"Reals", "roles", and demand features: A critical look at interview versus questionnaire measures of subjective states.

1996 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan T. Morrison ◽  
Harry T. Hunt
2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Hausman

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.


Author(s):  
Alan Thomas

The theory of value has three main traditions: subjectivism, which holds that the only valuable goods are subjective states of sentient beings; objectivism, which claims that while values must be human-related, they exist independently of us; and Neo-Kantian rationalism, which suggests that value is postulated on the basis of practical reason. Central distinctions in the theory of value are between subjective and objective values, instrumental and final values, intrinsic and extrinsic values, organic unities and the idea of an ultimate or architectonic value. There are also distinctions drawn between different types of value, such as moral and aesthetic value.


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