De ‘polder’-strategie van de natuurbeschermings- beweging in Nederland, 1930-1960

The ‘poldermodel’ strategy of thenatureconservationmovementinthe Netherlands, 1930-1960 This article analyses the strategies applied by the early nature conservation movement in the Netherlands to exert influence at the political level. Before the 1970s, conservationist civil society organisations preferred informal deals, advisory committees, and negotiated agreements with government departments and state agencies. It is argued that the balance between urging for formal legislation, on the one hand, and agreeing to informal deals, on the other, conformed to specifically Dutch forms of governance known as the ‘polder model’. The nature conservation movement was indeed successful in the period 1930-1960 to secure a place for itself in policy negotiations regarding nature and landscape. The strategy of informal deals and policy consultations was not interrupted by the German occupation during the Second World War, but conservationists discovered its limitations in the 1950s: without formal legislation, they did not have enough leverage in negotiations with other stakeholders.

Prisoners of their own device: Brexit as a failed negotiating strategy

Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus on the demands of ‘taking back control’ and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of ‘synergistic’ bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity – and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements.

Reframing Best alternatives to negotiated agreements in Representative Negotiations in Sports

The paper starts with differentiating between the positional and interest-based negotiation styles for reaching the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). It outlines the main problems of positional bargaining and the role of agents in representative negotiations in sports. The paper aims at specifying negotiation styles and tactics/games that could produce optimal win-win solutions in sports. It focuses on the need of tactical flexibility, timing, collaboration, issue-linkage and leverage creation that could possibly reframe BATNAs for reaching mutual gain agreements and optimal win-win solutions. The paper aims is to propose solutions for reaching agreements in representative negotiations in sports. The methodology’s starting point is BATNA. The analytical framework includes both choosing the appropriate negotiation style (positional or interest-based) and tactics (negotiation games) to end up with a given strategy. Principled negotiation and mutual gain approach are suggested as solutions. The results of the analysis could be summarized in four categories. The first is the importance of considering the specifics of sports negotiations, especially the advantages and disadvantages of using agents as representatives. Here short versus long-term interests have to be weighed. The second is the advancement of issue linkages, creative alternatives for win-win solutions, leverage and appropriate bargaining style. The third is the focus on the process of reframing BATNAS as a process of evaluating alternatives, seeking leverage but maintaining credibility and flexibility. The fourth is the application of the mutual gain approach to expand the frontier of possibilities. Here the most important is the brainstorming session and the concept of the next best solution.

Friedrich Fischer (1558–1623)

Chapter 8 centres on the Bautzen preacher Friedrich Fischer (1558–1623) and shows how the changing political and religious landscape of the early seventeenth century led to a repositioning of Lutheranism. A particularly valuable case study, Fischer demonstrates how Lutherans and Catholics constantly influenced each other, and how the complex mix of power resulted in negotiations with a wide range of actors: town councils, Lutheran preachers, Catholic deans, other clerics, representatives of the king of Bohemia, and sometimes even the king himself. The situation in these towns was never stagnant and councillors and clerics negotiated agreements throughout the sixteenth century. Fischer’s sermons show that this kind of continual compromise found its way into what was preached in Lusatia. Depending on the purpose and the audience, individuals like Fischer could criticize Calvinism or Catholicism, change their religious outlook, and leave out elements associated with Lutheranism, while at other times polemicizing against Catholics.

Conditioning Constructs: A Psychological Theory of International Negotiated Cooperation

Political psychology and social constructivism exist in an “ideational alliance” against realism; however, both have overlooked behavioral conditioning, the basis of animal learning. Through six stages situated in international negotiation behaviors, the theory of Conditioning Constructs shows how behavioral conditioning can take parties from specific to diffuse reciprocity, rationalist to constructivist cooperation, and crisis to durable peace. In stages 1, 2 and 3, parties use negotiated agreements to exit prisoner’s dilemmas, continuously reinforce cooperation during agreement implementation, and satiate to rewards as initial implementation finalizes. In stages 4, 5 and 6, parties receive fresh rewards with new negotiations, undergo intermittent reinforcement with periodic agreements thereafter, and finally attribute cooperative behavior to actor constructs. Conditioning Constructs demonstrates that agency is possible in socially constructed structures through willful participation in conditioning through negotiation; and that, while Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat strategy is suited to initial cooperation, intermittent reinforcement better preserves late-stage cooperation.

