scholarly journals THE LOGIC OF JOINT ABILITY IN TWO-PLAYER TACIT GAMES

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER HAWKE

AbstractLogics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-typecoordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we callTwo-Player Strategic Coordination Logic(SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality.

Author(s):  
Phanish Puranam

For a given division of labor, (potential) breakdowns of integration can be traced to either motivational or knowledge-related sources (or both). Integration failures arising from coordination problems require managing the need for and/or the extent of predictive knowledge; those arising from cooperation problems require managing the valence of interdependence. A fruitful area for further enquiry awaits the student of organization design at the intersection of these sources of integration failure. I outlined two possible approaches: a closer look at the interactions between knowledge and motivation-related issues, or a coarser bundling of both into the construct of integration. In particular, given the behavioral assumptions of adaptive rationality, thinking of integration of effort as a search problem may be an area of high research potential. It can help understand organizations as “marvels but not miracles”—how boundedly rational designers can nevertheless organize boundedly rational agents towards accomplishing goals.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
Paul Weirich ◽  

Margaret Gilbert (1990) argues that although the rationality of the agents in a standard coordination problem does not suffice for their coordination, a social convention of coordination, understood as the agents’ joint acceptance of a principle requiring their coordination, does the job. Gilbert’s argument targets agents rational in the game-theoretic sense, which following Sobel (1994: Chap. 14), I call hyperrational agents. I agree that hyperrational agents may fail to coordinate in some cases despite the obvious benefits of coordination. However, I add that fully rational agents, who rationally exercise rationality’s permissions, may coordinate in these cases without jointly accepting a principle of coordination. I make this point using a model that adopts common simplifying assumptions about agents and their coordination problems.


2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
FARHAD ARBAB

In this paper, we present Reo, which forms a paradigm for composition of software components based on the notion of mobile channels. Reo is a channel-based exogenous coordination model in which complex coordinators, called connectors, are compositionally built out of simpler ones. The simplest connectors in Reo are a set of channels with well-defined behaviour supplied by users. Reo can be used as a language for coordination of concurrent processes, or as a ‘glue language’ for compositional construction of connectors that orchestrate component instances in a component-based system. The emphasis in Reo is just on connectors and their composition, and not on the entities that connect to, communicate and cooperate through these connectors. Each connector in Reo imposes a specific coordination pattern on the entities (for example, components) that perform I/O operations through that connector, without the knowledge of those entities. Channel composition in Reo is a very powerful mechanism for construction of connectors. We demonstrate the expressive power of connector composition in Reo through a number of examples. We show that exogenous coordination patterns that can be expressed as (meta-level) regular expressions over I/O operations can be composed in Reo out of a small set of only five primitive channel types.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin P. Bruner

AbstractI argue that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest. In particular, I contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems are likely to be moralized.


Author(s):  
Hannah Lee

This paper is the attempt to show how system theory could provide critical insight into the transdisciplinary field of library and information sciences (LIS). It begins with a discussion on the categorization of library and information sciences as an academic and professional field (or rather, the lack of evidence on the subject) and what is exactly meant by system theory, drawing upon the general system theory established by Ludwig von Bertalanffy. The main conversation of this paper focuses on the inadequacies of current meta-level discussions of LIS and the benefits of general system theory (particularly when considering the exponential rapidity in which information travels) with LIS.


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