Maintaining the Punitive Element of Tort through Social Sanctions in Malpractice Reform

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 355-364
Author(s):  
Danish Zaidi
2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
MARY ELLEN SCHNEIDER
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 281-300
Author(s):  
Jody Weisberg Menon

Pleas for reform of the legal system are common. One area of the legal system which has drawn considerable scholarly attention is the jury system. Courts often employ juries as fact-finders in civil cases according to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved … .” The general theory behind the use of juries is that they are the most capable fact-finders and the bestsuited tribunal for arriving at the most accurate and just outcomes. This idea, however, has been under attack, particularly by those who claim that cases involving certain difficult issues or types of evidence are an inappropriate province for lay jurors who typically have no special background or experience from which to make informed, fair decisions.The legal system uses expert witnesses to assist triers of fact in understanding issues which are beyond their common knowledge or difficult to comprehend.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinyi Kuang ◽  
Sania Ashraf ◽  
Alex Shpenev ◽  
Maryann G. Delea ◽  
Upasak Das ◽  
...  

Social sanctions can be effective for sustaining beneficial norms by harnessing the power of social pressure and peer monitoring. Yet, field evidence regarding how norms might be linked to perceived risk of sanction is limited. In this study, we focused on communities located in peri-urban areas of Tamil Nadu, India, and examined how people’s perceived prevalence of a socially desirable behavior (i.e., toilet use) relates to the perceived risk of sanctions for deviating from this behavior (i.e., open defecation) in the sanitation domain. Cross-sectional data from 2427 participants in 75 communities revealed that the majority (77%, n = 1861) perceived the risk of informal sanctions related to open defecation. Among those, verbal reprimand was the most common (60%), followed by advice (30%) and gossip (7%). Results from multilevel logistic regression indicated that those who believed toilet use was prevalent in their community were more likely to perceive the risk of social sanctions for open defecation. Moderation analysis revealed that this relationship was robust among women, but attenuated among men. Our findings suggest that women are more likely to expect social sanctions if they deviate from what is perceived as the prevalent sanitation behavior (e.g., toilet use) in their community. Open defecation practices are known to cause psychosocial stress among women due to their experiences with sanitation insecurity, which may include fear of disapproval from community members. Our results highlight the need for gendered intervention strategies when sanitation programs leverage social influence for behavior change.


Privatization ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 246-275
Author(s):  
Gillian K. Hadfield ◽  
Barry R. Weingast

This chapter argue against the presumptive priority of government even in the domain of law: in recent work, the authors have developed a framework for analyzing law in which they suggest that the main distinction between legal and other social orders is the presence of an entity capable of changing rules. But an equilibrium in which these rules generate compliance does not require a centralized enforcement authority; indeed, the authors argue that fully centralized enforcement is in fact incapable of sustaining an equilibrium characterized by rule of law. Rather, the need to coordinate and incentivize voluntary participation under decentralized enforcement yields the normatively attractive legal attributes associated with the rule of law, and the authors draw on classical Athens to illustrate this model. On their account, private enforcement – in the sense of social sanctions and exclusion, limited use of force, and cooperation with authorized enforcers – are essential for a legal system to achieve the rule of law..


2017 ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
ADRIAAN LANNI
Keyword(s):  

BMJ ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 311 (6999) ◽  
pp. 267-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Dunea
Keyword(s):  

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