Institutional actors: Children’s emerging beliefs about the causal structure of social roles.

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-80
Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes ◽  
Frank C. Keil ◽  
Yarrow Dunham
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes ◽  
Frank Keil ◽  
Yarrow Dunham

Institutions make new forms of acting possible: Signing executive orders, scoring goals, and officiating weddings are only possible because of the U.S. government, the rules of soccer, and the institution of marriage. Thus, when an individual occupies a particular social role (President, soccer player, and officiator) they acquire new ways of acting on the world. The present studies investigated children’s beliefs about institutional actions, and in particular whether children understand that individuals can only perform institutional actions when their community recognizes them as occupying the appropriate social role. Two studies (Study 1, N = 120 children, 4-11; Study 2, N = 90 children, 4-9) compared institutional actions to standard actions that do not depend on institutional recognition. In both studies, 4- to 5-year-old children believed all actions were possible regardless of whether an individual was recognized as occupying the social role. In contrast, 8- to 9-year-old children robustly distinguished between institutional and standard actions; they understood that institutional actions depend on collective recognition by a community.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Ross

AbstractUse of network models to identify causal structure typically blocks reduction across the sciences. Entanglement of mental processes with environmental and intentional relationships, as Borsboom et al. argue, makes reduction of psychology to neuroscience particularly implausible. However, in psychiatry, a mental disorder can involve no brain disorder at all, even when the former crucially depends on aspects of brain structure. Gambling addiction constitutes an example.


Author(s):  
Tom Beckers ◽  
Uschi Van den Broeck ◽  
Marij Renne ◽  
Stefaan Vandorpe ◽  
Jan De Houwer ◽  
...  

Abstract. In a contingency learning task, 4-year-old and 8-year-old children had to predict the outcome displayed on the back of a card on the basis of cues presented on the front. The task was embedded in either a causal or a merely predictive scenario. Within this task, either a forward blocking or a backward blocking procedure was implemented. Blocking occurred in the causal but not in the predictive scenario. Moreover, blocking was affected by the scenario to the same extent in both age groups. The pattern of results was similar for forward and backward blocking. These results suggest that even young children are sensitive to the causal structure of a contingency learning task and that the occurrence of blocking in such a task defies an explanation in terms of associative learning theory.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Koenig ◽  
Alice Eagly
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommy Enkvist ◽  
Peter Juslin
Keyword(s):  

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kennon M. Sheldon ◽  
Richard M. Ryan ◽  
Laird J. Rawsthorne ◽  
Barbara Ilardi
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
pp. 71-74
Author(s):  
M. E. Nielsen

I suggest a description of the theory that I find applicable to understanding self-knowledge. The theory of its own complexity focuses on the structure of individual thoughts about themselves. Own complexity concerns two features of a person's self-determination: the number of social roles that a person has, and the ability of a person to differentiate among these roles. For example, I would be considered a weak bearer of the idea of ​​my own complexity if I considered myself as the bearer of a relatively small number of roles and I would describe existing roles as similar to those that I carry out. I would have a greater degree of my own complexity if I looked at the number of roles I increased and made more distinctions between them.


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