Comparison of LLR Powers of Fed with Bank of England, European Central Bank, and Bank of Japan

2016 ◽  
pp. 109-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hal S. Scott
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Central ◽  
Bank Of Japan ◽  
Bank Of England

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

scholarly journals Análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea

2013 ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
María del Carmen González Velasco ◽  
Roque Brinckmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Uncovered Interest Parity ◽  
European Central ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
Interest Parity

En este artículo se efectúa un análisis de la integración y dependencia de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Europea y, en concreto, de las políticas monetarias de la Unión Económica yMonetaria y de la zona no euro para el periodo comprendido entre Enero de 1999 y Septiembre 2009. Se aplica la metodología de la cointegración de Engle y Granger (1987) y de Johansen(1988) para contrastar la hipótesis de la paridad de tipos de interés no cubierta y se llega a la conclusión de que ambas políticas están cointegradas porque mantienen una relación de equilibrio a largo plazo. También se deduce una dependencia de la política del Banco de Inglaterra de la política del Banco Central Europeo, lo que confirma la importancia y el liderazgo de la Unión Económica y Monetaria.<br /><br />This study is to investigate the long-run relationship and dependence between the UME´s monetary policy and non-euro zone´s monetary policy for the period from January 4, 1999 to September 30, 2009. We use cointegration methodology to test the Uncovered Interest Parity Hypothesis and the results indicate a long-run cointegration and empirical evidence testifies a leader-follower pattern between the two central banks. According to this pattern, the Bank of England does follow the European Central Bank.

Method of Collecting Exchange Rates for the Calculation of the Value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule 0-2(a)

Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (60) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve Bank ◽  
European Central ◽  
Reserve Bank ◽  
Bank Of England ◽  
The U.S

This paper proposes modifications to the method of collecting exchange rates for the calculation of the value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule O-2(a). The value of the SDR in terms of the U.S. dollar is determined daily as the sum of the equivalents in U. S. dollar values of the amounts of the currencies that comprise the SDR valuation basket (as provided in Rule O-1), calculated on the basis of exchange rates established in accordance with procedures decided from time to time by the Fund.1 The current procedures are set out in Decision No. 6709-(80/189) S, as amended by Decision No. 12157-(00/24) S, March 9, 2000 (see Annex), which specifies the method for collecting exchange rates for this purpose. Under these procedures, the relevant currency amounts are converted into U.S. dollars using daily exchange rates that are provided to the Fund by the Bank of England (BoE). If rates cannot be obtained from the BoE, they are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and, if not available there, by the European Central Bank (ECB). The BoE, FRBNY, and ECB intend to rely on a new, more robust methodology to provide exchange rates to the Fund after November 1, 2016, and the proposed modifications reflect these changes.

Was für eine Europäische Verfassung?

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Balibar
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
European Constitution ◽  
Fundamental Level ◽  
European Central

The problem of a European Constitution is discussed at a fundamental level. In which way, can we speak about such a Constitution? Thearticle argues against the “postnational souveranism”, legitimating state against citizens. A new kind of citizenship is favoured based on extended social rights. The constitution now proposed contrarily makes the European Central Bank and its neoliberal policy to central and nearly unchangeable institution.

Dramatis Institutiones

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Regime Complex ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
Institutional Conflict

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.

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