International Adjudication ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.

The Aircraft Cases: Canada and Brazil

2002 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 387-431
Author(s):  
Rambod Behboodi
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Export Performance ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
Aircraft Industry ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Export Subsidies ◽  
The World ◽  
First Time

SummaryThe disputes between Canada and Brazil over subsidies to the regional aircraft industry were the first cases under Part II (covering prohibited subsidies) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PROEX case, involved the scope of the concept of “special and differential treatment” under Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, and the interpretation of the first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as set out in Annex I to the SCM Agreement. The Canada — Aircraft case involved, for the first time, Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines what practices constitute a subsidy, and Article 3, which prohibits subsidies “contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.” The case also dealt with important procedural issues relating to WTO dispute settlement. The author reviews critically these decisions with respect to both substantive and procedural issues.

Substance and Style—How the WTO Adjudicators Legitimize their Decisions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Gerstetter
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Member States ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This chapter analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies legitimize their decisions and by implication also the WTO Dispute Settlement System as well as the WTO as an institution more broadly. The author argues there are two relevant dimensions for understanding how judges legitimize judicial decisions: the substantive outcomes of cases, that is who wins and loses and what interpretations are adopted, and the way a judicial decision is justified. She concludes that the WTO dispute settlement bodies act strategically in order to win the acceptance of the member states, and ultimately legitimize this dispute settlement system as a judicial entity.

Legitimating Behind the Smoke Screen in the Battle Over Clove Cigarettes

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-160
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

Recent years have confronted the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS) with an intense wave of complex linkage disputes. US-Clove Cigarettes, which stands at the centre of this chapter, serves as the second case study in the investigation into the DSS’s goal-attainment endeavours in this category of WTO disputes. The chapter begins with a review of several jurisprudential milestones leading from the early US-Shrimp, examined in Chapter 5, to the more recent US-Clove Cigarettes, examined here, with a view to portraying the legitimation continuum of which the latter dispute forms a part. The chapter then discusses the intricate legitimacy setting in which US-Clove Cigarettes unfolded and, through a close goal-oriented analysis, shows how the intensified legitimacy concerns aroused shaped the goals pursued by the DSS and the judicial choices made towards their achievement. The chapter concludes by linking the goal-attainment efforts identified to the broader DSS goal-based effectiveness framework advanced in the book.

scholarly journals Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
KYM ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Trade Retaliation ◽  
Trade Measure

The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.

scholarly journals Remarks by Holger Hestermeyer

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 238-239
Author(s):  
Holger Hestermeyer
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Community ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial Economy ◽  
Over Time

This question is inextricably connected with the first one. The more you think a judge's or arbitrator's task consists in merely resolving a dispute, the more you will insist on judicial economy. The more you regard a judge as an instrument of the international community in developing international law or elucidating its concepts, the more you will favor her or his straying from what is strictly necessary to resolve the dispute. To some extent, the international judiciary serves both of these functions, which was made explicit with regard to World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement in Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. It obviously resolves disputes with an important role for judicial economy. But it also elucidates the concepts of international law. That function of adjudication gains some importance in international law, because it is a legal system without legislature, where pressures on legal rules can build over time and only the adjudicator can ensure that the system remains operable in a changing world, straying from the path of judicial economy.

scholarly journals THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
The Public ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.

WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Schoenbaum
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Appeal Process

We have now had three years' experience with the dispute-settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on 1 January 1995. By any objective standard, this system of dispute settlement is a resounding success. Well over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and, as at the end of 1997,25cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 were under consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal process. The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, the quality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO are complying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.

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