Primary and Secondary Qualities

1972 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell

The philosophy of primary and secondary qualities is in a state of some confusion. There is no agreement as to the basis upon which the two classes of quality may be distinguished—a host of features, as diverse as perceptible by more than one sense and belonging to the definition of matter, are offered as the mark of the primary. There is not even agreement on which qualities belong to which group. Shape, size and solidity are generally held to be primary, while colours, smells, and the like (I) are favoured secondary candidates. But for large numbers of qualities, for example being acidic, malleable, rust-proof—or, among perceptible qualities, glistening and vibrating—we are offered no effective guidance.Inevitably, in such a situation, we are without clear answers to the questions; Why should any distinction be made between primaries and secondaries? Must all qualities be the one or the other? To the solution of which problems does the distinction serve as a preliminary step? What special relationship is there between primary qualities and scientific theory, or between secondary qualities and peculiarities in perception?

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (05) ◽  
pp. 123-131
Author(s):  
Denis Bakhtiyorovich Sadullaev ◽  

The subject of this research is the concept of reduction in the logic and methodology of science. On the one hand, reduction is understood as a relationship between a term and its defining expression within a scientific theory, on the other hand, as a relationship between two theories. Since the expansion of the theory occurs due to the introduction of new terms into its vocabulary with the help of nominal definitions, reduction is an operation opposite to the definition: due to reduction, terms are removed from the dictionary of the theory. Moreover, the theory itself is defined in accordance with the set-theoretic approach as a class of sentences that are closed with respect to derivability. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that it examines the semantic and epistemological aspects of the formal definition of reduction. In particular, the explication of the reduction relation between the two theories is based on the concept of functional equivalence of theories. It has been established that the list of basic terms of the theory can only be specified conventionally. All terms introduced with the help of nominal definitions turn out to be reducible. Consequently, a distinctive feature of a theoretical term is the possibility of its reduction.


Author(s):  
Steven French

What is a scientific theory? Is it a set of propositions? Or a family of models? Or is it some kind of abstract artefact? These options are examined in the context of a comparison between theories and artworks. On the one hand, theories are said to be like certain kinds of paintings, in that they play a representational role; on the other, they are compared to musical works, insofar as they can be multiply presented. I shall argue that such comparisons should be treated with care and that all of the above options face problems. Instead, I suggest, we should adopt a form of eliminativism towards theories, in the sense that a theory should not be regarded as any thing. Nevertheless, we can still talk about them and attribute certain qualities to them, where that talk is understood to be made true by certain practices. This shift to practices as truth-makers for theory talk then has certain implications for how we regard theories in the realism debate and in the context of the nature and role of representation in science.


Author(s):  
Dmitriy Pavlovich Surovyagin

The subject of this research is the concept of reduction in logics and methodology of science. On the one hand, reduction is understood as a relation between the term and its defining expression within the scientific theory; while on the other – it represents the relation between two theories. Since the extension of theory is possible through introduction to its vocabulary of new terms by means of nominal definitions, the reduction represents an inverse operation – removing the terms from the vocabulary of the theory. At the same time, the theory itself is defined in accordance with the theoretical-multiple approach as a class of sentences closed in relation to derivability. The scientific novelty consists in examination of semantic and epistemological aspects of the formal definition of reduction. Particularly, the explication of reduction relation between two theories leans in the concept of functional equivalence of the theories. It is established that the list of basic terms of the theory can be set only conventionally. All terms introduces by the means of nominal definitions turn out to be reducible. Therefore, a distinctive feature of theoretical terms is the possibility of its reduction.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
S.S. Kulakov

The increasing number of dysfunctional families causes an increase in the number of civil litigation on the education of the child, where the relationship between the persons are highly conflictual. The actual task is study the one of components in the structure of the psychological relationship - emotional and semantic constructs underlying semantic perception of each other and the child's parents. Examination of 42 testees (parents) from harmonious families and 54 testees (parents) during the forensic psychological and psychiatric examination (regarding the definition of child`s residence or the order of meetings for the child and the parent who don`t live with it) by methods "Geometric test of relations" and "Semantic Differential" showed that in families where is highly conflictual relationship, there is positive assessments of herself and her child, while assessment of the spouse (wife) characterized inversion. This negative attitude toward the spouse (wife) is not the other parent's negative characteristics. It is the ignoring the other parent's positive characteristics. The positive acceptance of all family members was revealed in harmonious families.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (101) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Thor Grünbaum

Action in Narratology, Literature, and LifeIn this article I argue that the representation of simple, bodily action has the function of endowing the narrative sequence with a visualizing power: It makes the narrated scenes or situations ready for visualization by the reader or listener. By virtue of this visualizing power or disposition, these narrated actions disrupt the theoretical divisions, on the one hand, between the narrated story and the narrating discourse, and on the other hand, between plot-narratology and discourse-narratology. As narrated actions they seem to belong to the domain of plot-narratology, but in so far as they serve an important visualizing function, these narrated actions have a communicative function and as such they can be said to belong to the domain of discourse-narratology. In a first part of the article, I argue that a certain type of plot-narratology, due to its retrospective epistemology and abstract definition of action, is unable to conceive of this visualizing function. In a second part, I argue that discourse-narratology fares no better since the visualizing function is independent of voice and focalization. In a final part, I sketch a possible account of the visualizing function of simple actions in narratives.


