Developing Trade

2019 ◽  
Vol 250 ◽  
pp. R22-R29
Author(s):  
David Vines ◽  
Paul Gretton ◽  
Anne Williamson

Executive SummaryThe UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILY LYDGATE ◽  
L. ALAN WINTERS

AbstractWTO rules prohibit Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that provide tariff-free access or services liberalization in only one or a few sectors. In this sense, a narrow, sectoral approach to concluding an FTA between the EU and the UK would contravene WTO law. However, assuming the EU and the UK were able to agree a substantially broad tariff-free FTA, WTO rules would not prevent them from moving further to maintain the bulk of the benefits of the Customs Union and the Single Market in a few key sectors. They could establish customs union-like conditions by coordinating external tariffs in some sectors and agreeing on relaxed Rules of Origin (RoOs) administered lightly and Single Market-like access could be approximated through sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such an approach would enable continued deep integration, whose desirability has been signalled on both sides. It would fall short of current market access levels even in the selected sectors, and, in the case of tariff coordination, re-create some of the limits to an independent trade policy that Brexit aimed to remove. If the trade-off were deemed desirable, however, the approach could be reconciled with WTO rules including the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ requirement that equal treatment be awarded to all WTO Member States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Lyudmila Babynina ◽  

The United Kingdom left the European Union on January 31, 2020. On December 31, 2020, the transition period ended, during which all EU rules and regulations applied to Britain. The trade agreement was reached in record time, but it is too early to talk about long-term mutual benefits. The British case in the system of trade and economic agreements of the European Union is unique. On the one hand, at the time of the negotiations, the UK retained EU law, was a member of the EU Single Internal Market and Customs Union, subject to the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice. On the other hand, the EU for the first time found itself in a situation when a third country was determined to distance itself as much as possible from EU rules while concluding a trade agreement, despite the obvious economic losses. At the same time, both sides understood that the absence of an agreement threatened all interested actors with serious losses, and that it must be concluded. As a result, the compromise text of the TCA reflects the fundamentally different approaches of the parties to bilateral cooperation, and its provisions suggest a change of its format in the future.


Author(s):  
V.V. Pushkareva

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union with its overseas possessions returned to the political agenda the territorial dispute between Madrid and London over the Gibraltar semi-enclave. The opposite points of view have collided in the context of Brexit: the UK fundamentally defends its sovereignty over Gibraltar, Spain strives to regain the lost territory, the Gibraltarians want to maintain association with the Kingdom and not break with the European Union, the European Union is not eager to grant Gibraltar a special status, but at the same time is interested in maintaining a preferential financial zone in the South of the Iberian Peninsula. Separate issues of relations between the UK and Spain on the situation of Gibraltar for the transition period were agreed, they are set out in the “4 Memoranda”. The further fate of the territory depends on the UK's deal with the EU. The contracting parties guarantee that the interests of both Spain and Gibraltar are taken into account. Possible options: holding a referendum on the independence of Gibraltar; gaining control of Spain over the strategic objects of Gibraltar as a result of the deal; Gibraltar remains under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and continues to cooperate with the EU; dual Spanish-British sovereignty will be established over Gibraltar; at the end of Brexit Gibraltar will not cooperate with the EU. But each of the proposed solutions requires certain concessions from the disputing parties. They are not ready to compromise yet. The authorities of Gibraltar, however, are aware that without cooperation with the UK, Spain and the European Union, their further successful state and development is impossible. More favorable conditions, in our opinion, for the Gibraltarians will arise with the accession to the Schengen area and the Customs Union.


2020 ◽  
pp. 269-293
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter describes what is interchangeably called the ‘common market’, the ‘single market’, or the ‘internal market’. These terms all refer to the same concept: a geographical area made up of the territories of the Member States, wherein there are (in theory) no barriers to trade, and which operate an identical external trade policy. The chapter looks at the completion of the single market, considering the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It also identifies what makes the single market unique, detailing the stages of economic integration and the key components of the EU's internal market. In light of the Withdrawal Agreement, it will be some time before the UK distances itself from the EU's internal market. The transition period created by the Withdrawal Agreement effectively results in a form of ongoing ‘EU membership’ without institutional representation. Both the positive regulations that make up the internal market and the EU's customs union rules will thus continue to apply to the UK until at least the end of 2020.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-88
Author(s):  
James I. J. Green

