Dispute settlement under the north American free trade agreement and the treaty of European union

1994 ◽  
Vol 17 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Armand de Mestral ◽  
Jan Winter
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
The North

International law and domestic institutions: reconciling North American “unfair” trade laws

1996 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
The North

While scholars have written much about the role played by international institutions in cooperative behavior among nations, they have not examined the domestic political motives that may lie behind nations' decisions to join such organizations. Two-level games analysis provides a framework for studying domestic politics not as a constraint upon nations that enter into international agreements but as a catalyst for nations to enter into agreements. The dispute settlement procedures of the North American Free Trade Agreement and its predecessor, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, offer an empirical illustration of this point.

The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Laura W. Arnold ◽  
Christopher J. W. Zorn
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
North American ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Critical Element ◽  
Vote Model ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The North ◽  
Timing Model

A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will seek more information, delaying their announcement. We test several expectations by examining data on when members of the House of Representatives announced their positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement. We also contrast the timing model with a vote model, and find that there are meaningful differences between the factors influencing the timing of position announcements and vote choice. Our research allows analysts to interpret the process leading up to the House action and the end state of that process.

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