The League of Nations: a retreat from international law?

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Wertheim

AbstractDuring the First World War, civil society groups across the North Atlantic put forward an array of plans for recasting international society. The most prominent ones sought to build on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 by developing international legal codes and, in a drastic innovation, obligating and militarily enforcing the judicial settlement of disputes. Their ideal was a world governed by law, which they opposed to politics. This idea was championed by the largest groups in the United States and France in favour of international organizations, and they had likeminded counterparts in Britain. The Anglo-American architects of the League of Nations, however, defined their vision against legalism. Their declaratory design sought to ensure that artificial machinery never stifled the growth of common consciousness. Paradoxically, the bold new experiment in international organization was forged from an anti-formalistic ethos – one that slowed the momentum of international law and portended the rise of global governance.

2019 ◽  
pp. 111-139
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

This chapter examines Woodrow Wilson’s pragmatic decision not to declare war on the Ottoman Empire after American entry into the First World War. It explains why this policy choice offers important insights into Wilson’s attitude toward the Allied powers, particularly the British Empire. It evaluates Wilson’s broader attitude to Britain and his attitude toward an Anglo-American alliance. The chapter emphasizes the clash between Wilson and Roosevelt over whether the United States should declare war on the Ottoman Empire, and what this reveals about their humanitarian visions and broader conceptions of international order. In doing so, it traces the emergence of Wilson’s own solution to the Armenian question as part of a reformed, American-led international system.


1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (6) ◽  
pp. 999-1013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elmer Plischke

Current press articles and periodical literature, both in the United States and abroad, are manifesting a developing interest in trans-polar aviation and Arctic aërial jurisdiction. Although this interest in Arctic airspace appears to be conceived in the exigencies of the present world conflict, belief in the practicability of air routes traversing the Arctic Basin and joining the great centers of civilization of the two hemispheres was expressed as long ago as shortly after the First World War. Perhaps most vocal of the exponents is the polar explorer and publicist Vilhjalmur Stefansson, who began to stress the positional significance of the Arctic almost twenty years ago.Meanwhile the feasibility of polar aviation was demonstrated in actual practice. Following a series of experimental flights by dirigible and plane—and once the urge to attain the North Pole via the air materialized in the successful flights of Richard E. Byrd, Roald Amundsen-Lincoln Ellsworth, and Umberto Nobile in 1926 and 1928—polar flying concentrated largely upon the spanning of the Atlantic and Pacific aërial highways between the two hemispheres.


2019 ◽  
pp. 80-104
Author(s):  
R. Shindo

The First World War marked a turning point for civilization development in the 20th century. With the collapse of the Central Powers, a new international order arose. In the wake of the Paris PeaceConference, the founding of the League of Nations was above all due to the initiative of the victorious powers. Member states were expected to contribute to maintaining world peace. Japan was one of themajor Allied powers and a permanent member of the League Council. In this position, Japan was significantly involved in the post-war politics of Europe. To elucidate the nature and consequences of this involvement, the activities of Japanese diplomats in the League of Nations and in the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Hague during theperiod between the First and Second World Wars are examined. Particular attention is paid to Japan’s participation in the regulation of the demarcation and minority issues in Upper Silesia and in theVilnius and Memel districts.


PMLA ◽  
1955 ◽  
Vol 70 (4-Part2) ◽  
pp. 3-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Fisher

The First World War had been over for two years. In the League of Nations atmosphere following its close, world scholarship had begun to mobilize. In 1918 the Modern Humanities Research Association had been founded. In 1919 the International Research Council, the International Astronomical Union, the International Chemistry Union, and the International Union of Academies had all been organized, and similar bodies were being founded each succeeding year. In these international bodies, American scholars were ill at ease. The war had convinced Great Britain and Europe of the material achievements of the United States, but American scholars, many of them trained abroad, felt keenly that their nation did not stand so high in the fields of international scholarship. One of the first actions of the MHRA had been to send representatives across the Atlantic to meet with MLA members, out of which discussion grew the MLA annual bibliography (1921), intended to display American literary and linguistic scholarship to European scholars. The American Council of Learned Societies, founded in 1919 to make possible American participation in the International Union of Academies, had immediately addressed itself to fostering American scholarly projects that would earn respect abroad.


