Kant and the philosophy of mind: perception, reason, and the self

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-231
Author(s):  
Matthew C. Altman

This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.


Author(s):  
Piotr Balcerowicz

Kundakunda and Umāsvāti are among the first philosophers in Jainism to lay foundations for of Jaina philosophy of mind. A key concept in their philosophy of mind is that of a cognitive faculty, located in and constitutive of the self. Cognitive faculties should be understood as processes or manners through which the self makes use of the physical sensory apparatus, as well as the actual application of the self’s cognitive potential. This chapter discusses the complex structures of cognitive faculties. Kundakunda takes the self, the cognitive subject, to consist in cognition, a claim which influences the way both thinkers classify cognitive faculties and the important distinction between perceptual experience and cognition.


Author(s):  
Anil Gomes ◽  
Andrew Stephenson

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. This brief introduction briefly introduces each of the essays and says something about how they are connected. The questions the essays address are central to any understanding of Kant’s Critical philosophy. They include: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in judgment? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe?


This chapter discusses feminist theories of embodiment. The theories provide a general account of the relations between bodies and selves. The philosophy of embodiment extends outside the social and political sphere to engage with debates in philosophy of mind/body, where attention to embodiment has extended beyond a simple reductionist picture of the relation between mind and brain, to consider an embodied self, embedded within an environment. The formation of embodied subjectivity as constitutive of the self, to which feminists have paid such careful attention, and the persisting interrogation of the appropriate way of understanding biological and social embodiment, has links with these debates. Feminist theorists discussed in this chapter argue that naturalising frameworks need supplementing with phenomenological, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic ones for a complete understanding of the embodiment of the female human body.


The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s Critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination and inner sense? What is the nature of the self, and in what ways are we aware of ourselves in self-consciousness? These essays showcase the depth of Kant’s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant’s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.


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