Quasi-Disguised and Structured Measure of Schoolchildren's Racial Preferences

1969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Cohen Koslin ◽  
Bertram L. Koslin ◽  
John Cardwell ◽  
Richard Pargament
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Raymond J. Fisman ◽  
Sheena S. Iyengar ◽  
Emir Kamenica ◽  
Itamar Simonson

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Arcidiacono ◽  
Esteban M. Aucejo ◽  
V. Joseph Hotz

We examine differences in minority science graduation rates among University of California campuses when racial preferences were in place. Less prepared minorities at higher ranked campuses had lower persistence rates in science and took longer to graduate. We estimate a model of students' college major choice where net returns of a science major differ across campuses and student preparation. We find less prepared minority students at top ranked campuses would have higher science graduation rates had they attended lower ranked campuses. Better matching of science students to universities by preparation and providing information about students' prospects in different major-university combinations could increase minority science graduation. (JEL D14, E23, E32, E43, E52, E61, E62)


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Hiers

For nearly two centuries the United States was a democracy that institutionalized in law inequality between racially defined segments of the population. This article shows that such racial closure was causally linked to the workings of a party system in which one party was organized as an interregional alliance for the principles and practices of white supremacy. It does so through a detailed analysis of three historical outcomes: (1) variation in the establishment of racial closure laws across the North during the antebellum period, (2) the elimination of racial closure laws in the North after the Civil War, and (3) the failed attempt in the postbellum South to overcome racial closure in voting. Throughout the analysis of these three outcomes, the article shows that the party model conforms to the empirical record better than three major alternatives that emphasize the causal power of public opinion (electorate model), elite bargaining and consensus (elite model), and the racial preferences of the white working class (class model).


Author(s):  
Eric K Furstenberg

Abstract This article develops a theoretical model of college admissions to investigate the effects of banning affirmative action admissions policies on the efficiency of the admissions process. Previous work in this area has shown that prohibiting affirmative action causes inefficiency when college quality is an increasing function of diversity. This article identifies an additional reason why colleges and universities use racial preferences in admissions, setting aside explicit demands for diversity. In the theoretical model, the racial identity of the applicants is relevant information for making inferences about an applicant's true academic ability. Preventing admissions officers from using this information results in inefficient selection of applicants, even if diversity does not explicitly enter the objective of the university. Thus, affirmative action is justified solely on informational grounds.


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