scholarly journals Student Speech and Social Media: The Supreme Court Finally Enters the Fray

Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Extracurricular Activities ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
American Military ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Cyber Speech

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.

Under the Law: Regulating student speech in the Snapchat era

2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (6) ◽  
pp. 62-63
Author(s):  
Robert Kim
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Student Speech ◽  
School Time ◽  
The Law ◽  
The U.S

The upcoming case Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. will require the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on students’ rights to free speech on social media. The case involves a student who was disciplined for using foul language about her school’s cheerleading squad on Snapchat while off-campus and outside school time. Bob Kim traces the progress of the case so far and discusses what the case might mean for students and schools.

Moving beyond Brown: Race and Education After Parents v. Seattle School District No. 1

2011 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamel K. Donnor
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School District ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Students Of Color ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Community Schools ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Educational Advancement ◽  
Quality Learning ◽  
The U.S

Background By a 5–4 margin, the U.S. Supreme Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 declared that voluntary public school integration programs were unconstitutional. Citing the prospective harm that students and their families might incur from being denied admission to the high school of their choice, the Supreme Court declared that the plaintiffs, Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS), had a valid claim of injury by asserting a interest in not being forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions. Purpose The goal of the article is to discuss how conceptions of harm and fairness as articulated in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 privilege the self-interests of White students and families over the educational needs of students of color. Research Design This article is a document analysis. Conclusions By referencing the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision of 1954 (Brown I) to buttress its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that programmatic efforts to ensure students of color access to quality learning environments are inherently ominous. The dilemma moving forward for policy makers and scholars concerned with the educational advancement of students of color is not to develop new ways to integrate America's public schools or reconcile the gaps in the Supreme Court's logic, but rather to craft programs and policies for students of color around the human development and workforce needs of the global economy.

The Supreme Court and School Health Services: Cedar Rapids v. Garret F.

2000 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonis Katsiyannis ◽  
Mitchell L. Yell
Keyword(s):  
School District ◽  
Health Services ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
School Health ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
Nursing Services ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
School Day ◽  
Cedar Rapids ◽  
Trained Nurse

On March 3, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. During the school day, Garret required the services of a specially trained nurse to attend to his health needs. The school district, believing that they were not obligated under the IDEA to provide continuous one-on-one nursing care, refused to provide the services. The Supreme Court held that the school district had to pay for the nursing services Garret required when he was at school. This article analyzes the Supreme Court's ruling in this case and offers recommendations for educators and school administrators regarding the provision of complex health services to medically fragile students in special education.

Neutrality of the State and Regulation of Religious Symbols in Schools in Quebec and France

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Koussens
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
Cultural Integration ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
Immigrant Populations ◽  
State Neutrality ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference

The difference in attitudes towards the wearing of religious symbols in schools in France and Canada is symptomatic of the respective legal and political definitions of the official neutrality of the school institution and thus of way in which laicism is used to regulate religious pluralism and the “socio-cultural” integration of immigrant populations. In what ways is state neutrality put into practice, in Quebec and in France, as regards the judicial and political treatment of the wearing of religious symbols in public schools? The author proposes to examine the implementation of the liberal principle of neutrality by the French law dated 15 March 2004 on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada of 2 March 2006 to allow a young Sikh to wear his ritual kirpan at school.

The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion

1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Carroll
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Schools ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Local School ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Bible Reading

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, “the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. … Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer and state-prescribed Bible reading in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry, but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.

scholarly journals The Internet as a public place and a place of committing a prohibited act: Comments regarding the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland, case ref. no. IV KK 296/17

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 183-199
Author(s):  
Jan Kluza ◽  
Konrad Sączek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Space ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Public Place ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Way

The paper concerns the analysis of the possibility for classifying the Internet as a public place, which is of extraordinary legal significance with regard to the fulfilment of the criteria of many prohibited acts. Such a statement was presented by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland in its judgment of 17 April 2018, case ref. no. IV KK 296/17. This paper attempts to assess the standpoint of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland and the way it is reflected in various factual situations. To determine whether the Internet can constitute a public space in the sense of criminal law, several factors must be indicated, including, first of all, the application of an appropriate interpretation of the norms of criminal law. Internet jako miejsce publiczne popełnienia przestępstwa — uwagi na tle wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 17 kwietnia 2018 roku, sygn. akt IV KK 296/17Artykuł zawiera analizę możliwości zakwalifikowania Internetu jako miejsca publicznego, co ma swoje doniosłe znaczenie prawne dla spełnienia znamion wielu typów czynów zabronionych. Taką tezę zaprezentował Sąd Najwyższy w wyroku z dnia 17 kwietnia 2018 roku sygn. IV KK 296/17. Niniejszy tekst to próba oceny stanowiska Sądu Najwyższego oraz jego przełożenia na różnorakie stany faktyczne. W kwestii tego, czy Internet może stanowić miejsce publiczne w rozumieniu prawa karnego, trzeba wskazać na kilka okoliczności, przede wszystkim na zastosowanie właściwego sposobu wykładni norm prawa karnego.

scholarly journals PROBLEMS OF QUALIFICATION OF EXCITATION FOR HATEING OR ENMITY, AS ABA

2020 ◽  
pp. 35-40
Author(s):  
N.V. Tydykova
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
The Internet ◽  
The Supreme Court

The author analyzes the practice of applying this corpus delicti and notes two trends. The first is tounjustifiably expand the range of acts for which criminal liability arises. This practice does not find support inthe theory of criminal law and causes outrage in society. To overcome this problem, the Supreme Court gaveexplanations, according to which, for the imputation of the composition under consideration, it is necessaryto establish a number of circumstances, in addition to the fact of placing an image or text on the Internet. Thesecond trend of law enforcement practice unites cases of a more thoughtful approach, when a whole complexof circumstances is taken into account to solve the issue of the composition of the composition. Examples aregiven when, prior to the relevant clarifications of the Supreme Court in law enforcement practice, ideas wereexpressed about the need to analyze all the circumstances of the deed, in particular, the targeted orientationof the placement of materials. This led to the conclusion that the Supreme Court did not formulate new rules,but pointed to an approach that is the only true one in the light of the principle of subjective imputation.The author argues that not every dissemination of material can be recognized as aimed at inciting hatred orenmity from someone, or humiliating dignity. It is necessary, with the help of a number of signs, to determinewhich particular idea the person broadcast.

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