Moral hazard, competition and contract design: empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne Nygaard ◽  
Ingunn Myrtveit
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Contract Design

scholarly journals Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Cooperative Relay ◽  
Relay Nodes ◽  
Relay Incentive

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.

Zur Reform des Rating-(Un)Wesens

2010 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanno Beck ◽  
Helmut Wienert
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Market Inefficiencies ◽  
Set Up

SummaryThe market for ratings suffers from several inefficiencies: asymmetric information and moral hazard lead to conflicts of interest and principal-agent-problems. Moreover, network externalities and economies of scale lead to a lack of competition in the market for ratings. There is empirical evidence for market inefficiencies as ratingshopping, herding or slow adjustment of wrong ratings to a changed environment. As a remedy for these problems, we suggest a fund where rating-orders are pooled and rated by means of a double-blind-approach. Each issuer of a security gives his product into a pool and rating agencies which meet the standards of the pool are free to tender for the mandate to rate the product. Several aspects how to set up such a pool and possible problems are being addressed in this paper.

Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hudson ◽  
W. J. Wouter Botzen ◽  
Jeffrey Czajkowski ◽  
Heidi Kreibich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
The United States ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Disaster Insurance

Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence

1997 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georges Dionne ◽  
Robert Gagné ◽  
François Gagnon ◽  
Charles Vanasse
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Airline Safety

To work or to work out: a moral-hazard interpretation of labor supply, retirement, and investments in longevity

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-234
Author(s):  
STEFAN HUPFELD
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Life Time ◽  
Hazard Model ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Aggregate Output ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Multiple Tasks

AbstractIn a moral-hazard model with multiple tasks, an agent engages in different activities, labelled work, delayed retirement, and work out (investments in longevity). The latter imposes higher effort costs on weekly labor supply, but increases possibilities for life time labor supply. Work out does not affect aggregate output and does therefore not accrue to the benefit of the principal. Second-best incentives for work out areU-shaped in the agent's ability, and so is the effort level supplied by the agent. These theoretical findings are supported by recent empirical evidence on longevity, which is not always monotonically increasing in ability.

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