Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter L. Lindseth

As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article focuses in particular. The central idea behind the “administrative, not constitutional” interpretation—the historical-constructivist principal-agent framework rooted in delegation, as well as the balance demanded between supranational regulatory power and national democratic and constitutional legitimacy— directly complements both theories. The administrative alternative suggests how the relationship between national principals and supranational agents is one of “mediated legitimacy” rather than direct control. It has its origins in the evolution of administrative governance in relation to representative government over the course of the twentieth century (indeed before). By drawing on the normative lessons of that history—notably the need for some form of national oversight as well as enforcement of outer constraints on supranational delegation in order to preserve national democratic and constitutional legitimacy in a recognizable sense—this article serves an additional purpose. It suggests how theories of European equilibrium and demoi-cracy might be translated into concrete legal proposals for a more sustainable form of integration over time—a pressing challenge in the context of the continuing crisis of European integration.

Author(s):  
Thomas W. Merrill

This chapter explores the relationship between private and public law. In civil law countries, the public-private distinction serves as an organizing principle of the entire legal system. In common law jurisdictions, the distinction is at best an implicit design principle and is used primarily as an informal device for categorizing different fields of law. Even if not explicitly recognized as an organizing principle, however, it is plausible that private and public law perform distinct functions. Private law supplies the tools that make private ordering possible—the discretionary decisions that individuals make in structuring their lives. Public law is concerned with providing public goods—broadly defined—that cannot be adequately supplied by private ordering. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, various schools of thought derived from utilitarianism have assimilated both private and public rights to the same general criterion of aggregate welfare analysis. This has left judges with no clear conception of the distinction between private and public law. Another problematic feature of modern legal thought is a curious inversion in which scholars who focus on fields of private law have turned increasingly to law and economics, one of the derivatives of utilitarianism, whereas scholars who concern themselves with public law are increasingly drawn to new versions of natural rights thinking, in the form of universal human rights.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Zylberman

AbstractThe two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of external freedom. The constitutive view requires conceiving of external freedom in a novel, second-personal way, that is, as an irreducibly relational norm.


Chapter 3, after describing general principles of international law and the relationship between international law and domestic law, focuses on the hitherto neglected subject of private commercial law conventions. Textbooks on international law invariably focus on public law treaties. By contrast this chapter addresses issues relating to private law conventions. It goes through the typical structure of a private law convention, the interpretation of conventions and the treatment of errors, and the enforcement of private conventional rights against States. The subject of private law conventions and public law has become of increasing importance with the appearance in several private law instruments of provisions of a public law nature designed, for example, to ensure that creditors’ rights are not enforced in a manner that adversely affects the public interest or State security. Reservations and declarations are also discussed, together with the subject of conflicts between conventions.


Author(s):  
Jean-Bernard Auby

This chapter examines the distinction between public law and private law. It stresses the importance of being aware of this difference between the public/private and public law/private law dichotomies. The public–private divide is universal even if, from one society to another, it can be conceived differently in certain ways. All human communities have an idea about the relationship between the private sphere and the public domain. By contrast, the distinction between public law and private law is not universal. It may be ignored, rejected, or confined to a very limited sphere of operation as, traditionally, in common law systems. Conversely, the public law/private law distinction may be understood as an essential feature of the juridical world, as was the approach of Roman law, inherited by the continental legal systems.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 718-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramazan Kılınç ◽  
Carolyn M. Warner

AbstractWhile debates continue about the relationship between state-provided social welfare and religious charities, and whether organized religions are more capable of providing social welfare than is the public sector, less attention has focused on the question of what motivates religious adherents to contribute to the charitable work of their religions. In this article, we examine how adherents of Catholicism and Islam understand their generosity and its relationship to their faith. Through 218 semi-structured interviews with Catholics and Muslims in four cities in France, Ireland, Italy, and Turkey, we find systematic differences between the two religions. Catholics emphasize love of others and Muslims emphasize duty to God. We also find, contrary to expectations of the literature that emphasizes monitoring and sanctioning within groups to obtain cooperation, that Catholics and Muslims see their generosity as also motivated by the positive affect they feel towards their respective communities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. E-1-E-18
Author(s):  
Peter L. Lindseth

