scholarly journals Deep and Not Comprehensive? What the WTO Rules Permit for a UK–EU FTA

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILY LYDGATE ◽  
L. ALAN WINTERS

AbstractWTO rules prohibit Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that provide tariff-free access or services liberalization in only one or a few sectors. In this sense, a narrow, sectoral approach to concluding an FTA between the EU and the UK would contravene WTO law. However, assuming the EU and the UK were able to agree a substantially broad tariff-free FTA, WTO rules would not prevent them from moving further to maintain the bulk of the benefits of the Customs Union and the Single Market in a few key sectors. They could establish customs union-like conditions by coordinating external tariffs in some sectors and agreeing on relaxed Rules of Origin (RoOs) administered lightly and Single Market-like access could be approximated through sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such an approach would enable continued deep integration, whose desirability has been signalled on both sides. It would fall short of current market access levels even in the selected sectors, and, in the case of tariff coordination, re-create some of the limits to an independent trade policy that Brexit aimed to remove. If the trade-off were deemed desirable, however, the approach could be reconciled with WTO rules including the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ requirement that equal treatment be awarded to all WTO Member States.

2019 ◽  
Vol 250 ◽  
pp. R22-R29
Author(s):  
David Vines ◽  
Paul Gretton ◽  
Anne Williamson

Executive SummaryThe UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1850194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Troy Lorde ◽  
Antonio Alleyne ◽  
Brian Francis

This paper assesses Barbados' competitiveness within the EU market in light of its recent signing of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU in 2008. Using SITC data from 1992-2006, indices of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) were calculated. We found that Barbados possesses comparative advantages in Live Animals; Raw Sugars, Beet and Cane; and Spirits. However, policies such as the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, onerous rules of origin and non-tariff barriers including technical barriers to trade, threaten to undermine these advantages. These developments strongly suggest that Barbados must move agriculture up the value chain and increase value-added, as well as integrate it more fully with other sectors of its economy. Greater attention must be focused on countries in the EU other than the UK, if full advantage is to be taken of the EPA, as the UK market is already mature. There is evidence that export opportunities to these countries exist in other commodity groups (Fuels, Lubricants, etc.; Animal, Vegetable Oils Fats, Wax; Chemicals, Related Products; Manufactured Goods). When these issues are placed within the context of Barbados' history of weak capacity to take advantage of the market access opportunities available from their trading arrangements, the overarching challenge for Barbados is one of effective market access. This will require, among other things, a capable export promotion agency. The export of non-traditional commodities should be promoted, and greater support, perhaps in the form of incentives, should be provided to large firms that are not yet exporters to encourage them to look beyond the domestic market.


Author(s):  
Igor Merheim-Eyre

Igor Merheim-Eyre examines an area where EU values and interests appear to be currently in real tension – migration. Once again, while the EU institutions themselves may wish to promote values, individual member states are protecting their interests. He examines the ways in which the development of the single market and internal free movement has led to the need for greater control of the EU’s external borders. In this context the neighbours are seen as having a responsibility to help protect the EU from migration from further afield. In acquiescing in this they are promised visa-free access. We see the application of conditionality by the EU, referred to in several chapters, used not to just to promote norms and values but to defend the EU’s security interests. The EU may wish Turkey to be EU-ised but more immediately it needs Turkey to stop migration into the EU from Syria.


2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.


Significance This followed a landmark speech on January 17 in which she added more clarity and detail to her previous stance on the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU. May indicated a willingness to leave the single market, strongly implied that the United Kingdom would not be part of the customs union in its current form and asserted that she would rather quit the EU with no permanent or transitional deal agreed than accept an arrangement which limited the United Kingdom’s future freedom of action. Impacts The government is likely to meet its preferred timetable for triggering Article 50 even if it has to obtain approval from parliament. The United Kingdom will probably lose its passporting rights, which allow UK-based banks to sell their products across the EEA. Paris and Frankfurt will probably benefit as banks may seek to move some of their staff out of London.


2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Lyudmila Babynina ◽  

The United Kingdom left the European Union on January 31, 2020. On December 31, 2020, the transition period ended, during which all EU rules and regulations applied to Britain. The trade agreement was reached in record time, but it is too early to talk about long-term mutual benefits. The British case in the system of trade and economic agreements of the European Union is unique. On the one hand, at the time of the negotiations, the UK retained EU law, was a member of the EU Single Internal Market and Customs Union, subject to the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice. On the other hand, the EU for the first time found itself in a situation when a third country was determined to distance itself as much as possible from EU rules while concluding a trade agreement, despite the obvious economic losses. At the same time, both sides understood that the absence of an agreement threatened all interested actors with serious losses, and that it must be concluded. As a result, the compromise text of the TCA reflects the fundamentally different approaches of the parties to bilateral cooperation, and its provisions suggest a change of its format in the future.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. The seventh edition of EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials provides clear analysis of all aspects of European law in the post Lisbon era. This edition looks in detail at the way in which the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty have worked since the Treaty became operational, especially innovations such as the hierarchy of norms, the different types of competence, and the legally binding Charter of Rights. The coming into effect of the new Treaty was overshadowed by the financial crisis, which has occupied a considerable part of the EU’s time since 2009. The EU has also had to cope with the refugee crisis, the pandemic crisis, the rule of law crisis and the Brexit crisis. There has nonetheless been considerable legislative activity in other areas, and the EU courts have given important decisions across the spectrum of EU law. The seventh edition has incorporated the changes in all these areas. The book covers all topics relating to the institutional and constitutional dimensions of the EU. In relation to EU substantive law there is detailed treatment of the four freedoms, the single market, competition, equal treatment, citizenship, state aid, and the area of freedom, security and justice. Brexit is the rationale for the decision to have a separate UK version of the book. There is no difference in the chapters between the two versions, insofar as the explication of the EU law is concerned. The difference resides in the fact that in the UK version there is an extra short section at the end of each chapter explaining how, for example, direct effect, supremacy or free movement are relevant in post-Brexit UK. Law students in the UK need to know this, law students in the EU and elsewhere do not.


Author(s):  
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott

The chapter examines Brexit and the Scottish question, arguing that the UK secession from the EU may be the trigger for Scotland’s secession from the UK. While Scottish voters had by majority rejected independence in a referendum in 2014, they voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU during the Brexit referendum. At the same time, as Douglas-Scott explains, efforts by the Scottish government after the Brexit referendum to obtain a special deal to remain within the EU single market have received only scant attention from the UK government. Moreover, new tensions are likely to emerge between Holyrood and Westminster in the implementation of the UK government. EU Withdrawal Bill. Although pursuant to the Sewel Convention Scotland should be consulted on any UK primary Legislation relating to its devolved powers, the UK government does not seem sensitive to the issue—not least because the UKSC in Miller classified constitutional conventions as non-enforceable norms. Given the unsuccessful exhaustion of all these alternative roads to protect Scotland’s interest, the prospect of a new independence referendum gains credibility.


Significance The UK government remains divided over how its relations with the EU’s customs union should be arranged after Brexit, while the EU is unimpressed by any of the suggestions put forward by London to date. This issue is central to both the future EU-UK trade relationship and the debate about how to resolve the question of the intra-Irish border. Impacts Any physical infrastructure on the Irish border would become a target for violence. A hard border could increase support for Irish reunification among Northern Irish Catholics. Different customs regimes in the EU and the United Kingdom could lead to smuggling.


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