1994 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Kasher

In his introductory essay on the philosophical sources of The Guide of the Perplexed, Shlomo Pines points out a well-known contradiction between two conceptions of God in Maimonides' theology. On the one hand, Maimonides borrowed the Aristotelian definition of God as the intellect that cognizes itself; on the other, in line with Avicenna's Neoplatonic theory of attributes, Maimonides denied the possibility of saying anything positive about God. Pines proposes two possible solutions; first, that Maimonides was well aware of the contradiction, or, second, that he fell into the contradiction inadvertently. As Pines himself admits, however, neither solution is satisfactory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 264-269
Author(s):  
P. A. Moiseev

The review deals with Luc Boltanski's Mysteries and Conspiracies [Enigmes et complots]. The following is noted as defects of the reviewed book: detective fiction is associated with anxieties that question the framework of modern reality. Such attribution, it is argued, results from inaccurate comparison of detective fiction to a spy novel. The reviewer identifies contradictions in the definition of detective fiction: on the one hand, it is characterised by the proverbial anxiety. On the other, the writer suggests that unravelling a mystery normalises the ‘integrity of predictable expectations.' In addition, Boltanski confuses detective fiction with police procedural novels as well as the concepts of genre and theme with regard to spy novels (as a result, he dwells on ‘the genre of the spy novel,' even though spy novels are written in a number of genres). The review particularly criticises Boltanski's assessment of A. Conan Doyle's prose.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104-116
Author(s):  
Ivan O. Volkov ◽  

For the first time, in the article, Vladimir Titov’s letter (dated 12/24 February 1869) is published and commented. In the 1820s, in Russia, Titov was well-known as a writer and literature theorist, the author of a romantic novella The Remote House on Vasilyevsky Island (1829) close to Society of Lyubomudriye. The letter extracted from the archives of the National Library of Russia is addressed to Duke Vladimir Odoevsky whose relationship with Titov was friendly from the very beginning of their acquaintance. The letter focuses on Ivan Turgenev’s speech published in the first issue of Sovremennik and titled “Hamlet and Don Quixote”. Reacting to Turgenev’s article, Titov shortly and critically accesses the comparison concentrating mainly on the image of Hamlet and thoroughly expresses his opinion on the essence of his tragic state. Titov’s opinion is just the opposite of Turgenev’s complex and multidimensional interpretation. Having experienced the great impact of the philosophy of German idealism at the beginning of his career, Titov to a great extent idealizes Shakespeare’s character whom he long knows and whom he is clearly eager to vindicate. Meanwhile, Titov does not pursue the aim to absolutely advocate the romantic halo of Hamlet as a Titanic personality (grandiose intellect and scale of feeling) and to enact the tragic pathos of the inner fight only. Developing Goethe’s definition of the essence of the character’s inner conflict, Titov, on the one hand, approaches its real understanding underlying the prince’s necessity to stay in a derogatory position of a “pitiful semiclown, indecisive grouch and shred”. On the other hand, the assessment can not be absolutely objective because Titov wants to see Hamlet as a victim of the fatal fortune which turns him into a character of an almost classical tragedy of fate. Titov’s bright and developed reaction (in the document of private nature) to Turgenev’s article is attractive and important first of all for its vividly demonstrated novelty and creativity of the writer’s view, wideness and multimodality of the author’s perception of Hamlet’s image. For the first time, Turgenev gave a developed interpretation of Shakespeare’s image in the tale “Hamlet of Shchigrovsky Province” (1848). Continuing his searches in the area of “Russian” (or “steppe”) Hamlet, Turgenev creates moral and philosophical problems of the English tragedy in the crisis socio-historical and cultural atmosphere of Russia of the 1840s. However, the principles of the artistic generalization and the peculiarities of the new reading, not mentioned and not fully comprehended by his contemporaries, were surprising and rejected when the speech “Hamlet and Don Quixote” appeared, in which Shakespeare’s character is presented ultimately vividly and lively in the then current interpretation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  

In the age of information, it is no secret that the modern science is in a very difficult position. On the one hand, it has high hopes for solving the problems of modern humanity and very practical tasks. On the other hand, science shows limited potential and difficulty in carrying out the tasks. Beyond scientific theory remain such phenomena as gravity and gravitational waves and other unexplored and very useful phenomena. Obviously, the reason for these limited capabilities of modern science is its limited foundation. The foundation of science is determined by its basic axioms. If we expand the foundation of science, we will be able to build a more comprehensive, perfect and voluminous theory. In two monographs and a series of articles the author offers a system of extended axioms (with two new axioms) and a more extended theory (with eight new laws). To the great surprise of even the author, this new theory turned out to be extensive enough to cover and explain and the gravity. Moreover, the extended axioms and theory directly and naturally outlined the algorithm in the explanation of the so-called Gravity Funnels. According to the new axioms and laws, Gravity Funnels are both for suction (accelerating) and for expansion (decelerating). Expansion Gravity Funnel decelerates along its longitudinal direction as emits the matter in the transverse direction. In this way it consumes energy and generates matter. Suction Gravity Funnel accelerates along its longitudinal direction as sucks the matter in transverse direction. In this way it consumes matter and generates energy. The both of Funnels are situated in a new Space-time. The Space-time of decelerating and accelerating Funnels is packed by longitudinal vortices, in which the Space (S) is constant. It is radically different of the Space-Time where we live now. The Space-time where we live now is packed by cross vortices, where the time (T) is constant. According the new Axioms and Laws the two described Space- times are mutually orthogonal.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.


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