Abstract As is broadly recognized, the realm of administrative power greatly expanded over the course the twentieth century (particularly after 1945). This essay argues that this expansion, along with differential conceptions of legitimacy deeply bound up with it, are crucial to understanding not just the modern administrative state but also the nature of EU governance and the law governing its operation. Despite a dominant paradigm that seeks to understand EU governance in autonomously democratic and constitutional terms, the legitimacy of integration as a whole has remained primarily ‘administrative, not constitutional’. The EU’s normative power, like all power of an ultimately administrative character, finds its legitimacy primarily in legal, technocratic and functional claims. This is not to deny that European integration involves ‘politics’ or has profound ‘constitutional’ implications for its member states or citizens. The ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm is meant only to stress that the ultimate grounding of EU rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication comes closer to the sort of administrative legitimacy that is mediated through national executives, national courts, and national parliaments to a much greater extent than the dominant paradigm supposes. This is the reality that the ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm on EU law has always sought to emphasize, and it is one that is particularly pertinent to the integration process in times of crisis. It is unsurprising, in these circumstances, that the public law of European integration has continually resorted to mechanisms of nationally mediated legitimacy in order to ‘borrow’ legitimacy from the national level. Unless and until Europeans begin to experience democracy and constitutionalism in supranational terms, the ‘administrative, not constitutional’ paradigm suggests that the EU’s judicial doctrines must be adjusted. The purpose should be to address the persistent disconnect between supranational regulatory power and its robust sources of democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the national level.


Author(s):  
Peter Lindseth

This chapter focuses on EU public law—that is, on the structural and procedural law of public institutions, as well as their relation to each other and to private actors. It seeks to answer a specific question: whether, from a historical perspective, EU public law is best viewed as an extension of international, constitutional, or administrative law. It opts primarily for the latter rubric, setting out a historiographical theory for understanding the process of European integration as an extension of the development of modern administrative governance on the national level over the course of the twentieth century. By linking European governance to the development of administrative governance, one can begin to see the basic truth in Alan Milward’s famous, though controversial, assertion that European integration is really just ‘one more stage in the long evolution of the European state’.


Author(s):  
Christian Zendri

Abstract Feudal Law - Canon Law - Public Law. Recent Research and Outlook. Feudal law is a classical topic of the legal history. A recent book by Maura Mordini about the ecclesiastic fee both in civil and in canon law gives cause for studying the relationship between the papal revolution (as Harold J. Berman has written), secular and spiritual laws and the origins of the public law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (68) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Artur K. Modrzejewski

The article contains a description of the relationship between the consent of the owner of uninhabited real estate and the public law obligations resulting from the submitted declaration concerning the amount of the fee for municipal waste management. The author negatively assesses the legal solutions that give owners of uninhabited real estates the freedom to choose whether they want to be included in the municipal waste management system. Given the massive scale of performance of the service of waste collection and management, the tightness of the system is important, which is not guaranteed by the regulations adopted by the legislator.


Author(s):  
Balganesh Shyamkrishna

This chapter examines the relationship between private law and constitutional law in India, with particular emphasis on tort law. It considers the Indian Supreme Court’s expansion of its fundamental rights jurisprudence over the past thirty years, as well as its effort to transcend the public law/private law divide. It also explains how the Court’s fusion of constitutional law and tort law has affected the independent efficacy, normativity, and analytical basis of equivalent private law claims in India. It argues that the Court’s efforts have only undermined the overall legitimacy of private law mechanisms in the country, and that this phenomenon is evident not only with respect to tort law, but also to a lesser degree in other areas of private law, such as contract law and property law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document