Value Capture and Vertical Allocations of Public Amenities

This paper describes and critically reviews an important but under-theorized value capture mechanism that we have termed “vertical allocations” (or vertical exactions). This mechanism enables cities to capture value vertically by allocating floor space for public utilities in privately owned, mixed-use, vertical development. As a value capture tool, vertical allocations allow the government to tap value uplift to supply the nearby neighborhood, and the city as a whole, with much needed public services. The owner or developer is required to make in-kind contributions in the form of spaces provided for a range of public facilities such as schools, preschools, community centers, and public medical clinics. While focusing on vertical exactions in Israel we explore how a certain share of land/floorspace can be allocated for public amenities in a given project. There are several legal pathways for securing public floorspace including negotiated agreements, land readjustment and expropriation. The findings show that unclear policies and regulations could create frictions between developers and municipalities, and these raise the nexus question as well as debates about construction costs and financial contributions developers have to make. Specifically, the paper finds that while developers often argue that cities should cover the costs of constructing public floorspace, city officials assert that the costs should be borne by the owners and developers.

The Rana Plaza Collapse and the Case for Enforceable Agreements with Apparel Brands

Disasters like the Rana Plaza collapse and the Tazreen Fashions and Ali Enterprises fires painfully demonstrate the limits of conventional models of labour regulation in global supply chains. Buyer-driven markets characterised by outsourcing, subcontracting and offshoring, and the price pressure that results from them, undermines both the regulatory role of the state and the potential for collective bargaining. As a result, poor and unsafe working conditions prevail in transnational corporate supply chains in the garment industry. The aforementioned disasters offer a textbook example of the challenges facing the current clothing industry and the limits of the dominant “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) model used to address labour rights abuses.Yet, the responses to these disasters also provide fertile ground for alternative “worker-driven” strategies, where worker organisations enter into negotiated supply chain agreements with transnational corporations and hold the latter to account. The Bangladesh Accord and Rana Plaza Arrangement, as well as the corollary Tazreen Compensation Agreement and Ali Enterprises Compensation Agreement attempt to develop a counter-hegemonic alternative to dominant CSR practices and offer new strategies for social justice within global supply chains. This chapter describes and contextualises these agreements in a broader trajectory of labour organisations bargaining and negotiating such agreements with lead firms, highlighting how the post-Rana Plaza momentum made significant strides possible in terms of the depth, scope and enforceability of these negotiated agreements. The chapter identifies the strengths of these developments, but also identifies room for improvement for future negotiated enforceable agreements with apparel brands.

The Portuguese Estado da Índia (Empire in Asia)

The origins of the Portuguese Estado da Índia—the sum of all Portuguese Crown possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope—can be traced back to the late 1400s, most importantly to the inaugural voyage of Vasco da Gama from Lisbon to Calicut (Kozhikode) in 1497–1498. After some initial hesitations, the Portuguese Crown created a governorship for India in 1505, with a seat at Cochin (Kochi) later transferred to Goa, to oversee commercial, military, administrative, and other activities in an increasing number of possessions along the shores of East Africa and Maritime Asia. Portuguese trading posts (feitorias), forts, and fortified towns across the region resulted from conquest or, more frequently, from negotiated agreements with local rulers, on whose cooperation the Portuguese generally relied. The Estado reached its apex in the second half of the 16th century, drawing vast resources from trade around the Cape and within Asian and African waters, while investing increasingly in military and religious campaigns in a variety of regions from southeastern Africa to the Moluccas (Malukus) and Japan. Despite significant losses to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the English East India Company (EIC) during the 17th century, the Estado survived until the 20th century. Goa became a part of the Indian Union in 1961, and Macao integrated into the People’s Republic of China in 1999. The perceived decadence of the Estado during much of its history is at odds with its longevity and has prompted longstanding debates about the nature of Portuguese power in Asia; its reliance on trade, military might, and imperial ideas; and its intertwinement with Asian polities and societies.