Fourth Amendment update: the Supreme Court and strip searches:Safford Unified School District No. 1 v Redding

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-297
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.


2000 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonis Katsiyannis ◽  
Mitchell L. Yell

On March 3, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. During the school day, Garret required the services of a specially trained nurse to attend to his health needs. The school district, believing that they were not obligated under the IDEA to provide continuous one-on-one nursing care, refused to provide the services. The Supreme Court held that the school district had to pay for the nursing services Garret required when he was at school. This article analyzes the Supreme Court's ruling in this case and offers recommendations for educators and school administrators regarding the provision of complex health services to medically fragile students in special education.


Author(s):  
Ben A. McJunkin ◽  
J.J. Prescott

More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders using GPS devices. Many offenders will be monitored for life. The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as “civil” in character—and courts have seemed to agree. In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance. Grady left open the question whether the search—and the state’s technological monitoring program more generally—was constitutionally reasonable. This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.


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