A custom-made device (CMD) is a medical device intended for the sole use of a particular patient. In a dental setting, CMDs include prosthodontic devices, orthodontic appliances, bruxism splints, speech prostheses and devices for the treatment of obstructive sleep apnoea, trauma prevention and orthognathic surgery facilitation (arch bars and interocclusal wafers). Since 1993, the production and provision of CMDs have been subject to European Union (EU) Directive 93/42/EEC (Medical Device Directive, MDD) given effect in the UK by The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (Statutory Instrument 2002/618), and its subsequent amendments. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (Medical Device Regulation, EU MDR) replaces the MDD and the other EU Directive pertaining to Medical Devices, Council Directive 90/385/EEC (Active Implantable Medical Device Directive, AIMDD). The EU MDR was published on 5 April 2017, came into force on 25 May 2017 and, following a three-year transition period was due to be fully implemented and repeal the MDD on 26 May 2020, but was deferred until 26 May 2021 due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. In the UK, in preparation for the country’s planned departure from the EU, the EU MDR, with necessary amendments, was transposed into UK law (Medical Devices (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, UK MDR). The UK left the Union on 31 January 2020 and entered a transition period that ended on 31 December 2020, meaning that, from 1 January 2021, dental professionals in Great Britain who prescribe and manufacture CMDs are mandated to do so in accordance with the new legislation while Northern Ireland remains in line with the EU legislation and implementation date. This paper sets out the requirements that relate to the production and provision of CMDs in a UK dental setting.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001573252110122
Author(s):  
Rupa Chanda ◽  
Neha Vinod Betai

In June 2016, the United Kingdom took the world by surprise with the results of its referendum on whether to remain in the European Union (EU). With a 52% majority, the country decided to leave the bloc in which it had been a member since 1973. With this outcome began the long process of Brexit negotiations between UK and the EU. The UK officially ceased to be an EU member on 31 January 2020, with a transition period up to the end of 2020. The decision to leave the EU came on the back of rising bitterness among people. Membership in the EU was seen as expensive and not beneficial to the country. One of the major campaigning points of the leave camp was the issue of immigration. Given that free movement of people is an important part of being in the EU, the party argued that leaving the EU would help the country take back control of its borders. Immigration in the UK has been on the rise since the early 2000s. It shot up further with the accession of the eight East European economies into the EU. Figure 1 shows how, leading up to Brexit, immigration from the EU to the UK was constantly increasing. JEL Codes: F00, F30, F22, F23


2020 ◽  
pp. 002201832097753
Author(s):  
Gemma Davies ◽  
Paul Arnell

The Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom have a long, close and difficult history. The most recent phase of which dates from 1998 and the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement. Since 1921, however, there has been unique practice between Ireland and the UK as regards the transfer of accused and convicted persons from one to the other. Indeed, there has been a special and close relationship between the two in that regard; albeit one not without difficulties. In recent times EU Justice and Home Affairs measures and the Good Friday Agreement have supplemented and strengthened the relationship. These include, since January 2004, the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The EAW has been particularly important in streamlining the extradition process between the Ireland and the UK. This phase of history and co-operation is coming to an end. The UK’s membership of the EU has now ceased, and a transition period during which the UK remains part of the EAW will end on 31st December 2020. The extradition relationship between the two is therefore facing a considerable challenge. There are several options open to Ireland, the UK and the EU as a replacement. Time, political will and the interests of third states, however, may well stand in the way of the conclusion of an agreement that optimally serves the interests of all parties and criminal justice. This paper considers the origins of extradition between the UK and Ireland and the alternative methods of extradition open to the UK and Ireland after Brexit. Consideration is given to the likely operation of a Norway-Iceland style agreement and whether such an agreement will be in place by the end of the transition and, if it was, whether its terms are likely to be sufficient for the needs of Ireland and the UK. The possibility of a bilateral arrangement on extradition between Ireland and the UK is also explored. Underlying the discussion is the critical point that the future extradition relationship must retain its ‘special’ characteristics, and therefore maintain the trust and good will that has developed over the years and given rise to an effective extradition relationship between the two countries. In other words, the lessons of history must be remembered.


2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It discusses cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive and deals with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices harmful to the single market. Price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary and an excessively high price may be a way of preventing parallel imports or excluding a competitor from the market; but the division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and the EU Courts is considered, followed by cases in the UK. Where appropriate, reference is made to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.


2020 ◽  
pp. 88-122
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter examines the sources of EU law. As with domestic law, there are two overarching categories of EU law: primary law and secondary law. EU primary law includes the EU Treaties and the general principles of EU law. Meanwhile, EU secondary law includes regulations, directives, decisions, international agreements, and ‘soft law’. The chapter then looks at the legislative processes that are used to adopt secondary legislation, and assesses when, or in what policy areas, the EU can make law. It also considers two mechanisms that aim to prevent the EU from extending its legislative power beyond what the Treaties have granted it: the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality. Finally, the chapter addresses the impact of Brexit on EU law, assessing what will happen to EU law in the UK during the Withdrawal Agreement's transition period.


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