Supply chain models with imperfect quality items when end demand is sensitive to price and marketing expenditure

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Unit Price ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Supply Chain Model

This paper studies supply chain model for imperfect quality items under which unit price and unit marketing expenditure imposed by the buyer, regulates the demand of the item. It is presumed that with the accustomed supply chain model, all produced items are of good quality, coincidentally, it engrosses some percentage of defective items. Thus, inspection process becomes essential for the buyer to segregate the defective items, which are then sold at discounted price at the end of the screening process. In this paper, a supply chain model is ensued to substantiate the interaction and democracy of the participants in the supply chain, the buyer and seller, is pitched by non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretical approaches. In the non-cooperative method, the Stackelberg game approach is used in which one player behaves as a leader and another one as a follower. The co-operative game approach is based on a Pareto efficient solution concept, in which both the players work together to enhance their profit. Lastly, to demonstrate the significance of the theory of the paper, numerical examples including sensitivity analysis are presented.

Two-echelon imperfect production fuzzy supply chain model for reliability dependent demand with probabilistic deterioration and rework

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Sudip Adak ◽  
G.S. Mahapatra
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Idle Time ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Specific Time ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Imperfect Production ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Dependent Demand

This paper develops a fuzzy two-layer supply chain for manufacturer and retailer with defective and non-defective types of products. The manufacturer produces up to a specific time, including faulty and non-defective items, and after the screening, the non-defective item sends to the retailer. The retailer’s strategy is to do the screening of items received from the manufacturer; subsequently, the perfect quality items are used to fulfill the customer’s demand, and the defective items are reworked. The retailer considers that customer demand is time and reliability dependent. The supply chain considers probabilistic deterioration for the manufacturer and retailers along with the strategies such as production rate, unit production cost, cost of idle time of manufacturer, screening, rework, etc. The optimum average profit of the integrated model is evaluated for both the cases crisp and fuzzy environments. Managerial insights and the effect of changes in the parameters’ values on the optimal inventory policy under fuzziness are presented.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of a Three-Stage Supply Chain: A New Research in the Big Data Era

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
New Research ◽  
New Situation ◽  
Big Data Technology

In the Big Data era, Data Company as the Big Data information (BDI) supplier should be included in a supply chain. In the new situation, to research the pricing strategies of supply chain, a three-stage supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, considering the manufacturer contained the internal and external BDI, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in both decentralized and centralized supply chain using Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the optimal retail price and benefits in the four models were compared. Findings are as follows. (1) The industry cost improvement coefficient, the internal BDI investment cost of the manufacturer, and the added cost of the Data Company on using Big Data technology have different relationships with the optimal prices of supply chain members in different models. (2) In the retailer-dominated supply chain model, the optimal benefits of the retailer and the manufacturer are the same, and the optimal benefits of the Data Company are biggest in all the members.

Non-Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach in Supply Chain With Imperfect Quality Items and Credit Financing

2018 ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Rita Yadav ◽  
Sarla Pareek ◽  
Mandeep Mittal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Decision Variable ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Credit Period ◽  
Imperfect Quality ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Credit Financing

This paper considers a supply chain model for imperfect quality items in which retail price of the buyer influences the demand of the product. The seller offers fix credit period for the buyer to stimulate his sales. Each delivered lot, goes through an inspection process at the buyer's end. After the inspection, items are separated into two parts, one is perfect quality items and another is imperfect quality items. The perfect quality items are sold at selling price and the imperfect items are sold at a discounted price immediately after the inspection process. The credit period offered by the seller and the selling price of the seller, both are considered as a decision variable. Relationship between seller and buyer is derived from the non-cooperative Seller- Stackelberg game approach. Optimal selling price, credit period and order quantity are determined by maximizing expected total profit of the supply chain. At the end, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are given to explain the theory of the paper.

scholarly journals Effects of Variable Production Rate and Time-Dependent Holding Cost for Complementary Products in Supply Chain Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Variable Production

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.

scholarly journals Single-manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain model with pre-payment based partial free transportation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalesh Kumar Manna ◽  
Rajan Mondal ◽  
Ali Akbar Shaikh ◽  
Irfan Ali ◽  
Asoke Kumar Bhunia
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Maximization Problem ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Screening Process ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Imperfect Items ◽  
Rework Process

In this paper, a supply chain model between a manufacturing firm and a group of retailers has been developed. Manufacturing firm produces simultaneously both perfect and imperfect items which are separated by screening process. Then the perfect items are transferred to the retailers' showroom/warehouse located in different places and a part of imperfect items are repaired by rework process. Retailers receive the products from the manufacturer with paying partial pre-payment to ensure the replenishment of order. On the other hand, the manufacturer provides partial free transportation facility to the retailers due to pre-payment. The corresponding problem has been formulated mathematically as a profit maximization problem and then solved it analytically. As an illustration of this supply chain model, three numerical examples have been considered and solved. Finally, post optimality analyses have been carried out to investigate the effects of changes of different parameters on the optimal policy.

scholarly journals Effect of Unequal Lot Sizes, Variable Setup Cost, and Carbon Emission Cost in a Supply Chain Model

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Biswajit Sarkar ◽  
Sharmila Saren ◽  
Debjani Sinha ◽  
Sun Hur
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Lot Size ◽  
Setup Cost ◽  
Defective Items ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Function ◽  
Optimum Solution

Due to heavy transportation for single-setup multidelivery (SSMD) policy in supply chain management, this model assumes carbon emission cost to obtain a realistic behavior for world environment. The transportation for buyer and vendor is considered along with setup cost reduction by using an investment function. It is assumed that the shipment lot size of each delivery is unequal and variable. The buyer inspects all received products and returns defective items to vendor for reworking process. Because of this policy, end customers will only obtain nondefective items. The analytical optimization is considered to obtain the optimum solution of the model. The main goal of this paper is to reduce the total cost by considering carbon emission during the transportation. A numerical example, graphical representation, and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the model.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document