Effects of Issue Labels on the Efficiency of Negotiated Agreements

1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Multer ◽  
Thomas A. Darling ◽  
Jeryl L. Mumpower
2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.


10.1068/c11s ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Hansen ◽  
Katja Sander Johannsen ◽  
Anders Larsen

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-356
Author(s):  
Rachel Xian

Abstract Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 879-901 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Findley ◽  
Peter Rudloff

Civil war dynamics and outcomes are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. This examination explores how the fragmentation of combatants, especially the weaker actors, affects the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Some results of a computational modelling analysis are consistent with the article's expectations, several of them are counterintuitive. They show that when combatants fragment, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements, contrasting with the expectations of literatures on spoilers, moderates and extremists. Empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya and the Sudan, illustrate the importance of fragmentation. This study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war.


Author(s):  
Michael Parkin ◽  
Dean Kuo ◽  
John Brooke

Current protocols to agree to Web/Grid service usage do not have the capability to form negotiated agreements, nor do they take into account the legal requirements of the agreement process. This article presents a framework and a domain-independent negotiation protocol for creating legally binding contracts for service usage in a distributed, asynchronous service-oriented architecture. The negotiation protocol, which builds on a simple agreement protocol to form a multiround “symmetric” negotiation protocol, is based on an internationally recognized contract law convention. By basing our protocol on this convention and taking into account the limitations of an asynchronous messaging environment, we can form contracts between autonomous services across national and juridical boundaries, necessary in a loosely coupled, widely geographically distributed environment such as the Grid.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Raynor

Much of probation theory and probation training in Britain during the 1980s emphasised the importance of ‘contracts’ or negotiated agreements between probation officers, probationers and the sentencing Court – for example, joint decision-making was central to the influential ‘non-treatment paradigm’ and its variants. However, the legal requirement of consent to a probation order was abolished in 1997, partly because it was seen as diminishing the authority of the Court. This article discusses the arguments and attitudes that lay behind abolition, and considers how far the absence of formal consent should be seen as making a difference in practice. Recent studies of supervision skills, therapeutic alliance, compliance with probation, sentencer involvement in supervision, and the role of individual choice in desistance from offending all point to the continuing importance of co-operation and joint ownership of the supervision agenda. Although these can exist in the absence of a formal requirement for consent, they have greater support and legitimacy when such a requirement is present. Finally, the article explores how official thinking and political gestures lead to decisions that are detached from the realities of practice, and discusses some of the current dangers that arise from this.


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