Harold James, Making a modern central bank: the Bank of England 1979–2003

Author(s):  
John Calverley
Keyword(s):  
ITNOW ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
William Lovell

Abstract William Lovell, Head of Future Technologies at the Bank of England, explores how central bank digital currencies might change money, the problems of a cashless society and how he’s keeping bar staff guessing.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Naef

This paper presents new daily data on central bank reserves during the Bretton Woods period. It is the first paper to provide daily data for the Bank of France, Bank of England and Swiss National Bank directly from these central bank’s archives. I discuss some of the issue with these data and make them available to other researchers for further analysis.


Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.


Author(s):  
Simon James Bytheway ◽  
Mark Metzler

This chapter details how Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, in partnership with Benjamin Strong of the FRBNY, turned ad hoc wartime cooperation into a formal agenda. The paired ideas that national central banks should be autonomous, and that they should cooperate with each other, were first spelled out in a private “manifesto” that Norman circulated among fellow central bankers in 1921. Central bank cooperation was internationally recognized as a principle at the 1922 Genoa Conference, and it was also put into practice. Cooperation between central banks began primarily as informational cooperation, which includes not only the sharing of information but also the sharing and propagation of worldviews. An international network of central banks thus developed out of the war, as did the world's first truly coordinated system of international monetary policy. In these and other ways, financial globalization surged to a new level in the 1920s.


Author(s):  
Morton Guy ◽  
Marsh Andrew

This chapter talks about the Bank of England as the UK's central bank, which was established in 1694 by a Charter granted by King William III and Queen Mary II under the authority of an Act of Parliament. It explains the principal object of the Act in creating the Bank as a vehicle for raising money for the government. It also discusses how the Bank was closely associated with the raising and management of the national debt since its inception, which is a function that the Bank retained until the creation of the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) in 1998. This chapter highlights how the Bank raised money by issuing of banknotes, which became widely used as a convenient means of making large—value payments. It points out that the Bank of England notes were not formally legal tender until 1833.


2001 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAGO GIL AGUADO

This article reveals that the diplomatic and financial history of 1931 was even more turbulent than believed to date. New documents found at the Bank of England show that an intricate system of cross-deposits was set up by the Austrian Central Bank covertly to direct funds to the Creditanstalt via American and British banks – to compensate it for taking over the bankrupt Bodencreditanstalt – suggesting that the received accounts of the collapse of the Creditanstalt need to be revised. Further, documents have come to light which show that France exacerbated the 1931 run on the Austrian schilling in order to force Austria to abandon the Austro-German customs union project of that year. This article considers the relationship between the collapse of the Creditanstalt and the abandonment of the Austro-German customs union, incorporating the new evidence to provide a novel interpretation of the financial diplomacy of that year.


Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.


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