1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 877-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Stevenson

Between 1917 and 1919 the United States made its first, spectacular intrusion into European power politics. For President Wilson, entry into the First World War was a chance not only to eliminate an immediate threat to American interests but also to transform international relations. The time had come to weld the industrialized countries into a community of interest, based on a shared loyalty to representative government and the market economy, expressed by membership of a League of Nations, and in which economic and territorial causes of tension would have been removed. But hardly had the German obstacle to this programme been overcome before, at the peace conference of 1919, Wilson ran up against almost equally determined obstruction from his former allies. This article examines one source of that antagonism, in the latent conflict before the armistice between American war aims and those of France. It argues that French policy was moulded by a tension between the Paris leaders' own desires for the settlement with Germany and their need to preserve a system of alliances deemed essential for French security in the future as well as for the war itself. By 1917 French governments were already confronted with dilemmas which were to harass them for the succeeding twenty years.


Author(s):  
Liudmila M. Samarskaya

Introduction. The Mandate Palestine as a separate administrative unit inside the British empire emerged after the First World War. The aim of the present article is to research and analyze the key factors of its creation, the so-called «new diplomacy», which was formed on the verge of 1910s–1920s. Materials and methods. The methods used in the article are historical-analytical and historical-systematical applied to the original sources, as well as to the research literature on the relevant topics. Results and Discussion. During and after the First World War there happened considerable changes in the international political system: nationalist movements of the Middle East became the leading players in it; among them a major role was played by the Jewish and Arab nationalism. Their aspirations were supported by the United States of America, which with the help of the «new diplomacy» and the League of Nations tried to change the balance of powers on the international arena of that period. Conclusion. As a result of all the changes the mandate system was created – a new phenomenon in the international relations of that period. Thus the appearance of the Mandate Palestine became possible Keywords: the Mandate Palestine, Zionism, nationalism, the Middle East, «new diplomacy», the League of Nations


1970 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin David Dubin

A remarkable document in the history of international organization is a detailed constitution for a league of nations which was given limited distribution in March 1915 under the title “Proposals for the Avoidance of War”. Prepared by British liberal and socialist critics of prewar British diplomacy headed by Lord Bryce, the historian, jurist, and retired ambassador to the United States, it undoubtedly was the single most influential scheme for a league of nations produced during the First World War. Although the “Proposals” recommended neither international social or economic cooperation nor measures of international administration, it was known to the authors of the major league schemes prepared in the United Kingdom and the United States during the First World War and to officials in both countries. Indeed, the document was the source of key concepts and language embodied in 1919 in the Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and of its successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yet discussion of the “Proposals” in the literature on the origins of the League of Nations is both cursory and imprecise. Even such writers as Henry R. Winkler and Alfred Zimmern who recognize its importance seem not to understand how the “Proposals” evolved and how early and pervasive an influence it had.


Author(s):  
Andreas Timmermann

Abstract: This paper intends demonstrate to what extent Krausism, doctrine named after the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832), influenced Juan Hipólito Yrigoyen, Argentinian politician and two-time president (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) to challenge tradition and advocate for a new international law, Pan Americanism, linked to the the idea of the right to share the Earth and one humanity, thus, inspiring him to pursue a different path in the negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and at the League of Nations after the First World War.


1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Burk

It is a commonplace among historians of the First World War that during this period Britain and America changed positions as dorninant and subordinate financial powers. The great gap in the histories, however, has been any description of how this came about, Historians of the period have generally relied on one book, E. V. Morgan's Studies in Brtish financial policy 1914–1925 (1952), with the occasional use of Henry F. Grady's British war finance, 1914–1919 (1923). Both are very useful, and within its field Morgan in particular will be difficult to supplant; but within the context of Anglo-American relations they only treat one side of the stroy. It is clear that during the war Britain was dependent increasingly on American finance, private and later public, both to supply her civilian and military populations and to fight the war; and further, that by late 1916 decisions taken in America could have a direct bearing on British ability to finance her own operations. Once America entered the war this influence became even more direct. Negotiations over finance largely took place in America, by means of temporary and permanent missions. This article will describe the most important of these missions, and trace the gradual change in the balance of British and American financial power.


1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 1127-1144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Kruszewski

In the titanic struggle for leadership in Europe, Great Britain is resisting the most formidable challenge to her supremacy. For centuries, her principal foreign policy was to prevent any establishment of hegemony over the entire European continent. After the first World War, British statesmen, however, were convinced “that they could no longer bear the burden of regulating world affairs alone. They urged a League of Nations…. But national sovereignties were no more prepared to collaborate in a democratic world organization than they had been to submit to British domination. Thus, instead of the League of Nations succeeding to the British imperial hegemony, the world fell into anarchy in a new struggle of several states, each striving to become the dominant Power.”


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