People’s right to keep and bear arms

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pille Põiklik
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Values And Beliefs ◽  
Us Constitution

The article presents an analysis of the majority and minority opinions from the Supreme Court of the United States issued on District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008. The court case addressed the meaning of the Second Amendment to the US Constitution that establishes gun rights in a famously confusing wording. The analysis applies parts of Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2011, 2012) model of analysing argumentation and also discusses intertextuality to account for how the justices construct their arguments. The analysis shows how the justices shape their arguments on the basis of their values and beliefs, presenting contradictory readings of the amendment, sources of evidence and the preferred application of the amendment.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Elliott Young
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Indefinite Detention ◽  
Us Constitution ◽  
Immigrant Detention ◽  
Constitutional Protections

Although the Supreme Court limited detention for non-citizens in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Zadvydas [2000] and Martinez [2005]), its most recent decisions indicate that under certain circumstances non-citizens can be held indefinitely behind bars with no possibility of even a bond hearing. In practice, non-citizens deemed excludable from the United States are like the forever prisoners of Guantanamo, exposed to massive state power with few constitutional protections. Khalid Qassim is one of the forty Guantanamo detainees held for more than eighteen years to date with no charges and no trial. Although Guantanamo prisoners are not voluntary immigrants, they share with immigrants a lack of protection by the US Constitution and a vulnerability to indefinite detention. Immigrant detention today is part of a carceral landscape in the United States that includes more than 2 million citizens behind bars.

US Supreme Court, Medellín v. Texas: More than an Assiduous Building Inspector?

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN KING GAMBLE ◽  
CHRISTINE M. GIULIANO
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Strong Reaction ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Case

AbstractThe US Supreme Court case of José Ernesto Medellín, Petitioner v. Texas, decided on 25 March 2008, has generally been seen as a US refusal to follow unambiguous treaty provisions. There has not been such a strong reaction to US behaviour relative to specific treaty obligations since the 1992 Alvarez-Machain case. The Supreme Court majority (six votes to three) held that ‘neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law’. The uncomfortable – and to many illogical – conclusion reached by the Court was that even though Avena is an ‘international law obligation on the part of the United States’, it is not binding law within the United States even in the light of an explicit presidential order. While the result may be disappointing, the case should be understood in the context of a legal system that (i) makes treaties part of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’; (ii) has developed a complicated concept of self-executing treaties; and (iii) can be hesitant to direct states (sub-national units) to follow presidential directives even on matters of foreign policy.

scholarly journals Shooting America Straight

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 13-34
Author(s):  
Garrett Cleveland
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Related Case ◽  
Excellent Opportunity ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Many

Since the landmark cases of District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008 and McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010, the Supreme Court has declined to hear any of the many current cases that present an opportunity to address the Second Amendment. As a result, the lower courts have largely eroded firearm rights in many regions of the United States. It is thus imperative that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to a Second Amendment-related case to clarify certain aspects of Heller, or the lower courts will continue to treat the Second Amendment as a disfavored right. Essentially, the lower courts have predominantly applied only intermediate scrutiny to the fundamental right. But applying that level of scrutiny makes it too easy to hold that a certain law passes constitutional muster. The addition of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh provide the opportunity to fortify the Second Amendment. This addition likely provides the Supreme Court the votes needed to grant certiorari and the analysis needed to mandate that heightened scrutiny applies to the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court could even adopt a new and simpler test to apply to Second Amendment-related cases. This Article argues that the Supreme Court has an excellent opportunity to decide to hear a Second Amendment-related case and considers how the Court must rule to effectively preserve the protections offered by the Second Amendment.

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule: Blurring the Line Between Rule and Exception

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Heffernan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Exclusionary Rule ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal proceedings has generated controversy throughout the common law world. In the United States, there has been renewed debate in recent years over the propriety of the judicially-created exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. When defining the scope and purpose of the rule, the US Supreme Court has placed ever increasing emphasis on the likely deterrent effect which suppressing evidence will exert on law enforcement. This article explores the consequent restriction of the exclusionary rule evinced in the contemporary case law including United States v Herring in which the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the so-called "good faith" exception. In conclusion it offers reflection from the perspective of another common law country, Ireland, where the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence has been the subject of debate.

