Shadow banking, monetary policy and systemic risk

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Xiao-Li Gong ◽  
Xiong Xiong ◽  
Wei Zhang
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Riasi

<p>This paper tries to find out why shadow banking system has become so competitive in the global financial system and how it can be controlled. For this reason we use Porter’s diamond model to find the competitive advantages of shadow banking. Based on the results of this study it can be concluded that factor conditions, chance and government do not contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. On the other hand the results suggested that related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, and demand conditions contribute to the competitiveness of shadow banking industry. It is important to regulate the activities of shadow banking industry in order to prevent this industry from creating systemic risk.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hodula ◽  
Lukáš Pfeifer

Abstract In this paper, we shed some light on the mutual interplay of economic policy and the financial stability objective. We contribute to the intense discussion regarding the influence of fiscal and monetary policy measures on the real economy and the financial sector. We apply a factor-augmented vector autoregression model to Czech macroeconomic data and model the policy interactions in a data-rich environment. Our findings can be summarized in three main points: First, loose economic policies (especially monetary policy) may translate into a more stable financial sector, albeit only in the short term. In the medium term, an expansion-focused mix of monetary and fiscal policy may contribute to systemic risk accumulation, by substantially increasing credit dynamics and house prices. Second, we find that fiscal and monetary policy impact the financial sector in differential magnitudes and time horizons. And third, we confirm that systemic risk materialization might cause significant output losses and deterioration of public finances, trigger deflationary pressures, and increase the debt service ratio. Overall, our findings provide some empirical support for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies.


Author(s):  
Xavier Freixas ◽  
Luc Laeven ◽  
José-Luis Peydró

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-247
Author(s):  
Luca Agnello ◽  
Vitor Castro ◽  
Fredj Jawadi ◽  
Ricardo M. Sousa

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 2379-2420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kairong Xiao

Abstract I find that shadow bank money creation significantly expands during monetary-tightening cycles. This “shadow banking channel” offsets reductions in commercial bank deposits and dampens the impact of monetary policy. Using a structural model of bank competition, I show that the difference in depositor clienteles quantitatively explains banks’ different responses to monetary policy. Facing a more yield-sensitive clientele, shadow banks are more likely to pass through rate hikes to depositors, thereby attracting more deposits when the Federal Reserve raises rates. My results suggest that monetary tightening could unintentionally increase financial fragility by driving deposits into the uninsured shadow banking sector. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Joanna

Two notable traumas followed the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. The first was the catastrophic delivering that affected wholesale financial institutions in 2009, as the post-LBIE markets went into free-fall. The second was the very long delays in the return of client assets held by in the UK Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE). The systemic failure has been associated with the reuse of securities collateral in general. Some have argued that the client asset delays were associated with a category of reuse, known as rehypothecation, in particular. Regulatory reforms have been introduced with a view to addressing both. However, this chapter argues that the true lesson of both failures is not yet fully reflected in regulation. This is the profound impact of shadow banking, and the reuse of securities collateral within it, upon client asset protection and systemic risk management alike.


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