Saving Judicial Independence: A Threat to the Preliminary Ruling Mechanism?

Author(s):  
Charlotte Reyns

Admissibility of questions for preliminary ruling – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as Dorsch Consult criterion under Article 267 TFEU – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as element of the Rule of Law value under Article 19 TEU – Structural inadmissibility of questions for preliminary ruling as perverse consequence of the attempts to safeguard independence of the EU judiciary

Author(s):  
Monika Kawczyńska

AbstractRecent constitutional reforms in Poland have demonstrated a lack of respect for the rule of law and for the fundamental values which form the foundations of the EU legal order. The Polish authorities have substantially deviated from principles that the country has accepted as a part of the Copenhagen criteria. The aim of the article is to analyse the mechanisms and procedures applied by the EU institutions to address the systemic threats to the rule of law in Poland. The main focus of the assessment is on the effectiveness of the measure and its potential for a proper solution to the problem. The response provided by the EU demonstrate that there has been a shift from a political to judicial enforcement of values. The article argues that the remedies that were deemed to be the least suitable to address the systemic deficiencies in the rule of law – an infringement action and a preliminary ruling procedure – proved to be the most effective remedy to defend independence of the Polish judiciary. Unexpectedly, the most efficient institution to ensure the respect for values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in Poland proved to be the CJEU, providing extensive interpretation of Article 19 (1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. Nevertheless the values are still much more difficult to enforce than the law. While the most serious infringements have been reversed, this has not prevented the Polish authorities from further violating the rule of law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Tamás Molnár

On June 3, 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), closely following the Advocate General's Opinion, delivered its Grand Chamber judgment in case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament by dismissing Hungary's action. The ruling confirms that the European Parliament (EP) acted within the procedural boundaries of its powers when initiating, by a two-thirds majority vote of its members, proceedings against Hungary for the situation in the country regarding the rule of law, democracy, and other values on which the European Union (EU) is founded. The ruling comes after the Hungarian government decided to challenge the validity of the resolution of the European Parliament of September 12, 2018, which triggered the proceedings foreseen in the event of a clear risk of serious breaches of the foundational values of the EU, including the rule of law, pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ender McDuff

The international refugee regime is marked by a widening gap between the constitutional democratic values of countries in the global north and the practices employed by their state executives. While states have committed to the rights of refugees by joining the 1951 Refugee Convention, they have simultaneously subverted the rule of law in the name of security by instituting practices that externalize asylum: neo-refoulement. The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which judicial power can be used to combat executive practices of neo-refoulement. This article considers asylum claims heard in the Greek appellate court system pertaining to the safe third country agreement between the European Union and Turkey. The article concludes that, under a system of coequal institutions, judicial power and case law harbour the potential for necessitating the consideration of all individual asylum cases effectively disarming practices of neo-refoulement.


Author(s):  
Irēna Kucina ◽  
◽  

Rule of law is one of the fundamental values of the European Union. Over time, Court of Justice of the European Union, national constitutional and supreme courts and legal science, which form the common European legal space, have come to a more sophisticated and refined understanding of this notion – a concept, which more or less represents a shared understanding of what the rule of law means among all Member States. European Union cannot allow any of its Member States to deviate from this principle. It must have efficient tools for preventing such acts. The purpose of the Regulation 2020/2092 of the European parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (the Regulation) is to give European Union a more efficient tool for ensuring Member States compliance with the rule of law. In addition to the existing legal instruments, it provides an entirely unique mechanism, which links the EU budget to the respect for the rule of law. This article analyses the already existing mechanisms for the enforcement of rule of law and then takes an in-depth look at the new mechanism established by the Regulation. It can be concluded that the Regulation represents a compromise, which is not perfect, but still workable. Although the process established by the Regulation is political, and there are certain risks to rule of law, guidelines adopted by the Council will precisely formulate the specific mandate of both political bodies (the European Commission and the Council of the EU) and align it with the legal purpose of the procedure. It will also enable Court of Justice to decide on specific cases, albeit post factum. Therefore, this Regulation should be considered as a step forward towards more efficient enforcement of rule of law in the European Union.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 627
Author(s):  
Silvia Marino

Abstract: The present paper analyses the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Brisch case. The reference for preliminary ruling concerns the optional or mandatory nature of the application form established by the Succession Implementing Regulation for the issue of an European Certificate of Succession. The present paper tackles the general framework, from the current CJEU’s case law on the Succession Regulation’s provisions on the ECS, to the main procedural issues. Then, an analysis of the case and of the CJEU’s reasoning is offered. The concluding remarks submit some considerations on the impact of the standard forms established by the EU Regulations within the civil judicial cooperation.Palabras clave: European Certificate of Succession, Standard Forms, Succession Regulation No 650/2012, Implementing Regulation No 1329/2014.Riassunto: Il presente contributo analizza la recente sentenza Brisch della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. La domanda di pronuncia pregiudiziale verte sulla natura del modello di domanda di emissione del certificato successorio europeo, previsto dal regolamento di esecuzione del regolamento sulle successioni transfrontaliere. Pertanto, il contributo affronta lo stato attuale della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia sul certificato successorio europeo e le regole procedimentali fondamentali per il suo ottenimento. Quindi, è analizzato il caso con particolare attenzione alla motivazione della Corte. Infine, le conclusioni presentano alcune considerazioni più generali sul valore e sugli effetti dei moduli standard, previsti nei regolamenti dell’Unione in materia di cooperazione giudiziaria civile.Parole chiave: certificato successorio europeo, moduli standard, regolamento 650/2012 sulle successioni transfrontaliere, regolamento d’esecuzione 1329/2014


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 439-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon ◽  
Petra Bárd

Abstract The article proves a long-lasting legacy of Martin Krygier’s work on the rule of law. Taking the European Union as a case study, and specifically—the recent infringement action concerning the judicial independence in Poland, the article addresses the point (teleos) of the rule of law, the conditions the institutions need to fulfill to make this point, and institutional measures that help to meet these conditions in the EU as a whole and its Member States. It argues that the rule of law can be achieved via various paths, but there is general agreement on when its basic elements such as the guarantees against arbitrary removal of judges are missing. Therefore, it concludes, the EU does not need to determine the anatomy of national institutions, but it needs to remain vigilant against such modifications that put at risk the effectiveness of EU law, and the judicial protection of individual rights in particular.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-32
Author(s):  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Femke Gremmelprez

The rule of law as one of the core constitutional values of the EU legal order – The rule of law in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a combined reading of Articles 2 and 19 TEU – Protecting the rule of law in the Common Foreign and Security Policy – Protecting the rule of law in the member states in order to safeguard the structure and functioning of the EU legal order – Limits to the scope of application of EU law


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Nevin Alija

In its September 13th 2017 decision,1 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on a request for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court of Poland (Sąd Najwyższy) in proceedings between ENEA S.A. (ENEA) and the president of the Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki (Office for the regulation of energy, URE) on the imposition by the latter of a financial penalty on ENEA for breach of its obligation to supply electricity produced by cogeneration. The judgment of the Court of Justice follows many decisions of the European Commission and judgments of the EU courts assessing the involvement of State resources in support schemes in energy, particularly with the aim of switching towards more environmentally friendly sources. This case reaffirms that support schemes may, in certain circumstances, fall outside the scope of the EU State aid rules.


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