Purchasable Offices in Ceded Territory

1909 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Percy Bordwell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The United States ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
Secretary Of War ◽  
Considerable Detail

In the July number of the Journal is given the decision of the Court of Claims in Sanches v. The United States and of the Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Brooke. Both cases involve the validity of the orders of military governors in former Spanish territory abolishing offices for which a price had been paid and which the holder claimed were private property and thus under the protection of the law of nations and the treaty of peace with Spain. In the Sanches case the office abolished was that of “ numbered procurador of the courts of first instance of the capital of Porto Rico;” in the O’Reilly case the office was that of high sheriff of Havana. In each case the opinion was expressed that the office had ceased with the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, but in the Supreme Court case this was not necessary to the decision, as General Brooke’s liability had already been denied on other grounds, while the opinion on this point was delivered without argument of counsel, without exposition, and without the citation of authority other than that of the Secretary of War in approving General Brooke’s order. It is the opinion of the writer that the holders of those offices were entitled to indemnification. The facts of the O’Reilly controversy will be gone into in considerable detail.

Treaties in US Domestic Law: Medellín v. Texas in Context

2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Reed ◽  
Ilmi Granoff
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
Us Constitution ◽  
Death Penalty Case

AbstractIn Medellín v. Texas, a Texas death penalty case, the United States Supreme Court decided that it could not enforce what it acknowledged to be an international legal obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice. The Supreme Court's judgment in Medellín has put our understanding of the domestic treatment of US treaty law in a state of flux. Under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the land: binding, equivalent to federal statutes and enforceable by judges. After Medellín, treaties may not necessarily be enforceable federal law, depending on whether they are self-executing without additional legislation. The Supreme Court's decision depends upon the dramatic expansion of a narrow but necessary exception to the Supremacy Clause provided in an 1829 Supreme Court precedent. The consequence of that expansion is to put the US historical approach to treaty-making in question. This article provides (a) a brief overview of treaty law in the United States, including the law before Medellín regarding the domestic effect of treaty law, (b) an overview of Medellín, (c) a critique of the Court's reasoning in Medellín and (d) a discussion of its consequences.

Six Notions of ‘Political’ and the United States Supreme Court

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political System ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.

Freedom of Communication in the US and Europe

ICL Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Tenorio
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us

AbstractThis paper compares the freedom of communication in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, departing from the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is noted that there are differences, as specified herein. Regulatory texts invite to speak of two distinct models, though this may be a far-fetched statement. This paper makes the following concluding remarks: 1) There are many concepts of freedom of expression that are compatible with democracy; the one derived from the Sullivan Judgment in the US (and in Europe from the Lingens Judgment) is not the only one, although it is currently considered the most consist­ent with democracy. This point is not discussed here. 2) Major changes sometimes occur through seemingly small details. In this sense, the shift of the burden of proof in defama­tion cases (Sullivan) has created an earthquake in the legal regime governing the press. The Sullivan doctrine can be summarized as follows: first, errors are inevitable, as freedom of speech requires ‘breathing room’; second, the malice of those accused of defamation must be proven; third, it is necessary to prove the lack of veracity of the slanderer. This doctrine allows the press to play its role as the watchdog of freedom. 3) In Spain, the press also appears to play this role, thus requiring us to ask whether there is, or ever was, a Sullivan Judgment in Spanish jurisprudence. We tend to attribute the privileged position of the press in Spain to the fact that the Constitutional Court has given preferential consid­eration to freedom of speech when it is in conflict with honor, intimacy and self-image privacy. This preference is justified by its connection to democracy. Since the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court (STC hereafter) 6/1981 of 16 March, the Spanish Consti­tutional Court has stressed the importance of freedom of information for democracy, and since the STC 159/1986 of 16 December, the Constitutional Court has suggested the pref­erential position of freedom of expression. However, the incorporation of the Sullivan doc­trine into the Spanish system occurred through STC 6/1988 of 21 January, almost ten years after the passage of the Constitution into law.

scholarly journals Living or Dead? Specifics of the Language of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-136
Author(s):  
Izabela Kraśnicka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Original Text ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
Language Interpretation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
American Legal System ◽  
The Right ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The original text of the Constitution of the United States of America, written over 200 years ago, constitutes the supreme source of law in the American legal system. The seven articles and twenty seven amendments dictate understanding of fundamental principles of the federation’s functioning and its citizens’ rights. The paper aims to present the evolution of the U.S. Constitution’s language interpretation as provided by its final interpreter - the Supreme Court of the United States. Example of the Second Amendment will be analyzed to present the change in understanding of the language grammar and, as a consequence, the sense of the right to keep and bear arms in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of District of Columbia v Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)). It will argue for the accuracy of statement of Charles Evans Hughes, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is...”

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