scholarly journals Central Banks in Parliaments: A Text Analysis of the Parliamentary Hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolò Fraccaroli ◽  
Alessandro Giovannini
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Text Analysis ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
Bank Of England

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

scholarly journals Private shareholding: An analysis of an eclectic group of central banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannie Rossouw
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Implementation Of Monetary Policy ◽  
The Government

Although the title seems to be a contradictio in terminis, this paper identifies a small, eclectic number of central banks with private shareholders about which little has been published. It is shown that only the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States (US) Federal Reserve allow shareholding other than by the government of the respective countries, although not in all instances by the general public. This paper considers private shareholding in this eclectic group of central banks, despite the trend of nationalising central banks that commenced in 1935. Private shareholding is defined as shareholding in a central bank by any party other than the respective government or governments (e.g. the European Central Bank) where the central bank is located.Large differences in the classes of shareholders of these eclectic central banks and differences in their approaches to dividend payments are highlighted in the paper. The conclusions reached are, firstly, that investment only in the shares of the central banks of Belgium and Greece (albeit only for residents in the latter instance) can be regarded as growth investments. Secondly, shareholding in the Italian central bank has been used to recapitalise ailing commercial banks. Thirdly, shareholders play no role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Lastly, the shareholding structure of these banks contributes to improved governance in the case of the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey, but no evidence can be found that central banks with shareholders in any way outperform central banks without shareholders.

Method of Collecting Exchange Rates for the Calculation of the Value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule 0-2(a)

Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (60) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve Bank ◽  
European Central ◽  
Reserve Bank ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
The U.S

This paper proposes modifications to the method of collecting exchange rates for the calculation of the value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule O-2(a). The value of the SDR in terms of the U.S. dollar is determined daily as the sum of the equivalents in U. S. dollar values of the amounts of the currencies that comprise the SDR valuation basket (as provided in Rule O-1), calculated on the basis of exchange rates established in accordance with procedures decided from time to time by the Fund.1 The current procedures are set out in Decision No. 6709-(80/189) S, as amended by Decision No. 12157-(00/24) S, March 9, 2000 (see Annex), which specifies the method for collecting exchange rates for this purpose. Under these procedures, the relevant currency amounts are converted into U.S. dollars using daily exchange rates that are provided to the Fund by the Bank of England (BoE). If rates cannot be obtained from the BoE, they are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and, if not available there, by the European Central Bank (ECB). The BoE, FRBNY, and ECB intend to rely on a new, more robust methodology to provide exchange rates to the Fund after November 1, 2016, and the proposed modifications reflect these changes.

Is SDR Creation Inflationary?

Policy Papers ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
International Reserves ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
European Central ◽  
The World ◽  
The U.S

Giving greater prominence to SDRs in international reserves would entail allocating them more frequently in significant amounts. The question has properly been raised whether such issuance would be inflationary for the world economy. This short paper addresses that question. It explores five different “scenarios” that describe how recipient countries and the leading central banks—most notably the U.S. Federal Reserve (FRB) and the EU’s European Central Bank (ECB)—would respond to those allocations. It concludes that SDR issuance would be inflationary for the world economy under two of the scenarios, but not under the remaining three scenarios, which include the most likely ones.

scholarly journals Unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: A brief recapitulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>

scholarly journals Comparison of the Approach of the Czech National Bank and the European Central Bank to the Effects of the Global Financial Crisis

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.

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