Integration of Effort

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phanish Puranam
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Organization Design ◽  
Search Problem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Adaptive Rationality ◽  
Labor Potential

For a given division of labor, (potential) breakdowns of integration can be traced to either motivational or knowledge-related sources (or both). Integration failures arising from coordination problems require managing the need for and/or the extent of predictive knowledge; those arising from cooperation problems require managing the valence of interdependence. A fruitful area for further enquiry awaits the student of organization design at the intersection of these sources of integration failure. I outlined two possible approaches: a closer look at the interactions between knowledge and motivation-related issues, or a coarser bundling of both into the construct of integration. In particular, given the behavioral assumptions of adaptive rationality, thinking of integration of effort as a search problem may be an area of high research potential. It can help understand organizations as “marvels but not miracles”—how boundedly rational designers can nevertheless organize boundedly rational agents towards accomplishing goals.

scholarly journals Human–AI collaborative decision-making as an organization design problem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phanish Puranam
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Organization Design ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Collaborative Decision Making ◽  
Collaborative Decision

AbstractThe promise of collaboration between humans and algorithms in producing good decisions is stimulating much experimentation. Drawing on research in organization design can help us to approach this experimentation systematically. I propose typologies for considering different forms of division of labor between human and algorithm as well as the learning configurations they are arranged in, as basic building blocks for this endeavor.

scholarly journals How to Put the Cart Behind the Horse in the Cultural Evolution of Gender

2021 ◽  
pp. 004839312110497
Author(s):  
Daniel Saunders
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Gendered Division Of Labor ◽  
Early Humans

In The Origins of Unfairness, Cailin O’Connor develops a series of evolutionary game models to show that gender might have emerged to solve coordination problems in the division of labor. One assumption of those models is that agents engage in gendered social learning. This assumption puts the explanatory cart before the horse. How did early humans have a well-developed system of gendered social learning before the gendered division of labor? This paper develops a pair of models that show it is possible for the gendered division of labor to arise on more minimal assumptions.

Gender, Coordination Problems, and Coordination Games

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-39
Author(s):  
Cailin O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Special Problem ◽  
Break Symmetry ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Extra Information ◽  
Gendered Division Of Labor ◽  
Complementary Actions

The chapter opens with a brief discussion of gender and gendered division of labor. A general discussion follows of what coordination problems are and the models used to represent them–coordination games—are introduced. It is argued that not all coordination games are equal. While some can be solved by conventions and norms that are identical for everyone in a society, others, those that require people to take different, complementary actions, pose a special problem. Coordinating behavior in these sorts of games requires extra information to break symmetry between those who are interacting. Gendered division of labor is just such a scenario.

scholarly journals THE LOGIC OF JOINT ABILITY IN TWO-PLAYER TACIT GAMES

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER HAWKE
Keyword(s):  
Expressive Power ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Reliable Communication ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Meta Level ◽  
Strategic Coordination ◽  
Strategic Ability ◽  
Cooperating Agents

AbstractLogics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-typecoordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we callTwo-Player Strategic Coordination Logic(SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality.

Coordination and Hyperrationality

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
Paul Weirich ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Convention ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Simplifying Assumptions ◽  
Game Theoretic

Margaret Gilbert (1990) argues that although the rationality of the agents in a standard coordination problem does not suffice for their coordination, a social convention of coordination, understood as the agents’ joint acceptance of a principle requiring their coordination, does the job. Gilbert’s argument targets agents rational in the game-theoretic sense, which following Sobel (1994: Chap. 14), I call hyperrational agents. I agree that hyperrational agents may fail to coordinate in some cases despite the obvious benefits of coordination. However, I add that fully rational agents, who rationally exercise rationality’s permissions, may coordinate in these cases without jointly accepting a principle of coordination. I make this point using a model that adopts common simplifying assumptions about agents and their coordination problems.

Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor

2021 ◽  
pp. 000312242110278
Author(s):  
Emily Erikson ◽  
Hirokazu Shirado
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Graph Coloring ◽  
Nearest Neighbors ◽  
Network Structures ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Simulation Based ◽  
Graph Coloring Game

We use a simulation-based method to consider the effect of different network structures on the propensity for economic producers to develop a complementary division of labor. We use a graph-coloring game, in which nodes are given incentives to find a color that does not match their nearest neighbors, to represent the interdependent coordination problems inherent to the division of labor. We find that a decentralized development of a division of labor is difficult, particularly when too many specializations are chosen. Counterintuitively, a division of labor is more likely to evolve when the ability of agents to specialize is more constrained. The ability to store property also facilitates the development of a division of labor.

Coordination, conflict, and externalization

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin P. Bruner
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Problems

AbstractI argue that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest. In particular, I contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems are likely to be moralized.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document