Social reality makes the social mind

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jussim ◽  
Kent D. Harber ◽  
Jarret T. Crawford ◽  
Thomas R. Cain ◽  
Florette Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Person Perception ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Social Beliefs ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Mind

This paper contests social psychology’s emphasis on the biased, erroneous, and constructed nature of social cognition by: (1) showing how the extent of bias and error in classic research is overstated; (2) summarizing research regarding the accuracy of social beliefs; and (3) describing how social stereotypes sometimes improve person perception accuracy. A Goodness of Judgment Index is also presented to extract evidence regarding accuracy from research focusing on bias. We conclude that accuracy is necessary for understanding social cognition.

Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jussim
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Person Perception ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
High Accuracy ◽  
Expectancy Effects ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Error Bias ◽  
Meta Analyses

AbstractSocial Perception and Social Reality (Jussim 2012) reviews the evidence in social psychology and related fields and reaches three conclusions: (1) Although errors, biases, and self-fulfilling prophecies in person perception are real, reliable, and occasionally quite powerful, on average, they tend to be weak, fragile, and fleeting. (2) Perceptions of individuals and groups tend to be at least moderately, and often highly accurate. (3) Conclusions based on the research on error, bias, and self-fulfilling prophecies routinely greatly overstate their power and pervasiveness, and consistently ignore evidence of accuracy, agreement, and rationality in social perception. The weight of the evidence – including some of the most classic research widely interpreted as testifying to the power of biased and self-fulfilling processes – is that interpersonal expectations relate to social reality primarily because they reflect rather than cause social reality. This is the case not only for teacher expectations, but also for social stereotypes, both as perceptions of groups, and as the bases of expectations regarding individuals. The time is long overdue to replace cherry-picked and unjustified stories emphasizing error, bias, the power of self-fulfilling prophecies, and the inaccuracy of stereotypes, with conclusions that more closely correspond to the full range of empirical findings, which includes multiple failed replications of classic expectancy studies, meta-analyses consistently demonstrating small or at best moderate expectancy effects, and high accuracy in social perception.

Accuracy, bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, and scientific self-correction

2017 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jussim
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Person Perception ◽  
Scientific Literature ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Social Perceptions ◽  
Expectancy Effects ◽  
The Social

AbstractIn my Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality (Jussim 2012, henceforth abbreviated as SPSR), I argued that the social science scholarship on social perception and interpersonal expectancies was characterized by a tripartite pattern: (1) Errors, biases, and self-fulfilling prophecies in person perception were generally weak, fragile, and fleeting; (2) Social perceptions were often quite accurate; and (3) Conclusions appearing throughout the social psychology scientific literature routinely overstated the power and pervasiveness of expectancy effects, and ignored evidence of accuracy. Most commentators concurred with the validity of these conclusions. Two, however, strongly disagreed with the conclusion that the evidence consistently has shown that stereotypes are moderately to highly accurate. Several others, while agreeing with most of the specifics, also suggested that those arguments did not necessarily apply to contexts outside of those covered in SPSR. In this response, I consider all these aspects: the limitations to the tripartite pattern, the role of politics and confirmation biases in distorting scientific conclusions, common obstructions to effective scientific self-correction, and how to limit them.

Social reality makes the social mind

2007 ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Lee Jussim ◽  
Kent D. Harber ◽  
Jarret T. Crawford ◽  
Thomas R. Cain ◽  
Florette Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Social Reality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Mind

scholarly journals Connection between the psychological sovereignty and social beliefs: personal boundaries in the social world

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-114
Author(s):  
S.K. Nartova-Bochaver
Keyword(s):  
Social World ◽  
The Body ◽  
Just World ◽  
Social Beliefs ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Social Axioms ◽  
Fate Control ◽  
Personal Belief ◽  
Personal Boundaries ◽  
The Social

Connections between the psychological sovereignty and social beliefs: belief in a just world, religiosity, reward application, fate control were exanimated. 288 respondents (Mage = 23,7), 66 males participated in the survey. The foolowing tools were used: the Sovereignty of the psychological space questionnaire — 2010 (Nartova-Bochaver, 2014), the General and Personal Belief in a Just World Scales (Dalbert, 1999), and the Social axioms survey (Leung et al., 2002; Tatarko, Lebedeva, 2008). There has been found that social beliefs differ depending on the sovereignty level. In addition, it has been revealed that in deprived individuals the body and territory sovereignty predicted the social beliefs, and in super-sovereign individuals the regime habits and territory sovereignty did. In the group of moderate sovereignty there weren’t any significant connections. It was concluded that the most adapted group is free of typical beliefs as a form of social stereotypes.

2. The social mind

2015 ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Richard J. Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental Models ◽  
Attribution Theory ◽  
Impression Formation ◽  
Continuum Model ◽  
Attributional Bias ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Social Mind

Social cognition is how we encode, analyse, store, and use information about the people we meet and the relationships that define us. ‘The social mind’ considers the theories that have been developed to show how the social mind does this: Fritz Heider’s ‘naïve scientists’, who build mental models to represent how the world works; attribution theory; Kelley’s 1967 co-variation model; attributional bias; Fiske and Taylor’s ‘cognitive misers’ who rely on timesaving mental shortcuts known as heuristics; social priming; and schemas, scripts, and stereotypes. Studies show that we are motivated tacticians using the continuum model of impression formation—both naïve scientists and cognitive misers, but which we are depends upon the situation.

Putting the Social Back Into Social Cognition

1997 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 522-523
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Whitley
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
The Social

Efficacy of the Social Cognition Training Program in a Sample of Outpatients with Schizophrenia

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gil-Sanz ◽  
Mar Fernández-Modamio ◽  
Rosario Bengochea-Seco ◽  
Marta Arrieta-Rodríguez ◽  
Gabriela Pérez-Fuentes
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Training Program ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Cognition Training
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document