Democracy Assistance and International Development Co-operation: What Have We Learned?

2000 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-168
Author(s):  
Carlos Santiso
2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M Scott ◽  
Ralph G Carter

As the USA initiated strategies of democracy promotion to support the spread of democracy, a key element involved democracy assistance. However, some states receive substantial commitments of US democracy aid while other states receive little or none, and the mix of democracy assistance varies in allocation between civil society and institutional channels. This study examines democracy aid allocation, focusing on the role of regime conditions on the targeting and composition of the aid. We disaggregate regime type to differentiate among non-democratic governments and argue that such differences affect both the amount of democracy aid and whether aid packages target government institutions or civil society channels. We theorize how these regime conditions shape allocations, controlling for donor interests and recipient features, and test our argument against US democracy aid allocations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from 1975 to 2010. We conclude with discussion of the implications of these findings.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 839-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Dillon Savage

Countries interested in the promotion of political development often provide aid in the form of democracy assistance. However, some regimes resist these attempts to promote democracy, introducing repressive measures to counteract their effectiveness. Hence, democracy assistance sometimes has the unintended consequence of curtailing democracy. This article explains how the size of the targeted regime’s military determines the effectiveness of democracy assistance and why it can sometimes result in lower levels of political freedom. Large militaries, often holding a privileged position in authoritarian regimes, will be threatened by political liberalization and its associated redistribution of resources. They will thus work with the regime to limit the effect of democracy assistance, while their size makes this repression more feasible. In states with smaller militaries, regimes have less incentive and capacity for repression, and democracy assistance is more successful at empowering democratic opposition. Cross-national statistical analysis of the United States Agency for International Development democracy assistance supports the argument.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801877239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik H. Wang ◽  
Yiqing Xu

Recent debates over the relative importance of democracy and state capacity for human development have led to the prevailing view that a strong state must be built before the introduction of democracy. Our research challenges this “sequencing approach” in international development. Using a global panel of countries over 50 years, we document that democracy has a substantial, positive causal effect on state capacity with identification strategies that adjust for pre-treatment dynamics. The state-enhancing effect of democracy is robust to alternative measures of key variables, a large set of time-varying confounders and an instrumental variable design that leverages variation in regional democratic diffusions. Subsequent analysis suggests contestation, rather than participation, as a potential causal mechanism. Our findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on sources of state capacity in the developing world and yield practical implications for democracy assistance.


Author(s):  
Bich Le Thi Ngoc

The aim of this study is to analyze empirically the impact of taxation and corruption on the growth of manufacturing firms in Vietnam. The study employed pooled OLS estimation and then instrument variables with fixed effect for the panel data of 1377 firms in Vietnam from 2005 to 2011. These data were obtained from the survey of the Central Institute for Economic Management and the Danish International Development Agency. The results show that both taxation and corruption are negatively associated with firm growth measured by firm sales adjusted according to the GDP deflator. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is linked with a reduction of 16,883 percentage points in firm revenue, over four and a half times bigger than the effect of a one-percentage point increase in the tax rate. From the findings of this research, the author recommends the Vietnam government to lessen taxation on firms and that there should be an urgent revolution in anti-corruption policies as well as bureaucratic improvement in Vietnam.


Author(s):  
David M. Webber

Having mapped out in the previous chapter, New Labour’s often contradictory and even ‘politically-convenient’ understanding of globalisation, chapter 3 offers analysis of three key areas of domestic policy that Gordon Brown would later transpose to the realm of international development: (i) macroeconomic policy, (ii) business, and (iii) welfare. Since, according to Brown at least, globalisation had resulted in a blurring of the previously distinct spheres of domestic and foreign policy, it made sense for those strategies and policy decisions designed for consumption at home to be transposed abroad. The focus of this chapter is the design of these three areas of domestic policy; the unmistakeable imprint of Brown in these areas and their place in building of New Labour’s political economy. Strikingly, Brown’s hand in these policies and the themes that underpinned them would again reappear in the international development policies explored in much greater detail later in the book.


2001 ◽  
Vol 42 (8) ◽  
pp. 29-30
Author(s):  
Deborah Rubin ◽  
Deborah Curo ◽  
Deborah Cahalen

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